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ABSTRACT 
Decentralisation has been considered by many as one of the most important 
strategies in public sector reform in several of the developing countries. Both donors 
and governments have regarded decentralisation as a tool for national development 
through the realisation of the objectives of enhancing popular participation in 
development and the management of development at the regional or local level. 
Countries are expected to reap the benefits of decentralisation through improved 
service delivery, namely, through bringing service delivery closer to the consumers, 
improving the responsiveness of the central government to public demands and, 
thereby, reducing poverty and inequalities, improving the efficiency and quality of 
the public services and empowering lower levels of government to feel more 
involved and in control.  
However, decentralisation also has the potential to widen the gap in fiscal resources 
at the sub-national level and this may, in turn, result in inequities in service delivery 
to citizens of the same country and depending on where they live. Over the years 
Ghana has experimented with a mix of decentralisation reforms with the current 
policy integrating elements of political, administrative and economic 
decentralisation. The current system of local government in Ghana is based on a 
decentralisation programme that was launched in 1988 with the introduction of 
district assemblies (DAs) by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) 
government. Nevertheless, years after the launch of the decentralisation process there 
are still significant disparities and inequities between districts and regions in Ghana 
as regards health variables.  
This study set out to investigate the link between decentralisation and health 
inequities by exploring the spatial dimensions of health equities in Ghana.  The 
thesis used a concurrent mixed method approach by combining a quantitative 
inequality indices analysis and a qualitative analysis of interviews with policy 
makers in both the health sector and the decentralised system. The analysis used 
 
 
 
 
 xvii 
household level data from the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey  2003 and 
2008 to construct inequality curves and indices in order to illustrate the existing 
inequities across and within regions in Ghana after an increase in the intensity of 
decentralisation. The study then decomposed the indices to determine the extent to 
which these inequities were accounted for by variations both within the regions and 
between the regions. The thesis also used available data from the common fund 
records of district assemblies to assess the level of inequities in selected health 
resources across districts. The thesis then investigated the micro-foundations of 
health decentralisation using the qualitative and quantitative descriptive analyses.   
The analysis conducted revealed that inequities in maternal health utilisation 
decreased between 2003 and 2008 ‒ the two data points used based on the research 
design.  However, these inequities were attributed primarily to within region 
inequities as the level of between regions inequities was significantly lower for both 
the concentration index and the Theil’s index. However, although, at the regional 
level the general trend revealed that inequities had also decreased between 2003 and 
2008, some individual regions had recorded increases. The concentration index, 
which provided information on the gradient of the inequities, revealed that the health 
inequities in Ghana ‒ the total health inequities and also for both years between and 
within regions ‒ were pro rich. In the instances of the regional inequities these 
inequities generally manifested a pro rich nature, with the exception of the Upper 
East region which had showed pro poor inequities in 2008. The analysis of the 
district level inequities in selected health resources and as regards health facilities, 
doctors and nurses indicated that the distribution of these facilities favoured the 
richer districts as the inequities revealed a pro rich gradient. The inequities in the 
health facilities at the district level were highest in respect of the nurses, followed by 
doctors and health facilities with scores of 0.32, 0.29 and 0.084 respectively.  
The analysis of the qualitative data corroborated the results of the quantitative 
analysis as it emerged that policy makers at all levels believed that, over the years 
since the decentralisation, inequities had reduced, albeit marginally. The policy 
 
 
 
 
 xviii 
makers highlighted the high levels of the inequities in health resources, especially 
human resources, as a major area of concern.  However, they also raised major 
concerns regarding inequities within regions, arguing that a number of factors, 
including the nature of the decentralisation regime in Ghana, the variations in the 
economic strength of districts and certain political factors, continued to cause 
inequities within the decentralised system. They argued that these factors impacted 
on the ability of both districts and regions to address inequities at a local level. In 
addition, they also pointed to the need to re-examine the definition of inequities in 
the Ghana health sector, inequities which result from focusing the attention on a 
number of regions and areas to the detriment of others.  
Keywords: Inequity, decentralisation, concentration curves, concentration index, 
Theil’s Index, Ghana, districts, health care, public sector reforms, inequality
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
Decentralisation is considered by many as one of the most important strategies in the 
public sector reform agenda (Altman 2000; Smith 1997, p.1; Cerniglia 2003). The 
reason for this viewpoint is the fact that both donors and governments in sub-Saharan 
Africa have regarded decentralisation as a tool for national development through the 
realisation of the objectives of enhancing popular participation in local development, 
managing development at the regional or local level and promoting equity and 
national unity (Hoffman & Metzroth 2010). Decentralisation is expected to bring 
service delivery closer to the consumers, improve the responsiveness of the central 
government to public demands, thereby reducing poverty, improve the efficiency and 
quality of the public services and empower the lower levels of the governance 
structure to feel more involved and in control of their communities and localities 
development (Government of Ghana 1993; Ministry of Local Government 2010; 
Crook 1994, p.334).  
Ghana introduced decentralisation with a view to promoting grassroots participation, 
democracy and development and accelerating poverty reduction by moving the 
social services nearer to the people (Ayee 2000; Ayee 2002; Crook 1994). 
Decentralisation in Ghana dates back to the colonial era when the local governments 
which were set up comprised chiefs and traditional leaders (family heads and kings). 
These local governments represented a form of fiscal and administrative 
decentralisation. The colonial authorities mandated the chiefs to collect specific fines 
and taxes. The system was primarily for administrative and control purposes and 
involved, inter alia, the Municipal Ordinance of 1859 which resulted in the creation 
of just a few municipalities in the coastal towns (Inanga & Osei-Wusu 2004; 
Hoffman & Metzroth 2010).  The chiefs retained a portion of the revenues generated 
for the purposes of local development. Soon after the colonial era had ended and in 
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terms of the first republican constitution, the decentralisation process was formalised 
when the government of Kwameh Nkrumah promulgated the Local Government Act 
(Act 54 of 1961) (Inanga & Osei-Wusu 2004; Ayee 2002; Nkrumah 2000, p.55). 
This was in line with the international wave of decentralisation during the 1950s and 
1960s (Conyers 1985a). 
The next major wave of decentralisation in Ghana included the promulgation of the 
local government law ‒ PNDC Law 207 ‒ in late 1988 as part of the economic and 
structural reforms under the World Bank’s Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). 
The objective was to encourage local participation and decision making with the aim 
of finding solutions which would be applicable to the local problems because they 
had been suggested and implemented by the local people. This, in turn, led to 
popular participation in and better management of rural development than had 
previously been the case. The role of decentralisation as a means of national 
development was emphasised. It also used a wider variety of models than the 
colonial authorities had done when decentralisation had been used primarily as a tool 
for administration at the local level (Subramaniam 1980). Over the years Ghana has 
experimented with various decentralisation reforms, some of which have increased 
the intensity of decentralisation in terms of the availability of resources and the 
allocation of responsibilities.   
 
1.2 The Problem 
Decentralisation, if not properly implemented, may pose significant risks and 
challenges that may, in turn, lead to a deterioration in the provision of health services 
and, consequently, to poor health outcomes (Hoffman & Metzroth 2010; Lieberman 
2002; Schwartz Guilkey & Racelis 2002). In addition, decentralisation may also 
result in inequities as regards the service delivery to citizens of the same country, 
depending on where they live (Akramov & Asante 2008). While decentralisation 
may not necessarily lead to inequities, defined in this context as the inequalities 
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stemming from preventable socio-economic conditions, the devolution of revenue 
sources combined with the disparities in the endowments of regions are likely to lead 
to disparities in the fiscal resources at the sub-national level (Faguet 1997). These 
disparities may then exacerbate pre-existing gaps in the services in fiscally poor 
regions and thwart the national efforts at reducing poverty and realising the national 
goals. Public services that are maintained at the sub-national level, for example, 
primary health, education, housing and sanitation, are crucial in empowering the 
poor and lifting households out of debilitating poverty.  
Inequalities have severe implications for the welfare of the population, especially the 
poorer members of the society (Wagstaff 2002; Leon & Walt 2001; Smith, Bartley & 
Blane 2008). The persistence of inequalities makes it difficult to eliminate poverty 
because of the difficulties involved in providing members of the deprived groups 
with programmes of assistance. Deprived groups often face multiple disadvantages 
and discrimination and it is essential that these are confronted despite the seemingly 
impossibility of addressing them (Pauly 2008; Langer, Mustapha & Stewart 2007) . 
Health inequalities, in common with all other forms of inequalities, also have the 
potential to reduce social cohesion and, thus, resolving inequalities may lead to 
reductions in both violence and crime (Navarro 2000; Wilkinson 1999; Coburn 
2000). Governments throughout the world, especially in the developed countries, are 
continuing to attempt to address inequalities in health as many of the causes of such 
inequalities relate to policy issues such as taxation, employment, housing, education 
and local government (Wallace 2005).  
Several indices reveal both inequality and inequity in a number of socio-economic 
indicators in Ghana. In addition, much has been written on the socio-economic gap 
between the northern half of the country and the southern areas, especially with 
regards to levels of poverty and the allocation of health resources (Owens 2011; 
Ghana Statistical Service 2008; 2009; United Nations Development Programme 
2010; United Nations Development Programme 2012). Vanderpuye-Orgle (2002) 
established that regional disparities, especially between the northern and the southern 
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regions of Ghana, have increased since 1992 ‒ the year which saw the inception of 
the decentralisation policy. However, Vanderpuye-Orgle (2002) failed to provide a 
detailed description of the regional disparities and an assessment of the role which 
decentralisation had played in the increase in the disparities. Evidence available 
suggests that inequalities in terms of health variables persist between regions and 
districts (National Development Planning Commission 2012; United Nations 
Development Programme and Government of Ghana 2010). Nevertheless, in the area 
of health, decentralisation has been reported to have resulted in more equitable 
access to health care in Ghana, with this being attributed to both an increase in the 
budget allocations to districts and the more direct control by the districts of the 
spending decisions (Agyepong 1999). 
This thesis critically examines the link between decentralisation and inequities in the 
health care utilisation in Ghana in order to determine the effect of decentralisation on 
the health inequities in the country. This was achieved by analysing the effect of 
changes in the intensity of decentralisation on health inequities, using health 
inequality indices (Jiménez-Rubio, Smith & Van Doorslaer 2008; Zhong 2010). The 
study covered 20 years of decentralisation reforms in Ghana. The period selected 
ensured the availability of data and also covered a period of significant 
decentralisation reforms within the health sector. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Research Questions 
1.3.1 Objectives 
The overall research objective of the study is to explore the link between 
decentralisation and equity in health care utilisation by exploring the spatial 
dimension of equity in health in post-decentralised Ghana. The thesis realised this 
primary research objective by examining the inequities that exist in the utilisation of 
health services at the regional level. In addition, the study also decomposed the 
inequities in order to account for both intra and inter regional shares of the indices. 
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In order to fully understand the theoretical basis of health sector decentralisation the 
study also investigated the micro-foundations of health sector decentralisation and 
their impact on inequality by combining an extensive country-specific analysis with 
interviews with appropriate officials.   
1.3.2 Research Questions 
The study included two main research questions which were addressed by breaking 
them down into sub questions. The objectives of the first research question were 
achieved using quantitative methods whilst the second research question was 
addressed primarily using qualitative data.  
1. To what extent are changes in equity in the utilisation of maternal health 
services associated with decentralisation? 
a. What is the level of maternal health utilisation and what are the 
variations in maternal health utilisation across regions? 
b. What is the level of maternal health and related inequities in Ghana 
across districts and regions? 
c. To what extent are the observed health inequities in maternal health a 
reflection of either inter or intra regional variations? 
2. What are the factors that negatively influence the equitable utilisation of 
maternal health services in Ghana’s decentralised system?   
a. What is the level of decentralisation in both Ghana and within the 
health system and how has the intensity of decentralisation changed 
over time?  
b. What were the reasons for health sector decentralisation in Ghana?  
c. How is decentralisation perceived to have impacted on health 
inequities in Ghana? 
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d. What are the perceived threats to health equities within Ghana’s 
decentralised system? 
e. What is the prognosis of policy makers as regards decentralisation in 
Ghana’s health system if it is to positively influence the attainment of 
sectoral goals and achieve a reduction in inequities?  
1.4 Justification for the Study 
Decentralisation reforms have been implemented in Ghana for just over 25 years 
and, thus, there is sufficient relevant data available to query issues related to the 
effects and outcomes of decentralisation. In addition, there is also a body of, albeit, 
very limited quantitative and econometric work on decentralisation and its 
implications for equity in several countries (Uchimura & Jütting 2009) and that is 
especially significant for developing countries including Ghana.  The study will use 
methods that have been used mainly in developed countries in both a developing 
country and a new context. However, the study also improved the methods with the 
inclusion of new anthropometric measures and indicators to contextualise and 
enhance the analysis and understanding of issues. Thus, the study will contribute to 
the growing body of literature on the subject of decentralisation and the way in 
which it relates to the social sectors while also offering much needed theory building 
using empirical evidence on the role of decentralisation in influencing various 
aspects of health related inequity. 
Ghana is currently in the process of reviewing the existing policy on decentralisation 
and instituting a new policy that may confer on local government greater 
administrative and financial authority than is currently the case (Hoffman & 
Metzroth 2010). Despite the fact that political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation is highly constrained in Ghana, it is time to query the effect of more 
than 25 years of reforms on tangible outcomes in the social sectors. This, in turn, 
should inform modifications to and the implementation of the new policy as well as 
the direction of these modifications. The study will also contribute to filling a major 
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gap in the decentralisation theory as proposed by Zhong (2010) by providing an 
analysis of the micro-foundations of decentralisation policy in health from the 
perspectives of both practitioners and those responsible for implementing policy at a 
sub-national level.  
1.5 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
1.5.1 Decentralisation 
Defining the concept of decentralisation may depend on the specific approach 
applied. However, a basic definition that has been generally applied defines 
decentralisation as “the transfer of authority and power in planning, management, 
and decision-making from higher to lower levels of organisational control.”(Hanson 
1998, p.112) This definition is, to some extent, independent of subject matter and 
may be applicable in a cross-disciplinary analysis of decentralisation.  Mawhood 
(1983) defines decentralisation as the “sharing of part of governmental power by a 
central ruling group with other groups, each having authority within a specific area 
of the state”. This definition focuses particularly on the spatial dimensions of 
decentralisation and goes on to state that the process of decentralisation entails the 
sharing of central government powers with other institutions, especially those which 
are either geographically separated or responsible for specific functions, or those 
which have been given jurisdiction over specific physical locations.  
Makumbe (1998) identifies the following three fundamental areas in the 
decentralisation process, namely, power, authority and responsibility. Kasfir (1983) 
views decentralisation as a means by which authority and power are distributed 
horizontally rather than hierarchically while Work (2002, p.5) defines 
decentralisation as “the transfer of responsibilities for planning, management and 
resource raising and allocation from the central government and its agencies to the 
lower levels of government.” Mundial (1999, p.108) Mundial (1999, p.108) provides 
the following holistic definition of decentralisation: “the transfer of political, fiscal 
and administrative powers to sub national units of government.” Finally, Crook and 
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Manor (1998) and Ribot (2002) define decentralisation as a process by which a 
central government formally transfers powers to actors and institutions at lower, sub 
national levels in a political-administrative hierarchy. This definition, as culled from 
the public administration approach, has been used for evaluating the broad processes 
of decentralisation in developing countries (Cheema & Rondinelli 1983).  
1.5.2 Decentralisation in Health 
In broad terms decentralisation in health care entails the transfer of powers from a 
central authority (typically the national government) to more local institutions 
(Levaggi & Smith 2005). One of the most popular approaches to defining 
decentralisation in health care is the public administration approach which is 
summarised in the often-cited, four-part framework of delegation, deconcentration, 
devolution and privatisation (Cheema & Rondinelli 1983; Bankauskaite & Saltman 
2004; Bankauskaite & Saltman 2007). The inclusion of privatisation in the 
framework is often heavily disputed since as, in terms of this model, services are 
moved from the public sector to the private sector. Existing political conditions and 
specific aims and goals will, however, determine the exact form which 
decentralisation takes. The goals of health sector decentralisation include improving 
the efficiency, equity, accessibility, responsiveness, and quality of health service 
delivery and, ultimately, improving the health of a country’s population 
(Bankauskaite, Saltman & Vrangbaek 2004; Saltman, Bankauskaite & Vrangbæk 
2007; Conyers 1985b; Bossert 1998; Mills et al. 1990). 
Health care decentralisation usually encompasses most of the functions within the 
healthcare system. The only function that is often left untouched by decentralisation 
is strategic planning and policy making within the sector and this usually remains the 
domain of the central government (Saltman et al. 2007). Saltman et al. (2007, p.46) 
propose the following formal definition for decentralisation in health system, 
namely, “the transfer of formal responsibility and power to make decisions regarding 
the management, production, distribution and/or financing of health services, usually 
from smaller to larger number of geographically or organisationally separate actors”.  
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Decentralisation in the health system aims primarily at effecting changes in four key 
dimensional areas, namely, authority, accountability, capacity, and use of 
information alongside the key functional areas of political/legal, fiscal, and 
organisational with the aim of improving system performance, outcomes and overall 
health status (Tidemand 2010).  
1.5.3 Typology of Decentralisation 
Various conceptions for decentralisation exist and are usually based on the subject 
matter being discussed or the activity or process being decentralised.  Treisman 
(2002) identifies the following six conceptions of decentralisation, namely, vertical, 
decision-making, appointment, electoral, fiscal and personnel. Smoke (2003) and 
Work (2002), on the other hand, identify the three dimensions of decentralisation as 
political, institutional and fiscal. The literature often identifies the following four 
types of decentralisation, namely, deconcentration, delegation, devolution and 
deregulation, and based on the combination of the level of autonomy and location of 
accountability between local and central governments (Degefa 2003). This 
conceptualisation of decentralisation falls primarily within the public administration 
view of decentralisation. This thesis relies on a typology of decentralisation as 
presented in the literature and often used in health sector decentralisation.  
 
This typology is often described as administrative decentralisation and refers to the 
transfer of functional responsibilities to the local level. Writers such as Smoke 
(2003), Ribot (2007) and Work (2002) have applied the public administration view 
of decentralisation to the definition of the concept of decentralisation. This view 
seeks to redistribute the authority, responsibility and financial resources for 
providing public services between the various different levels of government. In 
other words, it is the transfer of the responsibility for the planning, financing and 
management of specific public functions from the central government and its 
agencies to field units of government agencies, subordinate units or levels of 
government, semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations, or area-wide, 
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regional or functional authorities. The three major forms of administrative 
decentralisation as identified in the literature are deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution. 
 
i. Deconcentration happens when central government allocates the 
responsibilities for specific activities or services to its regional branch offices. 
These regional offices may only implement decisions taken at the centre. 
Thus, in terms of deconcentration the authority in decision-making and 
management, as well as accountability, remains with the centre. This, in turn, 
implies that, as regards health systems, deconcentration involves a shift of 
power from the central office to the peripheral offices of the same 
administrative structure.  
 
ii. Devolution reflects a transfer of substantial authority from the central 
government to the local governments that are often elected by their 
constituents. Thus, the local governments are accountable to these 
constituents. Devolution often includes administrative, political and fiscal 
decentralisation with significant decision making powers (Lister & Betley 
1999). The areas of responsibility within a devolved system of government 
include finance and management decision-making and are often required to 
meet the developmental needs of the jurisdictions. As regards the health 
system devolution involves a shift of responsibility and authority from the 
central offices of the Ministry of Health to separate administrative structures 
within the public administration (e.g. local and provincial governments, and 
municipalities). 
 
iii. Delegation reflects the transfer of selected functions to a lower 
organisational level with local governments or agencies executing certain 
functions on behalf of the central government. Despite the fact that, to a large 
extent, decision-making lies with the local government or agencies in charge, 
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the central government remains ultimately accountable for the decisions. 
Litvack, Ahmad & Bird (1998) contend that delegation encompasses an 
inherent principal-agent relationship. In the health system this often takes the 
form of either contracting out or creating semi-autonomous entities to 
perform specific tasks within the health system such as the delivery of health 
care.  
 
1.5.4 Theories on Decentralisation and Inequality 
A major concern in the design and implementation of decentralisation policies is the 
need to ensure the efficient and equitable provision of services.  There is, thus, the 
need to determine the level of government which should be tasked with the 
responsibility of providing services if such services are to be efficient and equitable.  
A number of academics such as Oates (1972), Stigler (1957), Shah (2006) and; 
Eichenberger & Frey 2006) held various views on how this should be achieved.  
 
Stigler (1957) argued that the provision of services by government is best achieved 
when government is closest to and chosen by the people.  On the other hand, public 
choice theorists such as Oates (1972); Shah  (2006) & Olsom (1969) presented the 
argument that, in order to eliminate the free rider problem, political jurisdictions and 
benefit areas should coincide. Oates (1972) proposed the correspondence principle, 
which argues that the consumers of these services should bear the burden of cost of 
the services. This principle evolved into the Functional Overlapping and Competing 
Jurisdiction (FOCJ). Eichenberger & Frey (2006) argue that jurisdictions need to be 
organised on a functional basis in such a way that they overlap geographically but 
with consumers being free to choose from the competing jurisdictions. Oates (1972) 
presented the decentralisation theorem which stipulates that jurisdictions should 
internalise both the costs and the benefits of public goods. Additional arguments 
presented included the subsidiarity principle which states that the taxing, spending 
and regulatory functions that may be more effectively exercised at lower levels 
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should not be assigned to higher levels of government unless there is compelling 
evidence to do so (Shah 2006). Finally, the principle of residuality states that local 
governments should be assigned only those functions or responsibilities that the 
central government is neither willing nor able to perform (Shah 2006). 
 
As regards the relationship between local government and equity, applicable theory 
continues to be inconclusive on the way in which decentralisation affects equity and 
there has been no single reason suggested to explain the persistent inequities within a 
decentralised system. The pluralist theorists (Dahl 2005; Judge 1998) attempted to 
explain the persistence of inequities within a decentralised system by arguing that the 
very nature of democracy means that the various needs and demands of citizens will 
be met at different times and with varying degrees of success. However, elite 
theorists (Pareto 1935; Harding 1998; Mills 1956) disagree with this view, 
suggesting that inequalities are a consequence of the unequally distributed power 
which is vested in the hands of elite groups. On the other hand, the regime theory 
focuses on the significance of politics in society, presenting the argument that 
politics is organised in such a way that governments are less responsive to the needs 
of those groups that are socioeconomically disadvantaged (Judge, Stoker & Wolman 
1998; Elkin 1987).  Ecological theories, which do not attribute inequalities to either 
politics or a deliberate attempt not to meet the needs of specific groups, attribute the 
existence of inequalities to differences in the socioeconomic, demographic and even 
geographic characteristics of regions, districts, areas or neighbourhoods (Masotti & 
Lineberry 1976; Mosco 1996).  The political economy approach, which unifies a 
number of explanations, attributes the existence of inequalities in a decentralised 
system to the interaction between political and economic processes in society 
(Rondinelli, McCullough & Johnson 1989; Kolehmainen-Aitken 2000; Prud’Homme 
1995). According to this approach these factors threaten improved governance at the 
local level.  
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1.5.5 Measuring Health Inequalities 
The concept of inequity is broadly based on the ethical notion of distributive justice. 
There is a close relationship between the concepts of inequality and disparities. The 
term health disparity reflects differences in the health status of groups and is often 
used interchangeably with the term health inequalities (Braveman & Gruskin 2003). 
On the other hand the term inequities is often used to describe differences (disparities 
and inequalities) that are of preventable nature and which are, thus, deemed to be 
unfair of unjust (Braveman & Gruskin 2003). Researchers have defined health 
inequities as variations in the health of individuals or groups and which are deemed 
to be both unjust and systemic (Dahlgren & Whitehead 1991; Whitehead 1991; 
Kawachi, Subramanian & Almeida-Filho 2002).  These inequities in health may be 
analysed in terms of a number of dimensions; outcomes, utilisation and access to 
services. Thus, any measurement of health inequities starts with the measurement of 
health inequalities. 
The following four main models have been used for measuring health inequalities, 
namely, the behavioural, materialist, psychosocial and life course models (Bartley 
2004; Lohan 2007). The behavioural model attribute inequalities in health to the 
differing cultural attitudes to health and related health behaviours (Stronks & Mheen 
1996; Blane 1995; Smith et al. 1990; Blane 1985; Lantz, Lynch & House 2001).  
Both the materialist and the psychosocial models provide an insight into the causes 
of inequalities at both the individual and the societal levels (Lohan 2007). At the 
individual level the materialist argue that an individual’s access to tangible material 
goods and conditions that are associated with exposures that are either damaging to 
or protective of health (Bartley 2004; Adamson, Ebrahim & Hunt 2006).  On the 
other hand, these two models attribute inequalities at the societal level to factors such 
as a society’s ability to invest in health and social care, education and public 
transport ‒ all of which may affect the health of the population of that society (Lynch 
et al. 2000; Adamson et al. 2006; Lohan 2007).  The psychosocial model also 
attributes differences in health to the impact of adverse psychological exposures at 
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both the individual level and the level of the society.  Finally, the lifecourse model 
does not provide a unique set of explanations for inequalities but incorporates 
elements of the materialist, psychological and behavioural models already discussed. 
The lifecourse model argues that the health status at any given age for a given birth 
cohort reflects an amalgamation of contemporary conditions and is an embodiment 
of prior life conditions from in utero onwards (Kawachi et al. 2002).  
1.5.6 Evidence on Decentralisation and Health Inequalities 
Although limited, empirical evidence on the effects of decentralisation in the health 
sector remains mixed. This section discusses such evidence on decentralisation and 
inequities in health. In the case of Argentina, Habibi, Huang, Miranda, Murillo, 
Ranis, Sarkar & Stewart, (2001) used a panel of 23 Argentine provinces over a 25 
year period to provide evidence that revenue decentralisation had a significant 
impact on decreasing infant mortality.  Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2001) 
similarly discovered that countries in which local governments manage a higher 
share of public expenditures tended to have lower mortality rates. Khaleghian (2003) 
noted that expenditure decentralisation was positively related to improved health 
outcomes in both low and middle income countries, while Robalino et al. (2001) 
posited that decentralisation may lead to increases in regional disparities in health 
expenditures as a result of the absence of a mechanism to transfer resources from 
rich to poor jurisdictions.  
In a comparative study, Bossert, Larrañaga, Giedion, Arbelaez, & Bowser (2003) 
investigated the link between decentralisation and equity in resource allocation in 
Colombia and Chile. The study revealed that decentralisation, under certain 
conditions and with certain specific policy mechanisms, may improve the equity in 
resource allocation. In both Columbia and Chile equitable levels of per capita 
financial allocations at the municipal level were achieved through the use of 
allocation formulae, adequate local funding choices and horizontal equity funds.   
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Wagstaff (2005) pioneered the use of inequality curves and indices to answer the 
question as to whether income-related inequalities in the health sector are the result 
gaps between poor and less poor areas rather than the result of differences between 
poor and less poor people within areas. In the case of Vietnam it was discovered that 
inequality between provinces increased with decentralisation. 
Jiménez-Rubio et al. (2008) used the concentration curve decomposition analysis 
technique pioneered by Wagstaff (2005) to explore health inequities in a 
decentralised setting using Canadian Community Health Survey data from 2001.  
This survey was the first wave of a nationally representative health survey of 
individuals aged 12 years and over living in Canada. The results showed that, within 
area variation was the most important source of income-related health inequalities, 
while income-related inequities in health care use were driven primarily by 
differences between provinces. Zhong (2010) expanded on the study by Jiménez-
Rubio et al. (2007) using the perfectly decomposable Theil’s Index after a change in 
the degree of decentralisation had revealed that the level of within province 
inequality in the use of doctor services in Canada had reduced. In addition, there was 
also a lower level of between provinces inequalities in the utilisation of three other 
health services examined.  The overall results showed that inequity in health care 
utilisation in Canada is may be explained primarily by variations within provinces.  
1.5.7 Synthesis of Theory  
Thus, in assessing the impact of the political reforms of decentralising on inequalities 
in Ghana’s health sector, this thesis combines a number of theoretical perspectives. 
The ecological and political economy approaches as governance theories are 
positioned within a materialistic explanation for health inequities.  
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1.6 Research Methods 
1.6.1 Research Design 
The study used a mixed methods research design, comprising the following two 
phases, namely, a quantitative, econometric analysis of survey data from the 2003 
and 2008 Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS) and a qualitative analysis 
of the information gathered from field interviews. Qualitative and quantitative 
methods and data are often more powerful when combined, at different levels and in 
different sequences (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004).  Combining the methods 
enables the use of one method for the purposes of verifying or refuting the results 
obtained using the other method. For example, a qualitative investigation may be 
used to triangulate survey results and explain the relationships/trends/patterns which 
emerge from a survey (Garbarino & Holland 2009). This study used the qualitative 
research approach to enrich the analysis of the relationships, trends and patterns that 
emerged from the analysis of the survey data.  
The first phase of the study was an econometric analysis of household level data on 
health inequities from within and across jurisdictions. This involved conducting an 
inequality indices analysis to illustrate health inequities in Ghana.  The index was 
then decomposed in order to determine the magnitude of the inequities that could be 
attributed to inter, as opposed to, intra jurisdictional disparities. The second phase 
combined a quantitative analysis of the data gathered and a qualitative analysis using 
the primary data gathered from the semi-structured interviews to conduct a review of 
the health sector decentralisation process. The quantitative and qualitative methods 
were applied for the purpose of triangulation as well as to complement each other by 
enriching the study with the extensive information which had been gathered from the 
depth of the data provided from the interviews.  
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1.6.2 Methods of Data Analysis 
The quantitative data was analysed using descriptive analysis tools in order to fully 
understand the situation in Ghana. A statistical software package (STATA) was used 
to conduct both the regression analysis and the descriptive analysis.  
In order to understand the micro-foundations of health decentralisation, the grounded 
theory analytical approach was used to analyse the qualitative data. This approach 
allowed the researcher to clearly determine and outline the major concerns of policy 
makers in addressing the issue of decentralisation, specifically in the health sector. 
The grounded theory approach is used by a researcher to achieve the four basic 
functions of theory research as identified by Denzin and Lincoln (2000; 2005), 
namely, the initiation, refocusing, reformulating and clarification of a theory even in 
situations where little is known about the issues in question (Hutchinson 2001). 
1.7 Scope 
This study focused on the issue of decentralisation and its impact on horizontal 
health inequities in maternal health utilisation. This was achieved by investigating 
how decentralisation has affected both inter and intra-regional health inequities in 
Ghana. As a result of the nature of decentralisation in Ghana and the availability of 
data, the study was able to do to do this by examining both the regional and the 
district levels. In order to contextualise the analysis adequately the study provided a 
description of the inequalities as regards selected variables.  
1.8 Organisation of the Study 
The study was organised into eight chapters as follows:  
Chapter One (Introduction) introduces the study by clarifying the relationship 
between decentralisation and health inequalities. The chapter also contains the 
introduction and background to the study. In addition, the chapter touches on issues 
such as research motivation, problem statement and research questions.  
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Chapter Two (Decentralisation, Poverty Reduction and Inequality: Towards a 
Conceptual Framework): addresses the theoretical and conceptual foundations of 
decentralisation as it relates to inequities. The aim of this chapter was to provide a 
background to the study and build a logical framework for the study.   
Chapter Three (Literature Review: Decentralisation and Health Inequality) reviews 
relevant empirical literature on decentralisation and inequality in health. 
Accordingly, the literature review discusses inequities and inequalities in health and 
discusses studies that link decentralisation and inequality/inequities as they pertain to 
the health sector.  
Chapter Four (Methodology and Econometric Model) discusses the research design 
used in the study and focuses on the methods and techniques which the study used to 
realise the research objectives. Accordingly, the chapter contains a discussion of the 
study context, a detailed description of the data sources and the data collection 
instruments and techniques used for, an econometric model and estimation 
techniques.   
Chapter Five (The District Assembly and Health System Nexus in Ghana) contains a 
review of the decentralisation process in Ghana, a discussion of Ghana’s health 
sector and an assessment of health sector decentralisation in Ghana. Combining 
desktop research and interview responses, this chapter also explores the views of 
both policy makers in the health sector and also those who work in the decentralised 
structures at all levels.  
Chapter Six (Inequities in Maternal Health Utilisation: Measurement and 
Decomposition) focuses on estimation, analysis and diagnostic tests for the 
econometric model. The chapter contains a descriptive analysis of health 
inequalities, an estimation of the econometric model discussed in Chapter four and 
the computation and decomposition of health inequality indices. Statistical tests were 
conducted on the research results to ensure their relevance, significance, robustness 
and accuracy. The results were then elucidated using tables and charts.  
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Chapter Seven (A Qualitative Analysis of Inequity in Ghana’s Decentralised Health 
System) presents an analysis of the qualitative data gathered from the interviews. 
These discussions with policy makers provide an answer to the question regarding 
the effect of decentralisation on inequities in health. In addition, the chapter also 
examines the threats, if any, to inequities that exist in Ghana’s decentralised system.  
Chapter Eight (Conclusion) summarises the previous chapters and draws conclusions 
based on the analyses discussed in those chapters. The chapter also makes relevant 
policy recommendations, thus indicating the usefulness of the study to both the 
country and the research community. The chapter then positions the study within 
current theoretical and empirical debates, thus highlighting the empirical, policy and 
theoretical contributions of the study.  
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Chapter 2  
Decentralisation, Poverty Reduction and Inequality: Towards a Conceptual 
Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
The single, most important rationale underlying local government and decentralised 
administration worldwide is to ensure the efficient and equitable provision of 
services to citizens. In several national contexts the provision of water, sanitation, 
public education, health services and other services has treated as local government 
functions.  The issue of concern that has remained a subject of intellectual debate for 
some time is the way in which the efficient and equitable delivery of services may be 
accomplished in local government and decentralised administration and whether, in 
practice, this has been attained. Yet another issue of concern is the underlying 
explanation for the observed patterns of efficiency and inequality.  
The chapter provides a coherent theoretical framework for the study by clearly 
outlining concepts and theories that aid in the understanding of the research problem. 
This is achieved by examining the various theoretical and conceptual issues relating 
to the efficient and equitable delivery of public services. The chapter then specifies 
the theories that would best explain the observed inequalities in health delivery under 
Ghana’s decentralised local government system and indicates a conceptual 
framework for the purposes of the research study. These are then unified in a 
conceptual framework in terms of which inequities in health in Ghana’s 
decentralised system will be analysed. The conceptual framework outlines the 
approach that was adopted to analysing inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system.  
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2.2 Theoretical Understanding of Local Government  
A theory is used to explain, predict, master and understand relationships, events, 
and behaviours. “A theory is a set of interrelated concepts which structure a 
systematic view of phenomena for the purpose of explaining or predicting” (Liehr 
& Smith 1999). Theories make generalisations about observations and, as stated 
above, consist of an interrelated, coherent set of ideas and models. The theoretical 
framework forms the structure that supports the underlying theory of a thesis, 
presenting the specific theory or theories which explains the reason why a specific 
problem both exists and persists and, finally, providing the basis on which a 
particular research study is conducted. A well-formulated theoretical framework 
helps the researcher to clearly identify the variables of a study and provides a 
general framework as a basis for the data analysis (Torraco 1997).  
2.2.1 Basic Concepts of Optimal Efficiency and Jurisdictional Design 
The first issue in the debate on efficient service delivery by local government and 
decentralised administration centres on the jurisdictional design. Simply stated, the 
question is what level of government may best fulfil the goal of the efficient 
allocation of services so strongly desired in service delivery? The first indication 
may be found in what has now been generally termed as Stigler’s menu. Stigler 
(1957) established two principles of jurisdictional design. According to one of these 
principles, the representative government that works the best is the one that is closest 
to the people. The other principle is that people should be given the electoral 
mandate that empowers them to vote for the quantity and quality of public services 
they desire. The import of these principles is that, in order to achieve the efficient 
allocation of services in service delivery, decisions should be taken at the lowest 
level of government appropriate to this goal. The optimal size of the jurisdiction for 
the delivery of each service will vary according to the economy of scale and cost-
benefit considerations. While some services, on the basis of economy of scale and 
cost-benefit considerations, may be delivered at the local government level, others 
would be more efficiently delivered at the regional or equivalent government level. 
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Unlike Stigler’s menu, the principle of fiscal equivalency equates political 
jurisdiction with the benefit area in the optimal jurisdiction design. The principle of 
fiscal equivalency is closely associated with the public choice theorists, in particular, 
Olson (1969). Olson’s premise is that it is critical that the political jurisdiction and 
the benefit area are one and the same in order both to eliminate the free rider 
problem and to ensure that the marginal benefit is equivalent to the marginal cost of 
production so as to ensure the optimal provision of public services (Olson 1969). The 
principle of fiscal equivalency may require that each public service be provided by a 
separate jurisdiction (Shah 2006). 
The correspondence principle, first proposed by Oates (1972), bears a close 
resemblance to the public choice principle of fiscal equivalency. The correspondence 
principle states that the jurisdiction that provides a particular public good should 
comprise the group of people who consume the good and carry the cost of 
production of that good. Strictly applied, this principle would result in a large 
number of overlapping jurisdictions. 
The correspondence principle for ensuring the optimal level for the provision of 
public goods was further developed by Frey & Eichenberger (1996; 1995; 2006) into 
the concept of Functional Overlapping and Competing Jurisdiction (FOCJ). 
According to FOCJ, it is not necessary for service jurisdictions to be organised on 
the basis of geographical territories. They could, instead, be organised on a 
functional basis in such a way that they could overlap geographically but leave 
consumers free to select from among competing jurisdictions. However, if the FOCJ 
is to be effective, the following two conditions should exist. The jurisdiction should 
exercise full authority over its members as well as the power to raise the taxes 
required for the delivery of the public good (Shah 2006). 
The decentralisation theorem, which was developed by Oates (1972, p.55), stipulates 
that each public good should be delivered by the jurisdiction exercising control over 
the minimum geographic area that would internalise the costs and benefits of the 
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public good. Several underlying reasons support this theorem. Firstly, these 
jurisdictions would have a greater understanding for the needs of local people. 
Secondly, in the main, local decisions are responsive to the beneficiaries of the 
service provided and this, in turn, promotes fiscal responsibility and efficiency. 
Thirdly, they eliminate unnecessary layers of jurisdiction and, finally, they promote 
inter jurisdiction (Shah 2006) competition and innovation. The decentralisation 
theorem has the potential for some limited central control or compensatory grants in 
the provision of public goods when spatial externalities, economies of scale and 
administrative and compliance costs so require (Shah 2006) 
The subsidiarity principle which, according to Shah (2006), may be attributed to the 
social teachings of the Catholic Church provides yet another basis for the 
jurisdictional design for efficient service provision by local government. According 
to this principle, the taxing, spending and regulatory functions that may be more 
effectively exercised at the lower levels of government should not be assigned to 
higher levels of government unless there is compelling evidence for such a step. 
Shah (2006) explains that the subsidiarity principle was adopted as a guiding 
principle by the Maastricht Treaty as the basis for assigning responsibilities to 
members of the European Union. 
The principle of residuality is the direct opposite of the principle of subsidiarity. This 
principle, which is applicable mainly in unitary states, provides that local 
governments are assigned only those functions or responsibilities that the central 
government is neither willing nor able to perform (Shah 2006). 
2.2.2 Optimal Efficiency and Private Provision of Services 
The management of public service delivery in both developed as well as developing 
countries is often faced with monumental management problems because of general 
public disillusionment with the performance of the public sector bureaucracies 
(Elcock 2004). This disillusionment with the state controlled provision of public 
goods inevitably opened the way for exploring alternative modes for the provision of 
 
 
 
 
  
 
24 
public goods (Gargan 1997). One such mode has been a market-oriented approach in 
terms of which the principle is to offer the consumer a choice of where to go to 
obtain a service. This has the advantage of promoting competition between service 
providers as regards making them more attractive to the clients they serve. The 
private sector approach has seen both non-profit and for-profit providers using a 
variety of market models as a substitute for the direct provision of services at either 
the national or local level. 
It was assumed that the adoption of private sector approaches would enhance 
productivity efficiency and also improve the allocation of services as market 
decisions are assumed to be more efficient than the decisions of huge state 
bureaucracies (Nickson 2006). The IMF and World Bank directed Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) of the 1980s and 1990s pointed to a reduction in the 
dominant role of the state in Africa as the primary strategy for stimulating economic 
growth and efficiency. Accordingly, the SAP adopted a two-pronged approach to 
reducing the role of the public sector in the economy (Nickson 2006). 
According to Nickson & Alam (2006, p.26) this two-pronged approach “involved the 
transfer of responsibility for service provision both horizontally to the private sector 
through greater private sector participation and vertically to local government 
through decentralisation”. It was anticipated that this two-way strategy would realise 
two objectives. It was expected that the transfer of responsibility for service 
provision to the private sector would increase productive efficiency by breaking 
down natural monopoly and enhancing competition (Alam & Nickson 2006, p.27) 
while, at the same time, the transfer of the function of providing public services to 
local government would enhance the efficient allocation of services (Alam & 
Nickson 2006 p.27). 
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2.2.3 Efficiency and the new Public Management 
The notion of increased private sector participation in service delivery at the local 
government level was not new as it may be traced to the return to conservative 
policies during the Thatcher years (1970–79) in the United Kingdom. The dominant 
conviction was that the public provision of services was both inefficient and 
ineffective and that public officials were more concerned with their own interests 
rather than the needs of the service users. As a result, the conservative policy 
response was the privatisation and marketisation of public services (McLaughlin, 
Osborne & Ferlie 2002). 
The concept of the minimal state enjoyed a new resurgence. This concept implied 
that the state was a necessary evil and, thus, the role of the state was, essentially, to 
provide an enabling environment. The state should plan and finance public services 
but the actual provision of such services was to be assigned to the independent 
sector, comprising the voluntary and community sectors as well as the private for-
profit and non-profit sectors. The new focus was on market disciplines as a solution 
to the inefficient service delivery by the public sector. Marketisation and 
privatisation were the new strategies in the provision of effective public services 
(McLaughlin et al. 2002).  
At the intellectual level this trend of injecting market efficiency into public service 
delivery gave birth to a new movement in public administration which has come to 
be known as the New Public Management (NPM) (McLaughlin et al. 2002). The 
basic concerns of the NPM are simple but strategically important. 
Firstly, public administration should have the capacity to secure the economically 
efficient and effective provision of public goods. Secondly, the public sector and 
ministries should promote competition in the provision of public services and, 
thirdly, there should be a much stronger reliance on private sector management 
techniques on account of their superiority over state-centred management than was 
previously the case (McLaughlin et al. 2002). 
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2.3 Local Government and Equity 
The dual objective of ensuring efficiency and equity in the delivery of public goods 
by local government inevitably requires careful scrutiny of the equity aspect of the 
problem. A central issue in decentralised administration is the way in which to 
ensure equitable distribution in the process of delivering public services to 
population groups and geographical areas (Bingham & Hedge 1991). The issue of 
equitable distribution has assumed such a central position in public service delivery 
that equity now constitutes a major pillar in the citizens’ evaluation and assessment 
of the way in which their local governments implement their programmes (Morgan 
& England 1996). 
No matter where citizens live in a decentralised district or municipality they expect 
good education for their children as well as water and sanitation and health services 
that respond promptly to their needs (Elcock 2004). Citizens do not consider patent 
differentials in the provision of public goods provision to different communities as 
an option in the performance of local government functions. 
Nevertheless, the issue of equity in service delivery immediately raises difficult 
definitional issues (Bingham & Hedge 1991). There are, in essence, three different 
ways in which equity may be considered. Morgan & England (1996) identify these 
three ways as equal opportunity, market equity and equal results. 
Equal opportunity implies that all citizens receive the same level of services while 
market opportunity involves the delivery of public service in proportion to the taxes 
paid by citizens. The equal results approach requires an agency such as a local 
authority to allocate its resources in such a way that the living conditions of people 
are the same. The definitions suggested by Morgan (Morgan & England 1996) 
replicate closely what Bingham and Hedge (1991) had identified much earlier, thus 
suggesting that there is little controversy about the appropriate approach to equity in 
local government as regards service delivery. 
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Bingham and Hedge (1991) and Morgan and England (1996) concur that, today, 
people generally tend to favour the equal opportunity approach to equity in service 
delivery. The market opportunity approach is considered to be a more conservative 
approach while the equal results approach is perceived as more being focused on 
change or as liberal in nature (Morgan & England 1996). In the main this research 
study adopts the equal opportunity interpretation. 
2.3.1 An Assessment of Decentralisation Inequality and Poverty Reduction 
The differentials in service provision have long been an issue in local government, 
especially in the multiracial municipalities in the United States where there have 
been court cases held about the differences in the municipal services provided to 
black and white neighbourhoods (Bingham & Hedge 1991). Invariably, the judges 
have ruled that differences in the services provided to black and white 
neighbourhoods violated the equal protection clause contained in the Fourth 
Amendment (Bingham & Hedge 1991), thus suggesting that, in a decentralised 
administration, public services should be available equally to all citizens (Bingham 
& Hedge 1991). 
Inequalities in service delivery are a common occurrence in developing countries and 
service differentials in decentralised administration have been extensively studied. In 
their study of the Filariasis control programme in India,  Baru,  Rama,  Gopal & 
Meena (2006) observed wide differentials in outcomes in three major decentralised 
units, namely, Kerala, Varanasi and Rajamundhry (Baru et al. 2006). The study 
noted that there were significant variations in both the coverage and effectiveness of 
services across the three sites. The treatment coverage was the highest in Kerala and, 
as compared to Kerala, much lower in Varanasi and Rajamundhry (Baru et al. 2006). 
A careful scrutiny of the explanation for the different health outcomes in the three 
decentralised units in India underscore the fact that decentralisation in itself had 
contributed very little to closing the pre-existing socio-economic inequality gaps. In 
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fact, if anything, decentralisation had perpetuated the inequalities that had been in 
existence before. 
According to Baru et al. (2006), the accessibility, availability and quality of health 
services varied across the three decentralised units and this, to a large extent, 
influenced the coverage of the filariasis programme in these three areas. Kerala had a 
better health services outreach than the other units, Rajamundhry was somewhere in 
the middle but, in Varanasi, the health services outreach was poor (Baru et al. 2006). 
The number of posts that were not filled at all levels in the health service was higher 
in Varanasi than in either Kerala or Rajamundhry. 
A similar study on a poverty alleviation programme in the Indian state of Utar 
Pradesh showed that pre-existing inequalities had exerted considerable influence on 
poverty outcomes, thus leading the researcher to conclude that a higher degree of 
inequality was generally associated with the poor performance (Srivastava 2006). 
The researcher also concluded that a lesser degree of social and economic inequality 
among decentralised units is good for local level democracy (Srivastava 2006). 
2.3.2 Is Decentralisation an Effective Instrument for Reducing Poverty and 
Inequality? 
In the light of the emerging evidence of the apparent association between 
decentralised government and inequalities in both developed and developing 
countries it is clear that the issue should be subjected to further intellectual probing.  
The main issue of concern of such probing should be whether decentralisation is an 
effective means of addressing poverty and inequality. Crook and Sverrisson (2001) 
provided a helpful framework for addressing this issue. According to them, several 
angles may be pursued, including pro-poor growth, social equity, human 
development and spatial or inter-regional inequality. Of these the most relevant in 
the context of this thesis is spatial and inter-regional inequality. Spatial and inter-
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regional inequality often translates into inequality between culturally defined groups 
in the developing countries. 
Devas (2006) examined the potential of decentralisation to serve as an effective tool 
for reducing poverty and inequality and curbing political corruption. Earlier studies 
conducted by Blair (2000) and Crook (2003) had also examined the same issue. The 
results of these studies did not point to any clear-cut conclusion that decentralisation 
has had an impact on reducing poverty and inequality ‒ a surprising finding in view 
of the very high hopes that donors had had that the closer the decision-making was to 
the people, the greater would be the responsiveness of such decisions to local needs 
and accountability. Indeed, some studies have increased the hope that decentralised 
administration would facilitate the accelerated achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (Kiyaga-Nsubuga 2007).  
However, the reality is that the empirical research on decentralisation and its impact 
on the reduction of poverty and inequality have produced very mixed results. This 
implies it would be unwise for any policy-maker or scholar to categorically defend 
decentralisation as an effective tool for addressing poverty and inequality. 
The study conducted by Blair (2000), which was a cross-national research study on 
democratic decentralisation in six developing countries, established that in some of 
the countries studied, decentralisation had impacted positively on participation and 
accountability but had had very little effect on inequality and poverty. Crook and 
Manor (1998) performed a similar study in India, Bangladesh, Cote D’Ivoire and 
Ghana. The results were similarly mixed for the study found that the delivery of 
public services had improved in most of the countries studied but was particularly 
good in Karnataka, India (Crook & Manor 1998). 
On the other hand, the study found the citizens’ satisfaction with the responsiveness 
of local government ranged from good in Karnataka (India) to poor in Ghana (Crook 
& Manor 1998). Thus, while some poor groups had benefited from decentralisation, 
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others were unlikely to derive any benefit (Crook & Manor 1998). Other studies 
have produced the same mixed outcomes (Crook 2003; Crook & Sverrisson 2001). 
It would, thus, appear that decentralisation alone will not rectify any pre-existing 
socio-economic inequalities and, indeed, is more likely to perpetuate or even 
aggravate such inequalities. It would, therefore, seem that the very high hopes pinned 
on decentralisation as a instrument for alleviating poverty and inequality may have 
been misplaced and decentralisation has not had the socially expected impact it was 
hoped to have in the past. This thesis aims to provide evidence of the current 
situation.   
2.4 Theoretical Explanations for Decentralisation and Persistent Poverty 
and Inequalities 
However, if decentralisation has been ineffective in addressing poverty and 
inequality and if differences in service provision continue, even with decentralised 
government, there must be theoretical explanations for the continuing differences. 
These theoretical explanations have been extensively addressed within the literature 
on American urban politics with race preference, class preference, power elite 
theory, ecological theories and decision-rule explanations emerging as the most 
common explanations (Bingham & Hedge 1991; Judge et al. 1998). However, while 
some of the theories may be relevant to an African country such as Ghana others 
may not be as relevant.  
It is important to discuss the leading theories with a view to identifying those that 
best explain the inequality in health outcomes in Ghana ‒ the research topic of this 
thesis. 
2.4.1 Pluralism Theory 
The founding father of pluralist theory is Robert A. Dahl (1961), who sought to 
reject radical left theories which suggested that inequalities in democratic societies 
such as the United States of America were the purposive and even deliberate design 
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of the powerful classes or the elite (Judge et al. 1998). In his classic work, Who 
governs? Democracy and power in an American city: New Haven (1961) Dahl 
argued that, in a democratic society, even if there is dispersal of power in so far as 
several groups, and not one group or even a few groups, control the power resources 
even if the demands articulated by each are not necessarily or successfully acted 
upon, democracy does have merit in it is a system in which power is fragmented 
rather than concentrated. 
Different groups will articulate their demands in different sectors at different times 
and with varying degrees of success. The exercise of political power is not embedded 
in formal institutions only such as elections and representative bodies (Dahl 1961). 
The fact that decision-making is disaggregated and the outcome of the bargaining 
process is uncertain binds citizens and their groups to the process (Dahl 1961). 
According to Robert Dahl, no one group may permanently wield political power in a 
democratic society to the eternal detriment of all other groups. It is in embedded in 
the very nature of democracy that all groups share power in different circumstances 
(Dahl 1961). According to Judge (1998), after this classical formulation of the theory 
by Dahl different versions of pluralism came into existence. The central argument, 
however, remained unchanged. 
2.4.2  Elite Theory 
In its classical formulation by two Italian sociologists, Mosca (1939) and Pareto 
(1935), elite theory proposes that power inequality is a fact of life. Liberal 
democracy does, indeed, possess positive characteristics such as universal franchise 
and free competition. However, these make no difference to the reality of elite rule. 
Liberal democracy provides a means for replacing one group of elites with another 
only. Michels (1938), who was a student of Mosca and Pareto, argued that power 
inequality existed even in democratic organisations that were committed to 
egalitarian goals, in particular, socialist political parties and trade unions. Elite 
theorists argue that, regardless of the widely avowed democratic ideals of 
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egalitarianism, elites are critical for the management of increasingly complex 
societies. In other words, technocratic elites are a critical requirement for the 
effective management of complex and modern societies (Harding 1998). 
Mills (1956) perceived the growth of the power elite as the inevitable consequence of 
modern historical trends although it is neither natural nor desirable. Mills (1956) 
maintained that, as the pluralists argued, there had been a time in the past when 
power had been dispersed in the United States of America. This was attributable to 
the existence of a large number of small-scale leaders in business, politics and 
military affairs who had shared power with leaders from other institutional spheres 
such as the family, church and school. As a consequence of the increasing 
bureaucratisation of power there had developed an interconnection between large 
business corporations, the central executive machinery of government and the 
military establishment (Mills 1956). The final product had been a military/industrial 
complex in which a few top decision-makers in the three key power domains had had 
the opportunity to monopolise crucial decision-making as a result of their control 
over vast physical, financial, political and intellectual resources (Mills 1956). 
The emphasis in elite theory is that power is unequally distributed in society and is 
concentrated in the hands of a few elites. Accordingly, political, social and economic 
inequality is real, even in liberal democratic societies. 
2.4.3 Regime Theory 
Stoker (1995) explained that the central notion of regime theory is that politics is 
important. In this sense regime theory is opposed to all kinds of determinism ‒ 
social, economic or political. The basic premise of regime theory is that decision-
makers have a relative autonomy. However constraining systemic power may be, 
there is always room to influence decisions (Elkin 1987). However, the way in which 
politics is organised is such that government is less responsive to groups that are 
socially and economically disadvantaged than more advantaged groups. Politics in 
modern, democratic societies is organised in a way that does not easily provide for 
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large-scale, effective, popular participation because politics has become complex, 
involving several instructions and actors engaged in an intricate relationship. 
Accordingly, participation by the mass of the people is both unequal and ineffective 
and, thus, inequality becomes inevitable (Stoker 1995). 
2.4.4 Ecological Theories 
It would appear that the theories discussed thus far suggest either a conspiratorial 
theory of discrimination or the ineffectiveness of mass participation in politics and 
weak influence on decision-making. However, ecological theory contains no such 
assumptions and implications. The fundamental premise of ecological theory is that 
the provision of public goods and services may be explained by the characteristics of 
regions, districts, area or neighbourhoods. In effect it is the accident of history or 
geography that best explains inequality (Masotti & Lineberry 1976). It is, thus, not 
possible for game reserves, botanical gardens, universities, hospitals and many other 
public assets to be made available to every district or community as socio-economic 
features such as population density, type of vegetation or terrain may affect the 
distribution of public goods. 
In the specific context of Ghana conspiratorial theories and theories of ineffective 
participation in decision-making do not explain the wide disparities in the health 
service provision that have been observed under decentralisation. The northern area 
of the country, where poverty and inequality persist relative to the rest of the 
country, also happens to exhibit unique ecological features, such as sparse 
populations, low population density, dry savannah conditions and higher than 
average levels of poverty.  Indeed, the northern area comprises 40% of Ghana’s 
territory but contains 21% of the population only. Such conditions would require a 
monumental effort on the part of decision makers to minimise the existing high 
levels of inequality under the political and administrative decentralisation. This study 
will demonstrate that wide disparities in the provision of health services exist 
between regions in the northern areas of Ghana and regions in the relatively more 
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developed south. However, this is not the product of either elite manipulation or an 
ineffectual voice on the part of the residents of northern Ghana. In fact, it is 
ecological theory that best accounts for this gaping socio-economic inequality. 
2.4.5 A Political Economy Approach  
The political economy approach provides a final explanation for the existence and 
the persistent of inequalities in a decentralised system with political economy being 
used to analyse the interplay between political, social and economic factors. Mosco 
(1996, p. 24) defines political economy as “the study of the social relations, 
particularly the power relations, that mutually constitute the production, 
distribution, and consumption of resources”. After defining political economy as a 
means with which to address issues pertaining to both the household and the 
community Mosco (1996) concludes that political economy may be regarded as a 
broad based and variegated approach to all social analysis. 
Decentralisation reforms may be analysed using the political economy approach as 
this approach analyses the interaction between political and economic processes in 
society (Manor 1999). The political economy approach systematically models the 
behaviour of government, taking into account both the political and the institutional 
contexts.  In analysing decentralisation from a political economy perspective the 
emphasis is on the central role of politics in decentralisation, focusing on state–
society relations, on how power is distributed and exercised and on who shares 
similar interests. It also seeks to answer the question as to the way in which 
incentives are shaped by both formal and informal institutions.  
From a political economy perspective, successful decentralisation takes into account 
a multiplicity of factors that shape the incentives and interests of different actors and 
institutions. The capacity of local government, an engaged political leadership, 
strong political parties committed to popular participation, and social 
actors/organisations that are able to organise effectively and engage with the state at 
the local level are crucial. In a situation in which these factors exist and are 
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effectively aligned, decentralisation may certainly play a role in making local 
authorities more accountable and responsive and the decision-making processes 
more participatory than would otherwise have been the case. 
As regards its specific application to health inequities in Ghana’s decentralised 
system, the political economy approach may be used to examine factors that threaten 
the improved governance of health sector at the local level. This approach may also 
expose any bargaining between national and local elites who may be more concerned 
about maintaining a favourable balance of power among them than in promoting 
development at the local level.  The political economy may also be used to explore 
the ways in which local leadership may have hijacked the process and stifled genuine 
participation and accountability on the part of the population. In addition, the 
political economy approach also enables an investigation into whether authorities at 
the central level may be holding onto as much power and authority as possible while 
simultaneously letting go of key responsibilities for which they do not wish to be 
held accountable. The political economy approach also provides a basis for querying 
the transfer of administrative responsibilities to local levels without adequate 
financial resources. The factors cited above all render the equitable distribution or 
adequate provision of services more difficult and may, in fact, undermine the 
effectiveness of local government institutions.  
 
2.5 The Conceptual Framework 
This chapter has examined the theories underlying this study by unpacking 
concepts and theories relevant to decentralisation, inequities and poverty 
reduction. This, in turn, led to a discussion of those theories that explain the 
possible reasons why inequities and inequalities may persist within a decentralised 
system, thus providing the basis for conducting this study. The conceptual 
framework will bring these together and provide a logical and coherent approach 
to understanding inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system.  
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The conceptual framework used in this study is based on the concept of Horizontal 
Inequalities (HI) which was pioneered by the Centre for Research on Inequality 
Human Security and Ethnicity (CRSE) at Oxford University(Stewart & Langer 
2007) . 
Income inequalities exist between individuals and are known as vertical inequality. 
Horizontal inequalities occur between culturally and geographically defined groups 
that are of a cultural, social, political and economic nature. Horizontal inequalities 
occur when cultural identities overlap with political, economic, social and cultural 
inequalities. When political, social, cultural and economic inequalities overlap the 
resultant instability may manifest in the form of rebellions and protests and 
development may be retarded (Stewart et al 2007). 
The horizontal inequalities framework also alludes to the importance of vertical 
inequalities ‒ inequalities among and between individuals.  It is based on the 
argument that horizontal equalities are important components in the reduction of 
inequalities between individuals. In a number of situations, efforts to reduce 
inequalities between individuals may be futile if no attempt is made to mitigate 
inequalities between the groups to which these individuals belong.  
Horizontal inequality is a concept important for development, peace and security and 
it is for this reason that the inequalities in the health service delivery should be a 
focal point in Ghana’s decentralisation administration. The HI approach also offers 
an explanation for the way in which differences between regions and districts in 
multiple dimensions serve to perpetuate inequities at the individual level as regards 
health utilisation.  
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
The chapter discussed major concerns with regards to the efficient allocation of 
services and jurisdictional design, addressing the question of the level of government 
which is the best suited to realising the goal of efficient allocation that is so 
important in service delivery.  
The chapter then examined the implications of decentralisation for efficiency and 
equity in public service delivery, concluding that there is a need to examine equity 
from the viewpoint of equal opportunity for all local citizens.  In analysing the effect 
of decentralisation on poverty and inequalities it has been noted that decentralisation 
has produced mixed results as regards reducing poverty and addressing inequalities 
between groups.  The chapter concluded that ecological theories and a political 
economy approach all provide reasonable explanations as to the reason why 
inequalities persist in Ghana’s decentralised system.  
The chapter concluded by outlining the horizontal inequities framework as a lens for 
analysing the inequalities in decentralisation within the Ghanaian context.  
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review: Decentralisation and Health Inequality 
3.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to review existing literature on decentralisation and 
the effects of decentralisation on inequality/inequity in the social sectors of an 
economy. Despite the fact that a substantial body of literature exists on the issue of 
decentralisation, there is limited empirical literature on the link between 
decentralisation and equity in the health sector, especially in developing countries. 
The literature review includes empirical literature on the decentralisation of health 
systems and the link between decentralisation and equity in the social sectors, 
focusing on the health sector. The chapter begins by examining the concepts of 
health inequities and inequalities. This is followed by an overview of techniques 
and approaches which may be used to measure inequality and a review of some 
empirical applications of these techniques. The chapter then discusses the issue of 
health inequities and the way in which this issue relates to the main theme of the 
study by outlining empirical literature on decentralisation and health 
inequalities/inequities.  
 
3.2 Health Inequity 
The concepts of health inequality and health disparities represent two sides of the 
same coin and simply reflect the differences in health between groups or 
populations (Kawachi et al. 2002; Gakidou 2000; Braveman & Gruskin 2003; 
Pradhan, Sahn & Younger 2003). These differences may arise as a result of a 
number of factors, for example, biological variations, individual choices and also 
the external environment and other contextual factors beyond the control of the 
individual.  The issue of inequalities in health is well documented and a number of 
underlying causes of these inequalities have been identified (Marmot 2001; 2005; 
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Shin & Kim 2010; Wagstaff & Claeson 2004; Wagstaff 2002). It often happens 
that it is deemed either impossible or unacceptable to modify or change a number 
of the factors resulting in health inequalities and, thus, such inequalities in health 
continue to prevail. 
In the main the term health inequality has been applied in research to describe 
three major differences in health, namely, health differences between individuals, 
health differences between population groups and differences between groups 
occupying unequal positions in society. Nevertheless, no matter how researchers 
view the concept of health inequalities, it is generally accepted that the concept is 
a descriptive concept, simply describing patterns of health and refusing to make 
value judgments as to what should be (Peter & Evans 2001).  
As opposed to the concept of health inequality, the concept of health inequities, by 
definition, often raises issues with moral and ethical dimensions (Whitehead 1991, 
p.5; Kawachi et al. 2002, p.647). As explained by Dahlgren and Whitehead (1991) 
health inequities are deemed to be unfair and unjust and also avoidable (Dahlgren 
& Whitehead 1991). Despite the fact the majority of people accept variations in 
health between individuals as unavoidable, when these differences are socially 
structured, such differences are judged to be inequitable. This is often the case 
when the health differences which are linked to broader social inequalities are also 
associated with poor governance, corruption or cultural exclusion.  
According to Sen (2002), there is immense scope to the issue of health equity and 
it is not possible for the concept to be concerned with health only. He argues that 
an examination of health equity must be conducted in congruence with the much 
broader issues of fairness and social justice in all their dimensions, be it economic 
or political. He further points out that health equity should not merely be about the 
distribution of health and health care and that it is essential that equity in the 
achievement and distribution of health be fully incorporated into understanding 
the broader concept of justice (Sen 2002).  
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Sen (2002) points out that, in understanding and addressing health inequity, the 
major concern should be the lack of opportunity for all individuals to achieve good 
health because of inadequate social arrangements. Sen (1992) concludes that there 
is a major difference between a social or societal barrier to the prevention and 
treatment of a condition and the individual’s personal choice. This, in turn, renders 
it important to differentiate between the achievement or attainment and the 
capability that societies and communities provide to enable people to realise their 
choice outcomes. Thus, the case for health equity must not merely be a demand 
regarding how health care should be distributed but should encompass several 
influences of varying kinds, such as individual incomes, food habits and life 
styles, on the one hand, and the epidemiological environment and work conditions 
on the other hand.  Thus, health equity should not be restricted to the inequality of 
either health or health care only, but should take into account the arrangements 
pertaining to resource allocations and all other arrangements that link health with 
the general features of affairs of state and political affairs.  
According to Kawachi et al. (2002) and the McGillivray, Indranil, & Lawson, 
(2011), health equity also reflects the manifestation of differences in the quality of 
health and health care across various population groups. These differences result 
from unequal economic and social conditions and are both systemic and avoidable 
(ibid).  There is a multiplicity of factors that influence the individual’s need to avail 
him- or herself of health care services. However, in many instances the conditions 
that drive health inequities are neither natural nor inevitable but are rather the 
consequences of public policies. These may include differences in the “presence of 
disease”, health outcomes, or access to and utilisation of health care.  
Defining inequity in this manner highlights two principles of equity, namely, vertical 
equity and horizontal equity. In the case of health services vertical equity ‒ “unequal 
treatment of unequals” ‒ implies that people with varying health needs and 
socioeconomic conditions should be treated differently in the health services are to 
be equitable. On the other hand, horizontal equity ‒ “equal treatment of equals” ‒ 
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implies that people with similar health needs and socioeconomic status may be 
expected to be treated the same(McGillivray et al. 2011; Culyer 2001; Culyer & 
Wagstaff 1993).  Vertical equity is used primarily in relation to financing where 
individuals who are able to afford to purchase health care are expected to pay for 
such health care while others are either subsidised or provided with alternatives to 
ensure they are able to afford to meet their respective health care needs (Wagstaff & 
Doorslaer 2000; McGillivray et al. 2011). On the other hand, horizontal equity is 
widely applied in the analysis of health care utilisation (Wagstaff & Van Doorslaer 
2000). Horizontal equity in health may be analysed in terms of access, utilisation and 
outcomes (Oliver & Mossialos 2004; Donabedian 1972) .   
Analysing outcome equity presents a major challenge, as a significant degree of the 
influence on health falls outside of the domain of policy (World Bank 2005). Equal 
access to services is based on the assumptions that individuals are given equal 
opportunities to access such services, for example, by fees not being charged and 
resources being distributed equally across the regions. Even if it is possible to 
measure different indicators of access, such as waiting times, availability of 
resources, and presence of user charges, it is rarely possible to observe and measure 
access itself. Utilisation, on the other hand, is a function of both supply and demand 
factors, and it may be observed directly(Allin 2006). Thus, this study uses the 
indicators of inequality in health service utilisation in order to measure equity.  
According to O’Donnell and Wagstaff (2008), there typically exists inequality in the 
utilisation of health when the latter is analysed in relation to certain socioeconomic 
criteria such as expenditure, incomes, assets or wealth. The exact pattern of 
utilisation varies depending on the country’s specific situation.  Thus, to measure 
inequity, inequalities in health must be adequately standardised for differences in 
need and it is only after this has been done that inequalities may be interpreted as 
inequities.  
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It is, thus, clear that, in order to examine equity in achievement, be it utilisation or 
outcomes, it is important to examine health care distribution and also whether 
there is equity in the allocation of health care resources.  There are several studies 
available (Bago d’Uva, Jones & Van Doorslaer 2009; Wagstaff et al. 1999; 
Stewart & Langer 2007; Van Doorslaer, Koolman & Jones 2004; Van Doorslaer, 
Masseria & Koolman 2006; Hernandez & Easp n.d.; Morris, Sutton & Gravelle 
2005; Van Doorslaer et al. 2008) on the issue of horizontal equity in health care in 
the OECD countries. The results of these studies tend to vary depending on the 
measure of utilisation applied (Mackenbach et al. 2008). Studies of this nature 
have been constrained in low coverage settings, as a result of the unavailability of 
data on measures of income health care and need and the conceptual challenge 
involved in identifying either need or expected need.  
 
3.3 The Conceptualisation of Equity 
A major debate that continues to rage among health experts and policy makers in the 
area of health inequity is on the nature of fairness in access to, as well as the 
utilisation and distribution of, health resources. Being defined as inequalities of an 
unfair nature, the concept of health inequities has as a central theme in the concept of 
social justice and how it relates to health. The questions to be addressed by this 
section then become, What is unfairness or unjustness in relation to health? and How 
may these unfair and unjust situations be rectified? This section provides an answer 
to these questions by examining Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness and Sen’s 
capability theory of justice.  
As principles for evaluating laws and institutions from a moral standpoint, theories 
of social justice serve as standards against which existing institutions may be judged 
(Phillips 1979, p.314).  The two theories cited above provide a broad view of the 
concept of social justice. Rawls provides a basis for understanding what a just or fair 
society should look like, no matter the dimension in terms of which the society in 
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question is being examined. In contrast, Sen’s concept of social justice provides a 
means of judging on a scale whether a particular society is more just than another 
society.  Unlike Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness Sen’s the capability theory of 
justice (2009) provides a means of assessing an improvement in justice and not 
simply prescribing a movement towards an ideal situation of justice which may be 
envisioned in theory but is difficult to realise in practice (Sen 2009).  Other theories 
are not considered primarily because they do not offer adequate explanations of 
justice with regards to health utilisation. Examples of such theories include the 
egalitarian theory that argues that access to health care remains every citizen’s right 
and ought not be influenced by income and wealth and the Marxist theories that 
operate on the principle of to each according to his or her needs but fails to 
adequately address the issue of need. Utilitarianism limit its perspective to the 
concept of utility, ignoring everything else, and, to some extent, remain unconcerned 
by inequality in utilities but concentrates instead on maximising the distribution 
independent sum total of utilities (Sen 2002). 
3.3.1 Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
Widely acknowledged as the most salient theory of justice in its time, in the main the 
theory formulated by(Rawls 1971) answers the question as to what is just and fair in 
society.  The theory is often described as an institutional theory of justice because it 
proposes a comprehensive framework for the structure of the social institutions 
(political, economic, legal or social) which are being assessed. The theory is 
grounded in the methodological strategy of social contract theory as Rawls argued 
that justice is best understood as fairness and, by implication, principles of justice 
which derived from a fundamentally fair decision making process in society may 
automatically be considered as just. Rawls argued that;  
The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so 
profound and present from the start. The intuitive notion here is that this 
structure contains various social positions and that men born into different 
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positions have different expectations of life determined, in part, by the 
political system as well as by economic and social circumstances (Rawls 
1971 p. 54) 
Rawls argued that the basic structure of societies and the major institutions that exist 
within them play a pivotal role both in regulating the distribution of goods and social 
burdens to the members of society and in determining the life chances of these 
members of society. He pointed out that these basic structures and institutions 
generate inequalities by favouring certain starting points over others (Rawls 1971).  
According to Rawls, these inequalities are pervasive and significantly affect an 
individual’s opportunities in life. He explained that the principles of justice should be 
applied to these inequalities which have been born out of the basic structure of 
society (Rawls 1971). 
Rawls introduced the concept of primary goods which he considered to be the metric 
for assessing interpersonal comparisons of welfare ‒ the basis upon which one 
individual would be considered better off than another. According to Rawls, a 
primary good is “a good every rational man is presumed to want” (Rawls 1999; 
Coogan 2007). Rawls cites the following examples of such primary goods, namely, 
rights and liberties, powers and opportunities and income and wealth, but stating 
clearly that the list he provides is not exhaustive (Rawls 1999). From Rawls’ 
perspective, primary goods serve as the basis of equality, thus rendering such 
primary goods and the institutions that distribute these goods the subjects of justice. 
This, in turn, means that the principles of justice are applied both to these goods and 
to the mechanisms for distributing such goods.  
Based on this viewpoint, the least advantaged members of a society are judged based 
on their holdings of primary goods with these primary goods operating as the basis 
for measuring justness. In conceptualising justice as fairness, Rawls argues that 
social arrangements are communal endeavours which are aimed at advancing the 
progress of all who form part of the community. All inequalities, be they the result of 
 
 
 
 
  
 
45 
birth, historical or natural endowments in primary goods, are undeserved and should 
be rectified by people in a cooperative society. Despite the fact that, in his original 
conceptualising, Rawls (1999) did not include health care, he does argue that, in not 
providing an exhaustive list of primary good, he left room to include health care and, 
thus, in applying Rawls theory of justice to health care, health care is best included 
as a primary good (Rawls 1997; Coogan 2007).  This argument is supported by the 
definition of a primary good, with proponents arguing that “[h]ealth and health care 
are reasonable additions to the primary goods because it is a universal need, 
necessary for carrying out conceptions of the good, regardless of their 
content”(Coogan 2007; Rawls 2009; Bommier & Stecklov 2002).  
Thus, from the justice standpoint, Rawls argues that society is responsible for 
improving the lives of its least advantaged members and, therefore, the main issue to 
be addressed in attempting to attain justice is how this should be done in order to 
improve the lot of the naturally disadvantaged. Rawls attempted to answer this 
question using two principles of justice. The starting point of these principles is the 
“veil of ignorance” ‒ the situation in terms of which individuals in a given society 
are unaware of their own holdings of primary goods. These principles provides 
insights into the decisions individuals would make from behind the veil of ignorance. 
Firstly, the principle argues that 
… each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others (Rawls 1999). 
Rawls states simply that, as long as individuals in society are unaware of any 
previous advantages or disadvantages, basic liberties and freedoms must be shared 
equally with all. The first principle is priority and it must always take precedence 
over the second principle which states that, in the situation of inequality, the 
difference principle should apply and that redistribution should be done if 
… they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of 
society, consistent with the just savings principle (Rawls 1999). 
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Again, Rawls points out that society should be fair and just at all times and that the 
only condition under which a departure from equality in primary goods ‒ a departure 
from fairness is deemed as necessary ‒ is acceptable is when such a departure results 
in the betterment of those who were the worst off under such distribution. Rawls then 
sums up these two principles in what he terms the general conception of justice, 
which states that: 
All social primary goods ‒ liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and 
the bases of self-respect ‒ are to be distributed equally unless an unequal 
distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least 
favoured (Rawls 1971 p. 303). 
3.3.2 A Capability Theory of Justice 
Based on the social choice theory and his previous work on the capability approach, 
Sen presented a comparative theory of justice, which focuses on the practical reason 
behind which society would be chosen over another as a fair and just society. Sen’s 
capability theory focuses on the decisions which must be taken in order to achieve a 
more just society rather than on speculating about what a perfectly just society is.  A 
capability approach to justice is considered as a partial theory on justice only in view 
of its flexible and multipurpose nature (Nussbaum 2011; Sen 2009; Sen 1993). The 
capability approach (Sen 2009) focuses on the individual’s opportunity to do what he 
or she has reason to value. The approach is concerned primarily with the ability to 
achieve various combinations of “functioning” that may be ranked and compared 
with each other, focusing on actual opportunities of living by examining what an 
individual is able to do and not what the individual actually does.  
The capability approach argues that the best metric for interpersonal comparisons is 
an individual’s “functions and capabilities”. Sen argues that it is not sufficient to 
achieve equality in respect of people’s formal rights and freedoms and that this must 
be backed up with equality in substantive freedoms or capabilities.  Capabilities are 
defined as those beings and doings that are central to our understanding of ourselves 
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as human beings and which constitute human life.  Sen (1992) and Nussbaum (2011) 
also refer to the issue of basic capability which they define as “the ability to satisfy 
certain elementary and crucially important functioning up to certain levels”. These 
definitions facilitate the conceptualising of justice from a capabilities approach that 
already has embedded in it the issue of health, as health is essential to human 
functioning.   
Sen provides a more practical theory in that he moves away from providing answers 
to questions about the nature of perfect justice to formulating a theory that addresses 
the issue of the way in which justice may be enhanced and injustice removed.  In 
terms of this theory, failures in health provide important information about the 
injustice of particular social arrangements and may actually supplement assessments 
of these arrangements in general. In this context, equity in the utilisation of health as 
defined by this thesis implies the elimination of differences, marginalisation or 
discrimination as a result of socioeconomic status and/or geographical locations 
(Nussbaum 2011). 
 
3.4 Models for Health Inequality 
The sections above elucidated the concept of health inequities and the way in which 
health inequities relate to health inequalities.  Conceptualising inequities as 
inequalities, which are unjust in nature, highlighted the need for a better 
understanding of inequalities and how inequalities may be viewed. A number of 
models have been applied to explain both the existence and the persistence of health 
inequalities in society. Bartley (2004) identifies the four groupings of models that 
may be used to explain health inequality as behavioural, material, psychosocial and 
the life course models. These models all enable the analysis of inequalities in varying 
contexts and perspectives.   
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3.4.1 A Synopsis of Alternative Explanations   
The behavioural model suggests that health inequalities are an outcome of differing 
cultural attitudes to health and related health behaviours (Lohan 2007; Bartley 2004).  
On the other hand the psychosocial model focuses on the psychological impact of 
adverse psychosocial exposures, such as stress, hostility, hopelessness, loss of 
control or, collectively, the impact of ‘misery’ on health (Macleod & Smith 2003, 
p.565).  The psychosocial model may also be expanded to provide an explanation at 
the level of the society or community. At this level the psychosocial model attributes 
inequalities in health to broader societal inequalities in incomes and socioeconomic 
positions (Lohan 2007). This may potentially lead to psychosocial reactions which 
affect people’s vision of self-esteem and forms of social cohesion. Proponents of this 
viewpoint identify the channels through which health may be affected as psycho-
neuroendocrine mechanisms and unhealthy coping behaviours, for example, 
excessive drinking and smoking.  
The materialistic model attributes the existence of health inequalities to material 
differences between individuals and also between societies.  The lifecourse approach 
to understanding inequalities in health does not provide a completely new 
understanding of health inequalities as compared to those approaches already 
discussed. The lifecourse approach incorporates elements of the materialist, 
behavioural and psychosocial models but lengthens the causal chain of the 
explanations provided in these models. The lifecourse explanation suggests that the 
health status at any given age for a given birth cohort reflects not only contemporary 
conditions but is also the embodiment of prior life conditions from in utero onwards 
(Kawachi et al. 2002, p.650). This model highlights the temporal ordering of 
exposure variables and their interrelationships. 
3.4.2 Political Economy and Health Inequalities  
In order to fully understand the role of the political process of decentralisation in 
either the existence or persistence of health inequities this study applies the 
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political economy approach positioned within a materialist/neo-materialist 
paradigm.  The materialist/neo-materialist arguments offer explanations for the 
existence of health inequities at both the individual level and the societal level. At 
the individual level the materialist explanation refers to how an individual’s access 
to tangible material goods and conditions such as food, housing and amenities are 
inextricably linked in a way that may impact on the individual’s health in either a 
positive or negative way (Adamson et al. 2006).  Similarly, at the level of the 
society, the materialist suggests that the material conditions prevailing in a society, 
for example; levels of investment in health and social care, education and public 
transport, affect the health of the people living in that society. The materialist 
argument highlights the need for an equitable distribution of public and private 
resources in such a way so as to have the most impact on reducing health 
inequalities and improving public health (Lynch et al. 2000). No matter the levels, 
inequalities in health have been consistently found to be associated with material 
factors, irrespective of the particular measure of inequality applied.  
The application of the political economy approach to the analysis of health and 
healthcare dates back to the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of studies on the 
political economy of health.  This resulted from the criticism of the lifestyles theories 
which emphasised the individual’s responsibility in either choosing or not choosing a 
healthy lifestyle. The political economy analysis focuses on analysing and addressing 
the economic and political determinants of health and disease, including the 
structural barriers to people living and accessing healthy lives. Thus, the political 
economy approach provides a sound theoretical basis on which inequities in health in 
the context of political reforms may be effectively analysed.  
The study of the socioeconomic health inequalities in the global health arena has led 
to a significant number of researchers applying the political economy approach to the 
analysis of health.  Numerous public health researchers are currently focusing on 
examining the political nature of health and the prospects of clarifying the role of 
politics in health and its impact on health have never seemed brighter.  Studies by 
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researchers such as Borrell et al. (2007), Navarro (2000), Bhalotra et al. (2013), 
Callaghan (2011), Koivusalo (1999), Freeman (2000), Bambra, Fox and Scott-
Samuel (2005), Navarro et al. (2006) and Hofrichter (2003) have all explored the 
links between forms of government and health outcomes using variables such as 
infant mortality and general mortality.  It is important to note that the political 
economy approach focuses on the interactions between the political and economic 
processes in society, thus examining the distribution of power between different 
groups and individuals and the processes that affect these relationships (Collinson 
2003, p.3).  
The global neoliberal paradigm at the very basic level asserts that free market 
policies produce the economic growth that forms the foundations of human and 
societal wellbeing. It is anticipated that a political economy analysis positioned 
within the materialism paradigm will provide an appropriate framework for the 
analysis of health inequities within the context of political decentralisation. In 
applying this explanation to health inequities in a decentralised system, it is argued 
that inequities in health are the outcomes of inequalities in the socioeconomic and 
political conditions of both individuals and districts. The materialistic view perceives 
that ideas have torchbearers with resources, who will carry these ideas and translate 
them into actions and policies. To the materialist the type of society to which the 
individual belongs shapes, enables and constrains everything within that society 
(Lohan 2007). Thus, the materialist model identifies the importance of poverty, work 
and deprivation in its various forms in both the home and the immediate environment 
with regard to health and health inequalities (Lohan 2007; Bartley 2004).  
According to Bartley (2004, p.16), both the political processes and the distribution of 
power affect the provision of services, the quality of the physical environment and 
social relationships. By implication then, access to and the provision of health 
facilities and services will be biased in favour of those groups and individuals who 
wield the greatest power and authority in respect of influencing policies and 
programmes. Accordingly, the political economy approach to the analysis of health 
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inequalities provides the means with which to analyse the contextual effect on health 
inequalities as it relates to the broader political, cultural, or institutional context, thus 
providing a way of investigating health inequities.   
The political economy approach makes it possible to assess the effect of the 
economic policies and public programmes of support on health and health 
inequalities. Thus, a political economy analysis enables a close examination of the 
role played by changes in the political environment in health inequalities. This is 
crucial as the political processes within a society affect the distribution of power as 
well as access to services, assets and resources (Bartley 2004). This is of extreme 
importance as the line between inequalities in health and inequalities in the broader 
circumstances of people’s lives are sometimes blurred (Graham 2007). Graham 
(2007) asserts that inequalities in people’s health are intimately and inextricably 
connected to inequalities in both their material and their social circumstances. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: A framework for analysing health inequalities 
Based on the arguments presented in preceding paragraphs, an appropriate model for 
analysing inequality in a decentralised system will explore both the supply and the 
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demand sides of the health system. This will be achieved by examining both the 
influences of the decentralised system and structures on the environment and context 
within which individuals seek health and also the effect of the decentralised system 
on the provision of services to the end users. The materialist/neo-materialist model 
claims that decentralisation influences inequities through two channels, namely, the 
influence on the individual’s tangible material goods and conditions (including food, 
housing, access to amenities) and the influence on the material environment of the 
society (district) as a whole and the ability of the society (district) to invest in and 
contribute to policy in the areas of health and social care.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the 
translation of decentralisation reforms into health status and health care utilisation.  
Thus, this study analyses the national and local institutions within which the health 
sector operates. This includes the way in which these institutions affect the inputs 
into and processes in the health systems that exist within a decentralised structure.  In 
order to effectively analyse the effect of decentralisation on inequities in health the 
study analyses the effect of decentralisation on the individual’s utilisation of the 
maternal health services by conducting an inequality analysis on available household 
data as the process of decentralisation intensifies.  The thesis then analyses the way 
in which decentralisation may affect inequity within the health system by assessing 
the indirect effects of decentralisation on the individual’s utilisation of health care 
and also the effect of decentralisation on utilisation inequity using the perspectives of 
policy makers in both the health care system and the decentralised system.  
 
3.5 Measuring Health Inequality 
After examining the concepts of inequity and inequality it is important to understand 
exactly how these operationalisations may be applied in this study. Accordingly, this 
section identifies and outlines techniques that have been used to study inequalities. 
The section also contains empirical illustrations of how this has been previously 
applied in the area of health inequalities.   
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3.5.1 Techniques for Measuring Inequality in Health 
A number of techniques (McKay 2002) including the range, Gini coefficient, 
pseudo-Gini coefficient, index of dissimilarity, between group variance, slope index 
of inequality, general entropy measures such as the Theil’s index and the Atkinson’s 
index and also the concentration index have been cited in existing literature as for 
measuring socioeconomic inequalities in health (Manor et al. 1997). The majority of 
these techniques have been adapted from the field of economics and subsequently 
applied to the study of health inequalities. There are also a number of techniques that 
provide a simpler approach to measuring inequalities such as the odds ratio and the 
range, which rely on information from two socioeconomic groups only (ibid). The 
major challenge for the majority of these indicators in their application for the 
purposes of this thesis is their inability to be decomposed.  
In view of the fact that the focus of this thesis implies that, in selecting an 
appropriate index for the measurement of inequality, such index must be sufficiently 
complex to allow for other operations, the most important of which is 
decomposability. The ability to decompose the selected index will allow the effect of 
decentralisation on both within group and between group inequalities to be 
investigated. The aim of the study restricts the choices of index to those indices that 
provide population-weighted summaries of the imbalance between the share of the 
population and the share of ill-health and that are decomposable, as this will enable 
an investigation into the effect of decentralisation on the existence and persistence of 
health inequities.  Accordingly, this section will focus on indices that have been 
widely used in the field of health inequality measurements and which are 
decomposable, namely, the concentration index and the class of generalised entropy 
measures for inequality measurement.   
The concentration index (CI) has been widely applied in health inequality 
measurement. The main advantages of the CI include the fact that it takes into 
account the entire range of socioeconomic groups within a population while it is also 
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able to measure both relative and absolute inequalities in health despite the fact that 
it is known primarily as a measure of relative inequality.  The CI is also 
decomposable into its constituent parts mathematically as a linear combination of the 
concentration indices of its determinants (Harper & Lynch 2007). The two most 
important disadvantages of the CI include the fact that the index is useable with 
ordinal measures of social grouping only and is not sensitive to changes in 
socioeconomic status that do not affect socioeconomic rankings. This, in turn, 
implies that a change in an individual’s socioeconomic status, for example, income, 
consumption or wealth, which is insufficient to change the individual’s position on 
the ordinal ranking on the socioeconomic scale, will go undetected. In addition, 
when the CI is decomposed it leaves behind a relatively large error term, which may 
be larger than one of the constituents. This means that the portion of unexplainable 
inequality may outstrip both within group and between group elements of the index.  
The class of Generalised Entropy inequality measures are characterised by additive 
decomposability. This, in turn, means that total inequality may be completely 
decomposed into its component parts within and between any arbitrarily defined 
population subgroups. Common GE measures include the Theil’s T and Theil’s L 
measures, the mean logarithmic deviation, half the square of the coefficient of 
variation and Atkinson (1970)  measure of inequality. Of the two Theil’s indices, the 
Theil’s L measure provides a better decomposition as the within group component 
represents the value of the total Theil’s index when all between group differences in 
the variable of interest are suppressed, unlike the T measure.  This may be explained 
by the fact that the T index uses shares of the variable of interest of the subgroups as 
weights while the L measure uses population shares.  
3.5.2 Empirical Illustrations of Techniques  
Three types of decompositions have been applied to the concentration index, 
namely, decomposition into the determinant of the index, decomposition of the 
changes in the index and, finally, a geographic decomposition of the index. 
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Wagstaff (2003) illustrated both the decomposition of the CI into its determinants 
and a decomposition of the changes in the index using data from Vietnam on child 
malnutrition.  
The approach used (Wagstaff 2003) couples the concentration curve with a 
regression framework. The approach first estimates the inequality of the health 
related variable by the socioeconomic variable of interest (income or education), 
then plots the cumulative proportions of the health variable on the vertical axis 
against the cumulative proportions of the socioeconomic variable on the horizontal 
axis in order to attain the concentration curve and, by extension, the concentration 
index, which is twice the area between the 45 degree line and the curve.   
For the purposes of decomposition, it is supposed that the health variable of 
interest is linked to a set of determinants by a linear regression model. It is also 
assumed that everyone in the selected sample faces the same vector coefficients 
and that changes in the vector coefficients are accompanied by changes in their 
impact on the health variable. Wagstaff outlined a decomposition technique which 
combines regression analysis with distributional data. This approach was able to 
partition the causes of inequality into each of the individual determinants.  
In decomposing changes in health inequalities, Wagstaff et al. (2003) outlined the 
three possible decomposition techniques at this stage as follows: taking a 
difference of the concentration index, applying Oaxaca style decomposition to the 
formulation (Oaxaca 1973), and using a differential equation method. This 
technique may be illustrated by focusing on inequalities in stunting of growth 
using a child’s height for the age variable as a measure of stunting. The choice of 
this variable is based on the fact that not only does it provide a measure of the 
depth of malnutrition, but it also enables a linear regression analysis to be 
conducted on the data.  
The CI was computed by ranking the children by per capita household 
consumption in terms of 1998 prices. The variations in height for age scores were 
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explained by estimating a linear function of vectors of child level variables (age, 
age squared and gender), a vector of household level variables (living standards, 
access to both water and sanitation) and a fixed effect at the commune level of the 
child.  The results revealed that inequalities in malnutrition in Vietnam were 
primarily the result of both inequalities in household consumption and unobserved 
community level determinants.  
Wagstaff (2005) illustrated the technique used for the geographic decomposition of 
the concentration curve in studies conducted in both China and Vietnam.  This 
technique provided the opportunity to understand the way in which geographic 
differences contribute to socioeconomic inequalities in health (Wagstaff 2005; 
O’Donnell & Wagstaff 2008). Wagstaff focused on income. Closely related to the 
Gini coefficient the geographic decomposition partitions the concentration index 
calculated on a full sample into between group index, within group index and a 
residual (see chapter 4 for detailed discussion)(Wagstaff 2005). In the study 
conducted in Vietnam, Wagstaff (2005) used data from the 1999 Vietnam Living 
Standards Survey to assess the extent to which the higher incidence of subsidies 
among better-off people was the result of the richer provinces providing larger 
subsidies per capita rather than subsidies disproportionately benefiting the better-off 
within provinces.  Wagstaff (2005) decomposed the concentration indices for both 
overall subsidies and sector specific subsidies. The results suggested that inequalities 
in subsidies were attributable primarily to a combination of within-province 
inequalities and inequality of the provinces’ income ranges.  
Anand (2010) measured and decomposed health workforce inequality in both China 
and India. The study applied three inequality indices, namely, Theil’s T, Theil’s L 
and the Gini coefficient. The latter is not decomposable.  The process of 
decomposition required the partitioning of the counties into mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive units and calculating the two separate components of the 
overall inequality “within group” and “between-group” component that measured 
inequality as a sole result of variations in health-worker density across groups. This 
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was made possible by the application of the Theil’s indices as they possess an 
additive property(Anand 2010, pp.319–326; Cowell 2006).  
In the application of these measures to China, administrative data from both public 
and private health facilities was obtained from the Centre for Health Statistics and 
Information, Ministry of Health. In the case of China the analysis revealed that the 
overall inter-county inequality in the distribution of all four categories of health 
worker was extremely high and that there was consistently higher inequality in 
absolute terms in the distribution of nurses as compared to that of either doctors or 
health professionals overall.  
The proportion of inequality explained by within province differences was 82% or 
more for all categories of health worker (for both Theil L and Theil T) with nurses 
demonstrating the highest level of 84 to 85% of overall inter-county inequality. More 
than four-fifths of the inter-county inequality in the distribution of health workers 
was explained by within-province inequalities. On the other hand, the case study 
conducted in India relied on district-level workforce data obtained from the 2001 
national population census from the Office of the Registrar General of India. For the 
four categories of health workers examined, the between state and stratum 
contributions to overall semi district inequality were between 85% and 90%(Anand 
2010).  
The study conducted by Anand (2010) concluded by presenting a comparison of the 
situations of the two countries. However, the current study refrains from doing this 
for the following two reasons. Firstly, the purpose of reviewing this paper was to 
illustrate the uses and the benefits of the Theil’s general entropy measure and not to 
compare the two countries and, finally, as indicated by the paper itself, the data 
provided for the two countries was from different time periods, 2001 and 2005 for 
India and China respectively.  
Goli et al. (2013) sought to explain the pathways of economic inequalities in 
maternal and child health indicators among the urban population of India. Their 
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study decomposed a concentration curve using the techniques applied by Wagstaff, 
and data from the third wave of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS,). The 
study calculated the relative contribution of socioeconomic factors to inequalities in 
key maternal and child health indicators such as antenatal check-ups (ANCs), 
institutional deliveries, proportion of children with complete immunisation, 
proportion of underweight children, and infant mortality rate (IMR). The results of 
the decomposition revealed that illiteracy among women and their partners, poor 
economic status, and mass media exposure were the critical factors contributing to 
the economic inequalities in maternal and child health indicators.  
 
3.6 Empirical Literature on Decentralisation and Inequity/Inequality in 
Health 
There continues to be much debate on the relation or the effect of decentralisation on 
social service delivery. Whereas the aims of decentralisation include extensive 
considerations of efficiency and equity in terms of whether these have been 
achieved, the specific conditions under which they may be attained remain to be 
determined. Ultimately, the question as to whether decentralisation leads to more 
equitable outcomes and a more equitable utilisation of social services in general and 
health care provision specifically remains largely unanswered, especially in the case 
of many of the developing countries that have implemented various shades of 
decentralisation reforms.  
A major problem in the empirical literature is the absence of systematic evidence on 
whether increased participation in decentralised local governance generates better 
outputs in terms of improvements in the provision and utilisation of health services 
as well as in education, drinking water and sanitation services for the poor and other 
marginalised groups.  Evidence from Africa, in particular, is lacking (Robinson 
2007, p.7, 11). This section reviews empirical evidence on decentralisation and 
equity in social services in general and in health systems specifically. In order to 
 
 
 
 
  
 
59 
ascertain the impact of decentralisation on equity, the section will examine a 
selection of studies that describe the application of a number of analytical 
techniques, including the geographic decomposition of health inequities.  
Habibi et al. (2001) ran a regression using two indicators of health and educational 
status on two decentralisation measures. Their study used a panel data set consisting 
of socio-economic and fiscal indicators for the 23 provinces of Argentina over a 25-
year period (1970–1994) to investigate the link between decentralisation and human 
development outcomes. Decentralisation was measured using two indicators of 
devolution, namely, the ratio of revenue derived from co-participation, royalties and 
provincial taxes to total resources and the ratio of locally generated resources to 
locally controlled resources.  The study used a fixed effects model. The study 
concluded that both the percentage of revenue raised locally and the proportion of 
controlled revenue over the total had a negative and significant association with 
infant mortality rates for the panel of Argentinean provinces over the period 1970–
1994. In addition, the study established that decentralisation reduced intraregional 
disparities and increased the levels of human development.  
In an the attempt to determine the effects of decentralisation on public health care 
systems in the Philippines, Schwartz et al. (2002) investigated whether 
decentralisation led to more extensive health care provision than would otherwise 
have been the case. They further analysed whether the type of public health care 
provided are acceptable, and whether local governments are effective in the 
provision of health care services. Their study systematically examined these issues 
using data from audited annual expenditures combined with secondary census and 
demographic survey data for almost 1600 local governments before and after 
decentralisation in the Philippines. Using a two-stage procedure which first estimated 
the province and city/municipality expenditure equations by OLS, they determined 
predicted values for expenditures, and then replaced actual expenditures with 
predicted expenditures in a third equation. This method corrected for the potentially 
endogenous allocation of funds to the provision of health care by local governments.  
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Endogenous variables may have led to incorrect conclusions about causation as the 
effect of funds allocated by local government may have led to a biased outcome as 
the funds allocated may not have been exogenous to the health care provision.  
The results showed that, despite the fact that local health expenditures and the share 
of resources allocated to health had increased after decentralisation, local 
governments had decreased the share of effective public health care services. The 
study also determined that local expenditures had increased the use of public health 
services such as immunisations, infectious disease control, health education, family 
planning, and maternal and child health. In addition, the study revealed that the post 
devolution per capita health expenditures by local authorities had generally increased 
the positive impact of these expenditures on the use of health services although 
analysis had showed that the impact had been stronger on family planning services 
although positive but weaker on the use of immunisation services.  
In a cross-country study that used time series data from 140 low and middle-income 
countries, Khaleghian (2003) examined the impact of political decentralisation on 
essential public services. Data on immunisation for two vaccines, measles and 
whooping cough, was obtained from the WHO and UNICEF.  The study sought both 
to characterise differences in the immunisation coverage between decentralised and 
non-decentralised countries, controlling for other determinants such as national 
income and contact with donors; and to examine the effects of the presence of factors 
such as democracy, illiteracy, institutional quality and ethnic heterogeneity. The 
study adopted a linear model for decentralisation, in which a binary decentralisation 
variable and a host of structural or control variables explained the rate of 
decentralisation in a country at a point. The model was then estimated using the 
ordinary least square method.  
The study concluded that expenditure decentralisation was positively related to 
improved health outcomes in low-income countries.  Specifically, the study revealed 
that, in the low-income group, the decentralised countries had higher coverage rates 
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as compared to the centralised countries, with an average difference of 8.5% for the 
measles and DTP3 vaccines. However, in the middle-income group, the reverse 
effect was observed with the decentralised countries having lower coverage rates as 
compared to the centralised countries, with an average difference of 5.2% for the 
same vaccines. In addition, while in the low-income countries it was observed that 
development assistance reduced the gains from decentralisation, in the middle-
income group democratic government was found to mitigate the negative effects of 
decentralisation. Decentralisation in the middle-income countries was also found to 
have reversed the negative effects of ethnic tension and ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation although institutional quality and literacy rates were not found to 
have any interactive effect either way. The results were the same even when 
decentralisation was measured by either a dichotomous binary variable or with a 
more detailed measure of fiscal decentralisation.  
Robalino, Picazo and Voetberg (2004) investigated the link between fiscal 
decentralisation and infant mortality using panel data on infant mortality rates, GDP 
per capita, and the share of public expenditures managed by local governments from 
low- and high-income countries covering the period 1970–1995.  If the channels of 
influence for fiscal decentralisation on health outcomes are identified as an increase 
in the levels of allocative and technical efficiency, then a decentralised system is 
expected to be more successful in allocating scarce resources to alternative 
interventions in order to maximise health outcomes. Based on the above and also on 
the assumption that policy makers are not benevolent and have objective functions 
that respond to political incentives rather than social welfare, Robalino et al. (2004) 
developed a linear equation which modelled both infant mortality as a log function of 
an indicator of fiscal decentralisation and structural indicators which related to 
institutional capacity such as civil rights, political rights, and corruption.  
The indicator of fiscal decentralisation used was derived from the World 
Development Indicators and is computed as the ratio between the total expenditures 
of local governments and the total expenditures of the central government on the 
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basis of the Government Financial Statistics. The study then estimated the six models 
that differed in the vector of structural variables, concluding that countries in which 
local governments managed a higher share of public expenditures tended to have 
lower mortality rates with these benefits being more important for poorer countries. 
The research study further discovered that the positive effects of fiscal 
decentralisation on infant mortality rates were enhanced in institutional environments 
characterised by strong political rights and, finally, that it would appear that fiscal 
decentralisation may be a mechanism with which to improve health outcomes in 
environments with high levels of corruption. However, Robalino et al. (2001) posited 
that decentralisation may lead to increases in regional disparities in health 
expenditures in situations in which there is an absence of a mechanism to transfer 
resources from rich to poor jurisdictions.  
The study conducted by Jimenez and Smith (2005) explored the impact of health 
care decentralisation on the level of health of a population. They sought to answer 
the question as to whether a shift towards greater decentralisation was accompanied 
by improvements in population health. Their analysis drew on a theoretical model of 
local government’s public finance applied to health using the ten provinces of 
Canada as a case study. The results of the empirical analysis revealed that 
decentralisation in Canada had had a positive and significant impact on the 
effectiveness of public policy in improving the population’s health. 
Uchimura and Jütting (2009) analysed the effect of fiscal decentralisation on health 
in China by applying panel data analysis to nationwide country level data.  The study 
applied an analytical model linking fiscal decentralisation to health outcomes 
through a stylised chain of interactions. Uchimura and Jütting (2009) then proceeded 
to use panel regression analysis techniques to answer the question as to whether 
decentralisation leads to improved health outcomes and whether transfers from the 
central government played a facilitatory role. The variables used included a measure 
of provincial level infant mortality ratios as explained variables and a number of 
explanatory variables which included a two measures of fiscal decentralisation; 
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vertical balance (VB) and the ratio of the county’s expenditure to total provincial 
expenditure (RCE) as well as other socioeconomic characteristics that affected health 
outcomes. The outcomes established that the counties in the more fiscally 
decentralised provinces had lower infant mortality rates as compared to those 
counties in which the provincial government remained the main spending authority.  
However, this occurred only when there were clearly established and functioning 
fiscal transfer systems and local government fiscal capacity was strengthened.  
In an attempt to better understand the effect of decentralisation on district health 
service from the perspectives of service users and providers in Nepal, Regmi et al. 
(2010) examined the effect of decentralisation on service delivery. They assessed the 
decentralisation process in the Ministry of Health in Nepal using a qualitative 
technique based on social constructionist theory. Using purposive sampling 
techniques, the researchers conducted a series of in-depth interviews and focus group 
discussions in four primary health care institutions, capturing service users, providers 
and other stakeholders. The resultant data was then categorised into groups and 
analysed using tabulation and graphical techniques. The analysis revealed 
decentralisation to be positively associated with both increased service access and 
utilisation and improved service delivery.  
Relying on evidence from an anti-poverty programme in Mexico, Bustamante (2010) 
examined evidence on the effectiveness of centralised and decentralised health care 
organisations. The study did this by taking advantage of health care provider 
duplication in rural Mexico.  The study also benefited from both differences in the 
timing and models of health care decentralisation in Mexico and from a quasi-
random distribution of providers.  A treatment and a comparison group of 320 and 
186 individuals respectively were randomly selected from states in Mexico. A 
regression analysis was then conducted to compare the performance of federal and 
state providers of health services using private health expenditures and health care 
utilisation as the dependent variables. The analysis revealed that households served 
by centralised provider of health services performed better with 56% less regressive, 
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out-of-pocket health care expenditures and also observed a higher utilisation of 
preventive services as compared to the situation with decentralised providers of 
health services. In the areas in which there was a cash transfer programme, which 
provides cash transfers to poor families conditional upon school attendance and the 
families receiving preventive care, the state providers outperformed the centralised 
providers.  
Using a decision space analytical approach and an analysis of expenditures and 
utilisation rates, Bossert et al. (2003) investigated the relationship between 
decentralisation and the equity of resource allocation in Colombia and Chile in a 
comparative study.  The decision space framework is based on a principal-agent 
approach in terms of which the ministry of health (or policy maker), as the principal, 
sets goals and priorities for health policies and programmes and grants permission, 
authority and resources to local agents, that is, the district offices, regional 
government to implement in order to realise specific objectives. The study revealed 
that, under certain conditions and with certain specific policy mechanisms, 
decentralisation may improve the equity of resource allocation.  
In both countries (Chile and Columbia), equitable levels of per capita financial 
allocations at the municipal level were achieved through the use of allocation 
formulae, adequate local funding choices and horizontal equity funds.  However, the 
findings on the equity of the utilisation of services were less consistent although they 
did show that increased levels of funding were associated with increased utilisation. 
This, in turn, suggests that the improved equity of funding over time may reduce 
inequities in service utilisation. The study concluded that decentralisation may 
contribute to, or at least maintain, the equitable allocation of health resources to 
municipalities with varying incomes. 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill (2004) explored the link between increasing intra-national 
disparities at the global level and the drive toward devolution in many countries.  
They used an array of descriptive analytical techniques and correlations to chart the 
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link between the devolution of power and increased regional disparities. The study 
included both developed and developing nations. The study acknowledged that it 
would appear that decentralisation policies are popular throughout the world and that 
such policies seem to be associated with significant social and political benefits as a 
result of an awakened local consciousness and increased local economic potential. In 
addition, devolution may have also increase economic efficiency. Thus, the global 
trend towards devolution reflects a subtle, but profound, renunciation of the 
traditional equalisation role of national government in favour of conditions which 
foster economic and public competition and which lead to the increased development 
of initially rich and powerful regions to the detriment of the poorer areas. 
In an analysis of health sector reforms in Uganda, Okuonzi (2004) observed that 
decentralisation had led to a widening of disparities in the nature and quality of 
health care provided. Okuonzi’s study involved a systematic review of health sector 
reforms in Uganda and focused on decentralisation reforms. He noted that the 
reforms had, in fact, increased inequity as regards access to health and that important 
health indicators had worsened.  He argued that this was primarily because the richer 
districts and those with powerful local politicians who had been able to persuade 
nongovernmental organisations to work in their districts had fared better than the 
other districts which had not been as fortunate.  
Wagstaff (2005) uses the concentration curve decomposition to answer the question 
as to whether income-related inequalities in the health sector were the result of gaps 
between the poor and less poor areas rather than the differences between poor and 
less poor people within areas. Wagstaff (2005) conducted two empirical studies to 
demonstrate these techniques, namely, the case of government subsidies to the health 
sector in Vietnam and insurance coverage in rural China.  In the case of Vietnam it 
was found that the disproportionate accrual of health subsidies to Vietnam’s better 
off was primarily as a result of the fact that the richer provinces had larger per capita 
subsidies as compared to the poorer provinces. On the other hand, the pro-rich 
inequalities in health insurance coverage in rural China were discovered to be mainly 
 
 
 
 
  
 
66 
as a result of the fact that the better-off villages had been more successful at 
preventing the collapse of their insurance schemes as compared to the poorer 
villages. The cases used household level data from the Vietnam Living standards 
survey and data from a baseline household survey undertaken as part of the World 
Bank’s health project in China. 
Jiménez‐Rubio et al. (2008) used the concentration curve decomposition analysis 
technique applied by Wagstaff (2005) to explore health inequities in a decentralised 
setting using 2001 Canadian Community Health Survey (CCHS) data.  The survey 
was the first wave of a nationally representative health survey of individuals aged 12 
years and over living in Canada. The CCHS provided detailed data on health status, 
health-care utilisation and other personal characteristics for a sample of 130,880 
respondents. Jiménez-Rubio et al. (2008) explored whether income-related 
inequalities in health and inequities in the use of health care were more likely to be 
caused by gaps between the rich and poor Canadian provinces rather than the 
differences between rich and poor individuals within these provinces. The results 
revealed that within area variation was the most important source of income-related 
health inequality while income-related inequities in health care use were driven 
primarily by differences between provinces. 
Akramov and Asante (2008) examined the link between decentralisation and local 
public services in Ghana, seeking to answer the question as to whether geography 
and ethnic diversity were relevant. The study did this by exploring the disparities in 
the local public service provision between decentralised districts in Ghana using 
district and household level data from two major sources, namely, the 2000 Ghana 
Population and Housing Census and the 2003 Ghana Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire (CWIQ) Survey.  
The study developed an econometric model for analysing the differences between the 
decentralised districts in terms of local public service provision and based on an 
analytical framework with insights from (Besley & Coate 2003; Faguet 2004)Besley 
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and Coate (2003), Faguet (2004); and Ahmad and Brosio (2005).  The results 
showed that districts’ geography, defined primarily as the ecological zone (coastal, 
forest and savannah) and the distance to the regional capital played a major role in 
shaping disparities as regards the access to local public services in Ghana. The 
districts located in the coastal and forest zones had better access than those in the 
savannah areas. It is worth mentioning that distance between the districts and the 
national capital was not statistically significant. The findings also suggested that 
ethnic diversity had a significant negative impact on access to local public services, 
including drinking water. This negative impact was significantly higher in the rural 
areas. However, the negative impact of ethnic diversity on access to local public 
services, including drinking water, decreased as the average literacy level increased.  
Spain is generally regarded as having a relatively efficient health system at the 
macro-level. However, Costa-Font and Gil (2009) and Costa-i-Font (2005) explored 
the effect of decentralisation on inequities in the Spanish health system. In the study 
Costa-Font (2005) used data from the 1997 Spanish National Health Survey and 
adopted the concentration index techniques. He found that inequality in health within 
and between Spanish health services was relatively small and often not even 
significant. However, when the Catalan region was compared with the regions of the 
Navarre, Basque Country or Andalusia, the inequalities are found to be significant in 
the Catalan region.  Two regions, Catalonia and Insalud, where private health care 
predominates, recorded high levels of inequality. The study concluded that 
devolution in Spain had not led to inter-regional inequalities, except in instances in 
which the private sector had continued to play a dominant role in the health sector.  
In a more recent study, “Exploring the pathways of inequality in health, health care 
access and financing in decentralized Spain”, Costa-Font and Gil (2009) revealed 
that it would appear that inequalities in health and healthcare in Spain are driven by 
the prevailing income inequalities. The researchers argued that inequalities in health 
and health care did not appear to be driven by inequalities in financing and health 
expenditure. The study pointed out that those states which were politically 
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responsible for the organisation of healthcare did not exhibit significant differences 
in health and healthcare inequalities and, in fact, tended to exhibit a better equity 
performance.  The study conducted an empirical analysis and applied the 
concentration and Gini index analyses of horizontal inequalities to data from the 
Spanish National Health Survey 2001.  The study measured inequalities in three 
major dimensions, namely, health (outcome), healthcare (access) and healthcare 
payments (financing).  
In a study that developed the techniques applied by Jiménez-Rubio et al. (2008), 
Zhong (2010) examined the impact of decentralisation of health care administration 
and inequity in health care access in Canada.  In this study, Zhong extended the 
methods used in previous studies by adopting a perfectly decomposable Theil’s 
index in order to analyse the spatial dimension of inequity. Zhong argued that using 
the Theil index helped to overcome the challenge involved in the concentration index 
applied by Jiménez-Rubio et al. (2007), namely that the CI is not completely 
decomposable and leaves a residual term that is relatively large.  
However, the Theil’s index is not able to distinguish the socioeconomic gradient of 
inequity meaning and it is, thus, unclear whether inequities captured by the Theil’s 
index were pro rich or pro poor.  In the study Zhong conducted a before and after 
comparison of a change in the degree of decentralisation in Canada which was 
defined by the introduction of the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 
1996/1997. Zhong (2010) aimed to shed further light on the casual relationship 
between decentralisation and health-related inequity. The CHST had improved the 
approach to fund transfers from the federal government to the provinces by pooling 
the funds into a grant block for a number of programmes.  The study revealed that 
the overall inequity in health care utilisation could be explained primarily by 
variations within provinces in Canada. In addition, the study showed that, after an 
increase in the intensity of decentralisation, there had been a lower degree of within 
province inequity in the use of general practitioners and hospital services as well as a 
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lower degree of between province inequity in the use of general practitioners (GP), 
medical specialists, and hospital services. 
3.7 Appraisal of the Literature 
There were two categories of empirical literature reviewed above, namely, literature 
on decentralisation and health systems and literature on decentralisation and 
inequality/inequity in health. The studies on the effect of decentralisation on health 
service provision tended to reveal a general positive impact (Habibi et al. 2001; 
Khaleghian 2004; Robalino et al. 2004; Jimenez & Smith 2005; Uchimura & Jütting 
2009) while the study which Bustamante (2010) conducted in Mexico found that 
centralised health services had reported better outcomes than the decentralised health 
services.  However, the focus of the majority of these studies was relatively narrow 
as they tended to focus on the measure of decentralisation and in the main they relied 
on some measure of fiscal decentralisation. While Habibi et al. (2001) focused on 
revenues, Schwartz et al. (2002) measured expenditure shares. In operationalising 
and measuring decentralisation quantitatively Robalino et al. (2001; Jiménez-Rubio 
et al. (2008) and Uchimura and Jütting (2009) all focused narrowly on an 
examination of fiscal decentralisation.  
The application of such an approach which focuses on fiscal aspects of 
decentralisation to the Ghanaian context may prove challenging as it has already 
been documented that fiscal decentralisation lags behind other forms of 
decentralisation in Ghana (Ahwoi 2010; Crawford 2004). Khaleghian (2004) applied 
a measure of fiscal decentralisation to a dichotomous measure of decentralisation in 
a cross-country analysis. However, this would be difficult to apply in the context of a 
single country if decentralisation has been rolled out to all jurisdictions at the same 
time as was the case of Ghana. Thus, in order to conduct a comprehensive 
examination of the impact of decentralisation in the Ghanaian context, the effect 
measure used would have to go beyond a measure of fiscal decentralisation.  
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As regards decentralisation and equity the results from the studies reviewed offered a 
mixed picture and the approaches used were equally varied. A few of the researchers 
had relied solely on a single decentralisation measures as some studies had examined 
the effect of devolution while others had also examined fiscal decentralisation.  In 
examining the effect of decentralisation on inequalities a number of the papers 
reviewed had used inequality index techniques. However, not one of these studies 
had been conducted in the developing country context. The study on Uganda by 
Okuonzi (2004) had used a literature review approach while Akramov and Asante 
(2008) had applied a regression technique. The studies on inequalities and inequities 
tended to focus heavily on quantitative analysis techniques, thus often missing a 
more nuanced analysis of the country context. This, in turn, has resulted in a problem 
in distinguishing between the effects on inequity of various reforms that were 
implemented at the same time as decentralisation in the health sector as it is often the 
case that decentralisation is implemented together with other reforms such as user 
fees and health insurance. The above arguments provide a rationale for the decision 
to combine methods for the purposes of this study.   
3.8 Chapter Summary 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section examined the concepts of 
health equity and health inequality and discussed techniques which could be used to 
measured and illustrate these concepts while the second section examined the issues 
of decentralisation and health, providing empirical evidence on the links between the 
two.  
In understanding the issue of health inequity and inequality the chapter reached the 
conclusion that, despite the fact that, in terms of both achievement and in 
distribution, health inequality is a good indicator of inequities, the scope of health 
inequities is far wider and has embedded in it issues of a social, economic and also 
political nature. Thus, an examination of health inequities which focuses solely 
inequalities fails to address the issue comprehensively as it is not possible to judge 
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the violation of health equity merely by investigating inequality in health (Sen 2002; 
Whitehead 1991). Accordingly, it is essential that any attempt to promote health care 
and examine health inequity must happen at all levels, including the allocation of 
resources to health care and the distributive arrangements within the health care 
system.  
Despite the fact that this does not, in any way, undermine the importance of 
examining health inequality when addressing the issue of health inequity, there is 
little doubt that the far broader concept studies on health inequities should be 
extended beyond just the examination of inequality.  Health inequality is definitely a 
sine qua non in any critical examination of health inequity as inequity is a concept of 
multiple dimensions. In order to borrow from (Sen 2002)again in concluding this 
issue, health inequity is an immensely rich concept and there should be no attempt to 
narrow the domain arbitrarily. Accordingly, a thorough examination of health equity 
may require the application of a general and more inclusive framework meshed with 
certain special formulae that have been deemed appropriate.  
This, in turn, justifies both the decision to use the political economy approach for the 
purposes of this study as well as  the decision to go beyond the quantitative analysis 
of health inequalities and inequities to examine the deeper economic, social and 
political genesis, thus exploring broader solutions to the combating of inequities. 
The chapter also contained a discussion of the techniques used to measure and 
decompose health inequality.  It chapter revealed that there are several methods 
available for measuring health inequality, each with their accompanying strengths 
and weaknesses (Manor et al. 1997). It is, therefore, important to ensure both the 
usability and suitability of a selected index.  
The chapter then used examples to establish that the two major types of indices make 
possible the level of decomposition as required by a study of this nature. These two 
major types of indices include the generalised entropy class of indices and the 
concentration index, which has been widely used in the area of health inequality 
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measurement (O’Donnell & Wagstaff 2008). This is primarily as a result of the fact 
that these indices satisfy a number of the preconditions required for an index to be 
decomposed. Of the two, the chapter showed that, in view of its additive nature, the 
generalised entropy index is completely decomposable into its constituent parts and, 
thus, is the best alternative for a decomposition analysis of health inequality. Its 
ability to show data unavailability may best suit the purposes of this study.  
The second section of the literature review focused on studies that provided evidence 
on the link between decentralisation and health outcomes. These studies provided 
evidence of the fact that, in most instances, decentralisation, whether in low or 
middle income countries, has had a positive effect on health outcomes and that 
decentralisation has been shown to have a positive relationship with a number of 
health outcome variables. The variables examined included, but were not limited to; 
infant mortality, malnutrition, immunisation and utilisation of preventive healthcare 
services.   
As regards the effect of decentralisation on regional disparities in health care, the 
evidence provided was generally imprecise although some studies attributed such 
inequities to be primarily the result differences between regions (inter regional 
variations) while other studies (Jiménez-Rubio et al. 2007; Zhong 2009) revealed 
that intra regional variations best explained the inequalities in the health variables.  
Fiscal decentralisation was found to be especially important in this regard. Wagstaff 
(2005) pointed out the role of endowed regions in the differences in health and health 
care observed. The literature also revealed a significant lack of studies conducted in 
the context of developing nations, especially in Africa.  
In conclusion, the chapter lays the foundation for this study by conceptualising 
health inequalities and inequities and by outlining techniques which may be used to 
analyse such health inequalities and inequities. After an examination of relevant 
empirical literature the chapter then discussed the existing gap in the literature in the 
areas of decentralisation and health inequities. This, in turn, forms the basis for the 
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specification of the methods and techniques which may be used to address this gap 
and as contained in the following chapter.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
74 
Chapter 4  
Methodology and Econometric Model 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the methodological issues which were pertinent in this research 
study, specifically the research objectives of the study, analysis techniques, 
econometric model specification, sources of data, selection of variables, and the 
statistical instruments used. The chapter also contains a summary profile of the 
country selected as well as a description of the selected districts in order to 
contextualise the discussions that follow in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. The chapter also 
discusses the fieldwork processes followed in the study, explaining the procedures 
that were used to gather the data used in the analysis of the research problem. The 
chapter then proceeds to describe the objectives of the study; and the specific 
techniques which were used to realise these objectives. The chapter concludes with a 
critical examination of the techniques used to ensure the accuracy of the data 
gathered and a discussion of ethical issues raised and how these ethical issues were 
addressed in the study.  
4.2 Research Design 
The success of a research project depends heavily on the accuracy and relevance of 
the research design applied. If the research design is accurately specified this ensures 
that the evidence obtained from the research studies answers the research questions 
posed in an unambiguous manner (De Vaus 2001; 2002). Typically, the research 
design stipulates the specifications of the types of data or evidence required to 
answer the research questions, test a theory, evaluate a programme or describe a 
phenomenon.  Research designs are intended to deal with logical problems rather 
than logistical problems (Yin 1989; 2009).  This, in turn, means that the research 
design is expected to provide a systematic and coherent means of realising the 
research objectives. For this to be possible the research design should be well 
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specified before actual research commences as a poor specification of design in early 
stages of a study may lead to weak and erroneous conclusions. Research designs are 
often confused with research methods. The clear distinction between the two is that a 
research design provides a logical structure to the inquiry whereas the research 
method often presents and outlines the means by which data is collected. However, 
the process of collecting data is often irrelevant to the logic of the research design 
(De Vaus 2002).  
Traditionally two distinct research cultures ‒ qualitative and quantitative research 
techniques ‒ have been applied to social science research. These two are 
differentiated by their respective assumptions, methods and philosophical 
orientations (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004). The proponents of these two research 
paradigms have often engaged in fervent dispute. While the proponents of the 
quantitative school believe that social observations should be treated as entities, in 
much the same way that physical scientists treat physical phenomena and maintain 
observation, they also maintain that social science inquiry should be objective. In 
other words, time- and context-free generalisations (Nagel 1989) are both desirable 
and possible and it is possible to determine the real causes of social scientific 
outcomes in a reliable and valid way.   
On the other hand, the proponents of the qualitative methods reject what they 
perceive to be positivism. Positivism is based on the view that knowledge in research 
should be gained from the ‘positive’ verification of observable experience and 
present a number of arguments in favour of the superiority of their techniques and 
approach (Smith 1983; Guba & Lincoln 1994; 2001). The proponents of the 
qualitative methods argue that it is not possible to ignore the context and time of 
reality as reality is socially constructed and, therefore, generalisation is not desirable. 
The interpretivists argue that reflexivity in research is impossible as logic flows from 
the specific to the general and it is not possible to separate the subject of a study 
from the response. The qualitative proponents believe that research should be 
characterised by detailed, rich and in-depth descriptions of what is being studied. 
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However, the traditionalists of both the quantitative and the qualitative paradigms 
advocate the incompatibility thesis (Howe 1988), arguing that the qualitative and 
quantitative research paradigms and their associated methods may not be used 
jointly.  However, more recently there has been an increase in the use of mixed 
methods research designs (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; Onwuegbuzie et al. 2009; 
Creswell & Clark 2007; Ivankova et al. 2006; Maxwell & Loomis 2003). The goal of 
mixed methods research is not to replace either the qualitative or the quantitative 
approaches but to maximise the benefits and minimise the weaknesses of these two 
paradigms either in a single study or across a number of studies (Maxwell & Loomis 
2003; Creswell 2014; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie 2004; Creswell & Clark 2007; 
Onwuegbuzie et al. 2009). 
The majority of the mixed methods designs are developed from a combination of 
qualitative and quantitative research methodologies within and across the various 
stages of the research process.  However, it is essential that researchers working in 
the arena of mixed methods research choose which combination of techniques to use 
and also create more complex models or combinations that address the specific need. 
In other words, the basic tenet of the mixed methods approach is that the researcher 
creates a design that effectively answers his/her research questions (Onwuegbuzie et 
al. 2009). By definition and by scope research problems and research questions may 
fit into one or more research paradigms. Creswell & Clark (2007), for example, 
argues that qualitative research methods are better suited to exploratory studies in 
new topic areas or areas in which existing theories are limited in the extent to which 
they are able to explain a problem.  
The rational for combining methods in this study was threefold. Firstly it was 
believed that the mixed methods approach would provide a broader understanding of 
the research problem than either the qualitative or quantitative technique alone 
(Teddlie & Tashakkori 2011).  The exploratory nature of qualitative research means 
that the qualitative approach provides the only viable means to answer the questions 
of why, how and so what posed in the research problem (Weaver-Hightower 2013).  
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Thus, in order to understand the effect of decentralisation on inequities in health is it 
important to rely on both data and the perspectives of “experts in the sector”.  
However, this approach is supported by the inadequacy of the quantitative data 
available on decentralisation in the Ghanaian context and the need for a mixed 
method approach to the study is even more necessary in view of the fact that, despite 
the years of decentralisation, there is insufficient data at the district and regional 
levels to analyse the research issues satisfactorily. The two techniques were also 
intended to be complementary, thereby enriching the study with the extensive 
information gathered from in-depth data obtained from the semi-structured 
interviews. The two techniques were also applied for the purposes of triangulation. 
This was especially necessary in view of the gaps in the data as well as the nature of 
the data available on the decentralisation process. In addition, the nature of the 
research questions made it impossible to analyse the issue of health inequities 
conclusively using either a quantitative technique or a qualitative technique. 
Ultimately, qualitative and quantitative methods are often more powerful when 
combined at different levels and in different sequences. 
The research was generally positioned within a combined strategy of concurrent 
triangulation and concurrent nested strategy, owing to the suitability of this 
combination.  As both of these strategies permit both quantitative and qualitative 
data to be gathered simultaneously in one data collection phase (Creswell & Clark 
2007; Ivankova et al. 2006). Elements of concurrent triangulation are seen when the 
two main data sources are used to address the same research question, thus allowing 
researcher to triangulate or to verify the outcomes of one approach using the other 
approach. The concurrent nested approach provided a means of complementing the 
inadequate quantitative data with data from the interviews. In contrast to the 
concurrent triangulation technique, which accords equal weight and priority to the 
two methods (qualitative and quantitative), in the nested approach one method is 
nested within the other.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
78 
The main advantage of the nested approach is that each of these methods may be 
used to address a unique set of research questions, whereas, in terms of the 
triangulation method, the same question is addressed using the two methods for the 
purpose of corroborating the results. There are sometimes difficulties in embracing 
any of these paradigms wholly as the requirement of triangulation to address the 
research questions with both qualitative and quantitative data may prove restrictive 
while the nested approach requires that the data collected from the two methods must 
be mixed during the analysis phase and this often is impossible in view of the wide 
differences in the procedures used for the data analysis. Combining methods allows 
the use of one method for the purpose of verifying or refuting the results of the other. 
For example, qualitative investigation may be used to triangulate survey results and 
to explain relationships/trends/patterns emerging from the survey (Garbarino & 
Holland 2009; Beall & Piron 2005).  These factors motivated researcher to agree 
with Onwuegbuzie et al. (2009) when they argue that researchers working in the 
domain of mixed methods research should be able either to create or to choose the 
iteration that best answers their research questions. This study used qualitative 
research to enrich the analysis of relationships, trends and patterns that emerged from 
the analysis of the survey data.  
 
4.3 Research Methods 
This study incorporated a mixed methods approach and comprised two stages: 1) a 
quantitative analysis of the survey data and 2) a qualitative analysis of the 
information gathered from the semi-structured interviews. The study also adopted a 
concurrent mixed methods approach to ensure the dual goals of complementarity and 
triangulation.   
The first stage of the study comprised a combined analysis of the quantitative data 
gathered on the districts and an econometric analysis of the household level data 
pertaining to health inequities that were exhibited within and across regions. This 
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analysis involved applying concentration curves and concentration indices analysis 
in order to illustrate the health inequities in Ghana. The concentration indices were 
then decomposed to determine the magnitude of the inequities that may be attributed 
to inter- as opposed to intra- regional disparities. The quantitative analysis also 
included a descriptive analysis of the district level variables and indicators.  
The second stage comprised a qualitative analysis using the primary data gathered 
from the semi-structured interviews. The aim of this procedure was to conduct an 
analysis of the decentralisation process in Ghana, focusing on the decentralisation 
process in the health sector and analysing both the effect of decentralisation on 
inequities and the sources of health inequities in Ghana. The process also relied 
heavily on descriptive analysis techniques. In addition, the analysis also made use of 
archival data and records with an extensive review of both pre and post 
decentralisation data and documents. 
4.4 The Study Area  
The aim of the discussion of the study area is to provide a detailed contextual picture 
of for the setting of the thesis. The dualistic nature of the study implied that a 
discussion of the study area should not focus on Ghana as a country only but also 
include a detailed examination of the selected districts. Accordingly, this section 
describes the socio-economic context of Ghana, touching on issues such as 
demographic and spatial characteristics, economic history and an analysis of poverty 
and social indicators with a specific focus on health. An examination of the nature 
and characteristics of the districts studied, exploring the socioeconomic indicators 
which are required to fully understand the context of each district is however 
provided in Chapter 7.  
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4.4.1 Ghana’s Socioeconomic Context  
Ghana is an Anglophone West African country and a former British colony that 
achieved independence from Great Britain in 1957 ‒ the first sub-Saharan African 
country to do so. The area of modern-day Ghana was formerly known as the Gold 
Coast. Although the Gold Coast has been inhabited for several thousands of years, 
there is little documented prior to the 16th century. The current ethnic profile of the 
region remains largely the same with minor differences as a result of migrants from 
neighbouring countries. 
With a total landmass of 238,533 sq. km, Ghana is boarded to the south by the Gulf 
of Guinea and to the north, east and west by its three francophone neighbours, 
namely, Burkina Faso, Togo and Côte d’Ivoire respectively (Ghana Statistical 
Service. 2013).  Administratively, the country is divided into 10 regions with the 
national capital, Accra, being situated in the Greater Accra region.  There are four 
domestic airports in the country while the one international airport is situated in the 
national capital of Accra. The country also has two trading harbours, one in Tema in 
the Greater Accra region and the second in Takoradi in the Western Region.  
The country is broadly defined as covering three ecological zones, namely; coastal 
forest and savannah.  The southern part of the country includes the coastal areas and 
the majority of the forest areas while the northern part of the country is covered by 
predominantly savannah vegetation.  
Ghana’s capital city of Accra is situated in the coastal region with is to the south of 
the country. This region is known historically for trading and it is economically 
extremely vibrant. The region hosts three of Ghana’s biggest cities; Accra, Kumasi 
and Takoradi, the only international airport in Accra and the two shipping ports in 
Tema and Takoradi respectively.  Numerous economic migrants from the inland 
areas of the country go to the region in search of socio-economic opportunities.  As 
an agrarian country and a country that relies heavily on the export of timber and 
minerals, traditionally Ghana’s forest belt has been the economic heart of the 
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country. The major economic activities in this region are cash and food crop farming 
while the forest areas of the region are also known for the timber which is a major 
export commodity and a source of foreign exchange. The country’s mineral wealth is 
also concentrated in the forest belt. Significant numbers of migrants from the 
savannah regions move to the forest belt in search of seasonal farming jobs and more 
permanent jobs in the mining areas.  
Ghana’s savannah region, which extends from the upper middle belt of the country 
to the northern parts of the country, has been documented as the most socio-
economically deprived region in the country. This region is characterised by the 
highest levels of poverty in the country as well as a low level of education and 
generally poor physical and social infrastructure (National Development Planning 
Commission 2010; National Development Planning Commission. 2013; Ghana 
Statistical Service. 2007).  The region is also known for its high level of out 
migration to other parts of the country in search for better opportunities. Figure 4.1 
depicts the study area and the selected districts in relation to the rest of the country.   
According to the latest population census figures (2010), the national population is 
24.6 million with an average annual growth rate of 2.5% for the last decade (Ghana 
Statistical Service. 2013). The current gender ratio is 95.2 males per 100 females. 
Ghana has a young population with approximately 57% of the population being 24 
years and younger and an estimated 40% of the population being under 15 years of 
age (Ghana Statistical Service. 2013).  The main religions in the country are 
Christianity (71.2%), Muslim (17.6%) and traditional African religions (5.2%).  The 
ethnic composition of the country is relatively heterogeneous although the dominant 
Akan ethnic group constitutes 47.3% of the population, the Mole Dagbani 16.6% and 
the Ewe, Ga-Dangme, Gurma and Guan ethnic groups 13.9%, 7.4%, 5.7% and 3.7% 
respectively (ibid). 
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Figure 4.1:  Administrative map of Ghana outlining the study districts 
(Author’s Construct, 2013) 
4.4.1.1 Economic Overview 
The economy of the Gold Coast was primarily dependent on trade in gold ‒ a 
mineral found in several regions in West Africa ‒ and timber. The trade was 
conducted mainly with European traders. The Portuguese arrived first on the shores 
of the Gold coast in the late 15th century, followed later by traders from other 
European countries, including the Dutch, Danes, English and even the Swedes. The 
gold trade in the 16th and 17th century was followed with the slave trade which was 
mainly driven by the demand for labour in the Americas. The colonial rule of the 
British started in the early 19th century. The colonial government developed limited 
infrastructure to support the trading activities, mainly roads and railroads, and to 
facilitate the movement of minerals and timber from the inland areas to the coast for 
export.  A shipping harbour at Takoradi was also constructed. In 1878, a Ghanaian 
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brought cocoa pods into the country, introducing what eventually became the 
country's major cash crop. 
The modern Ghanaian economy may be described as agrarian with a relatively 
diverse natural resource base. Agriculture contributes more than a third of the 
national output and remains the largest employer (55%) in the country. Cocoa is the 
leading cash crop, followed by other more non-traditional crops, mainly horticultural 
and including oil palm, pineapples, mangoes and citrus fruits. As regards minerals 
and natural resources the country is heavily depended on the export of gold and 
timber. Since 2011 crude oil has been included in the country’s export products. 
Other minerals found in limited quantities include diamond, manganese and bauxite1. 
Gold has remained the country’s most significant export earner, contributing 48% of 
revenue in 20122 although it is believed that crude oil will overtake gold in the near 
future (Africa Development Bank 2012; International Monetary Fund 2013). Despite 
the fact that Ghana has a relatively more advanced industrial sector as compared to 
other African countries this sector has always lagged behind and has recently been 
surpassed by the booming services sector. A major challenge to the economy has, 
however, been the attainment of macroeconomic stability and sustained economic 
growth (Aryeetey et al. 2002; Aryeetey & Fosu 2003). The country’s 
macroeconomic history has been characterised by volatile GDP growth, large and 
persistent budget and current account deficits, high inflation and high interest rates. 
The immediate post-independence economic strategy combined a rapid, state-led 
modernisation strategy based on import-substitution industrialisation and a 
commitment to a wide range of social welfare benefits in the hope of transforming 
the structure of the economy and ensuring an improved standard of living for the 
people (Aryeetey & Fosu 2003; Aryeetey et al. 2000). The resultant effect was a high 
per capita income and a GDP growth rate driven predominantly by cocoa exports. 
The late 1960s to the early 1980s saw a highly volatile economic performance which 
                                                
1http://www.gepcghana.com/index.php 
2http://www.gepcghana.com/gold.php 
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was seen to be driven primarily by political instability, poor implementation of 
domestic policies, intense government interventions, the lack of political will and the 
oil price shock of the 1970s and 1980s.  
This state of affairs culminated in an unprecedented period of economic decline in 
the early 1980s and, by 1983, the country’s GDP was a mere fraction of its value in 
1970 and the revenue base of the nation was severely eroded. The government of 
Ghana, with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank, embarked on an Economic Recovery Programme/Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ERP/SAP) ‒ the first African country to embark on the SAP (Konadu‐
Agyemang 2000; Weissman 1990). The economy appeared to respond positively to 
the ERP/ SAP. It recovered from an average real GDP growth of less than 1% 
between 1966 and 1983 to an impressive rate of 9% by 1984 (Weissman 1990; 
Konadu‐Agyemang 2000; Aryeetey et al. 2000). This favourable growth continued 
into the 1990s and, as a result of the efforts, the GDP growth averaged 5%, poverty 
was reduced and the social indicators improved. However, fiscal challenges persisted 
through the 1990s and, by the end of the decade, there was still a long agenda of 
unfinished reforms in the public sector while private sector development continued 
to lag (Osei 2012; Aryeetey et al. 2000).  
4.4.1.2 Poverty Reduction and the MDGs 
Ghana had long aspired to attain the global income grouping of middle-income 
status. Numerous government programmes (Ghana Vision 20-20, the Growth and 
Poverty Reduction Strategy) over the years have had this as their overall aim and, in 
2010, Ghana finally attained a middle-income country status, primarily as a result of 
rapid economic growth and the GDP rebasing exercise (Moss & Majerowicz, 2012; 
Ghana Statistical Service, 2003).  Figure 4.2 below presents Ghana’s GNI per capita 
as compared to the average of low human development and middle human 
development countries.  The graph shows that Ghana’s GNI per capita falls 
consistently below the average for middle human development countries. Even after 
attaining middle-income country status Ghana’s per capita GNI continued to lag 
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behind. However, since 1990, the country’s GNI has started to outstrip the low 
human development countries. 
 
Figure 4.2: GNI per capita in PPP terms (Constant International 2011 
International USD)3 
The economic growth in the country since 1990 has resulted in a significant decline 
in poverty with the number of people living below poverty line declining over the 
years from 36.5% in 1992 to 18.2% in 2006 for the lower poverty line and 52% to 
29% over the same period for the upper poverty line respectively(Ghana Statistical 
Service. 2008). However, despite this progress, other multi dimensional poverty 
indices such as the UNDP Human Development Index and the Human Poverty Index 
show mixed results. Although index values continue to rise, albeit gradually, it does 
not appear that the HDI ranking for Ghana is reflecting the gains. However, this may 
be explained by the fact that other countries’ gains are outstripping those of Ghana. 
According to the 2012 Human Development Index (HDI), Ghana is in the lower half 
of the medium human development category and ranked 135 out of 187 ‒ the same 
as the 2011 ranking (Malik 2013; Klugman et al. 2009). Figure 4.3 depicts Ghana’s 
HDI values in comparison to sub-Saharan African countries and to low and middle 
human development countries. It may be observed that, although Ghana lies above 
                                                
3HDRO calculations based on data from World Bank (2014), IMF (2014) and UNSD (2014) 
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both the low human development index grouping and Africa for the period in 
question, the country continues to lie far below the middle human development 
category.  
  
Figure 4.3: Trends in Human Development Index values for 1980 to 20134 
Regional and Spatial Patterns of Poverty in Ghana  
Despite the general improvement in both poverty and human development at the 
national level, an examination of regional level data over three periods (1991/92, 
1998/99 and 2005/06) reveals that poverty continued to be characterised by 
significant spatial dimensions. Figure 4.4 illustrates that poverty was 
disproportionately concentrated in the three northern regions (Upper East, Upper 
West and Northern regions) of the country, all of which recorded levels above a 50% 
incidence. Despite the fact that the Upper East region recorded a decline in levels 
from 1998 to 2005, the data shows that that level was actually higher than the 
                                                
4Source: HDRO calculations based on data from UNDESA (2013), Barro and Lee (2013), UNESCO Institute for Statistics 
(2013), UN Statistics Division (2014) World Bank (2014) and IMF (2014) 
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1990/1991 levels.  In addition, poverty in the Upper West Region actually showed an 
increase in 2004/2005 over the 1998/1999 levels.  
 
Figure 4.4 Regional and overall trends of poverty incidence in Ghana, 1991/92, 
1998/99, and 2005/065 
 
A further investigation into historical trends reveals that the regional nature of 
poverty is not surprising. Data from 1975 (see Figure 4.5), when the country had 
nine administrative regions only, reveals a similar pattern to the pattern above.  
                                                
5 Source: Patterns and trends of poverty in Ghana 1991–2006, Ghana Statistical Service 
 
0	  
10	  
20	  
30	  
40	  
50	  
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
Po
ve
rt
y	  
In
ci
de
nc
e	  
in
	  P
er
ce
nt
	  	  
AdministraVve	  Regions	  	  
Years	  1991	  
Years	  1998	  
Years	  2005	  
 
 
 
 
  
 
88 
 
Figure 4.5: Incidence of poverty by administrative regions, Ghana 19756 
While the national poverty incidence was 55%, the Northern and the Upper regions 
(currently Upper West and Upper East) recorded 90% and 88% respectively. The 
Volta region, which has since seen a significant reduction in poverty levels, recorded 
a high of 92%.   
This trend has been documented by a number of researchers in earlier periods 
although statistical evidence may appear to be lacking (Boateng et al. 1990).  For 
example, Ewusi (1976) constructed a composite index of development for all the 
administrative regions in Ghana using data from 1970 and established that Greater 
Accra was the most developed region. He also pointed out that the Northern and the 
Upper regions were the least developed regions with index values of less than 10% 
as compared to the index value of the Greater Accra region.  Based on his index, 
Ewusi (1976) categorised the exiting regions into 4 groups ranging from the least 
developed to the most developed.  This information is presented in Table 4.1.  
 
 
 
                                                
6 Source: Patterns and trends of poverty in Ghana 1991–2006, Ghana Statistical Service and GLSS Report 
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Table 4.1: Levels of regional development in Ghana, 19707 
Development category Administrative region  Score on index  
More developed  Greater Accra 1.000 
Developed Western  0.392 
Central  0.398 
Developing  Eastern  0.355 
Ashanti  0.340 
Brong Ahafo 0.265 
Volta  0.306 
Less developed  Northern  0.110 
Upper  0.071 
 
Rural areas have consistently recorded much higher levels of poverty than urban 
centres and, despite the fact that both rural and urban poverty decreased over the 
years from 85.08% and 53.48% in 1975 to 39.2% and 10.8% in 2005 for rural and 
urban respectively, this pattern continues to persist. The extent of this rural urban 
dichotomy in poverty was so significant that Boateng et al. (1990, p.28) described 
poverty as an “overwhelmingly rural phenomenon”.  However, more recent reports 
indicate that the level of urban poverty is on the rise (Ghana Statistical Service. 
2013).  
                                                
7 Source: Ewusi, K., 1976. Disparities in levels of regional development in Ghana. Social indicators research. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00286164 pages 88 to 89 [Accessed October 6, 2014]. 
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Figure 4.6: Incidence of poverty by location, Ghana 1975 to 20068 
With regard to the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
provide brief insights into all the sectoral development goals in Ghana, national 
reports (United Nations Development Programme and Government of Ghana 2010; 
National Development Planning Commission 2012; Ghana Health Service. 2011)  
indicate that the country has made significant progress in achieving these goals. Of 
the 12 targets couched out of the eight MDG goals on which Ghana reports, 5 have 
been accessed as probable. These include targets on extreme poverty and hunger, 
universal basic education, gender disparity in primary and basic education, gender 
access in secondary education and access to safe drinking water (United Nations 
Development Programme and Government of Ghana 2010; National Development 
Planning Commission 2012; National Development Planning Commission 2010) .  
Three of the targets have been ranked as potentially achievable, namely, halving the 
population suffering from hunger, halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and 
address national debt.  Two of the targets have been indicated as unattainable, 
namely, reducing under-five mortality by two-thirds and maternal mortality by three-
quarters (ibid). The report indicates that the two remaining targets, namely, halting 
                                                
8 Source: Patterns and trends of poverty in Ghana 1991–2006, Ghana Statistical Service and GLSS V Report (Ghana Statistical 
Service. 2008) 
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and reversing the spread of malaria and environmental sustainability, suffer from a 
lack of adequate data with which to quantify performance (ibid).   
To summarise the report MDG targets in the health sector are proving to be a 
challenge despite increasing investment. Of the three goals directly linked to health, 
only the HIV/AIDS goal is on track. Over the last few years the HIV/AIDS 
prevalence rate has stabilised between 2 and 3% while the prevalence rate for 2012 
was 1.37% ‒ an improvement on the 2011 level of 1.46% (National Development 
Planning Commission, 2013).  The main concern is the relatively high prevalence 
rate of HIV/AIDS amongst the youth. The maternal mortality goal appears to be 
improving, although only slightly (United Nations Development Programme and 
Government of Ghana 2010). According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2009), 
maternal mortality rate was 200 per 100,000 live births ‒ a slight improvement on 
the 2007 rate of 224 per 100,000 live births (Ghana Statistical Service 2004).  
The current figures for maternal mortality institutional measure stand at 155 deaths 
per 1000 live births ‒ a far cry from the 2015 target of 54 per 1000 live births for the 
institutional rate ‒ and 451 per 100,000 live births for the survey rate ‒ also far 
removed from the 2015 target of 185 per 100,000 live births (United Nations 
Development Programme and Government of Ghana 2010; National Development 
Planning Commission 2012) . The goal of improving child and infant health showed 
some improvement with under-five mortality declining from 111 per 1000 live births 
in 2007 to 80 per 1000 live births in 2008. Infant mortality also experienced a 
marginal decline from 67 per 1000 in 2003 to 50 per 1000 live births in 2008 (ibid). 
The reported infant mortality rate of 82 per 1000 live births is still off the targeted 
2015 rate of 53 per 1000 live births (ibid).  
4.4.1.3 Health Status and Health Inequality   
a. Health Status  
Despite the poor performance on health related MDGs in general Ghana may, 
nevertheless, be said to have made progress in health delivery over the years. There 
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have been gains in the area of health care and policy post-independence. Examples 
of such gains include the eradication of small pox, consistent improvement in life 
expectancy and the prevention of a range of communicable diseases such as measles, 
poliomyelitis, and diphtheria and which has had significant impacts on child survival 
rates and development over the years. Policy gains include the expansion of the 
coverage of the health services based on the primary health care approach. Tables 4.2 
and 4.3 present selected health indicators for children and adults respectively. For 
example, in the case of child and infant indicators the data shows that Ghana 
continues to lag behind its fellow medium human development countries but 
consistently outperforms the low human development, least developed countries and 
also sub-Saharan African countries. The indicators on antenatal care coverage and 
malnutrition even outperform the average for medium human development countries.  
 
Table 4.2: Child and infant health indicators9  
 
Infants lacking 
immunisation10 
2012 
Mortality rates 
per 1000 live 
births 2012 
Antenata
l 
coverage
11 2008–
2012 
Child malnutrition12 
2008–2012 
Country DTP 
Measle
s Infant 
Under-
five  
Stuntin
g 
Overweig
ht 
Ghana 8 12 49 72 96.4 22.7 2.6 
Medium 
human 
development 10 20 37 46 78.7 40.3 5.3 
Low human 
development 18 27 64 94 70.5 39.8 4.2 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 20 28 64 97 76.9 37.8 4.6 
                                                
9 Source: Compiled from http://www.who.int/countries/gha/en/ 
10 Percentage of one-year-olds 
11 Percentage of live births  
12 Percentage of under-five  
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Least 
developed 
countries 10 20 57 84 69.1 41.1 3.8 
 
The adults indicators shows that though male and female mortality rates are high 
although once again, Ghana outperforms the sub Saharan African average, low 
human development and low income averages but fall behind the medium human 
development countries average.  The indicator for physician coverage points to a 
major problem in the availability of physicians as the number is significantly lower 
for Ghana as compared to all the other categories (Sub Sahara Africa, low human 
development, low income averages and medium human development countries). 
Health expenditures commanded 4.8% of GDP, lower than the low human 
development and the Sub Saharan African average but larger than the medium 
human development average. Ghana health seekers bear 29.1% of the total health 
expenditure burden, significantly lower than the medium human development and 
low-income countries but higher than the sub-Saharan African average ‒ see Table 
4.2 for details.  
Table 4.3: Adult health indicators13 
 
Country/Region  
Mortality 
rate 201114 
HIV 
prevalence 
2012 
Life 
expectancy 
in years 
201015 
Physicians 
per 10,000 
people 
2003–
201216 
Health expenditure 
2011 
 
Fe
ma
le 
Mal
e 
(% aged 
15-49) 
Fem
ale 
Mal
e 
 
(Total 
as % 
of 
GDP) 
(Out of 
pocket % of 
total health 
expenditure) 
Ghana 
21
7 252 1.4 56.1 54.5 0.9 4.8 29.1 
                                                
13Source:  complied from http://www.who.int/countries/gha/en/ 
14 Per 1000 people 
15 Health-adjusted years 
16 Per 10,000 people 
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Medium human 
development 
15
7 230 .. 59.5 56.3 7.4 4.6 44.7 
Low human 
development 
27
0 313 .. 53.0 50.7 2.8 5.2 52.7 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
32
7 372 .. 51.6 49.4 1.8 6.3 27.6 
 
However, the epidemiological situation in Ghana remains unchanged(Ministry of 
Health 2007) over the last few decades and is characterised primarily by high levels 
of infectious/communicable diseases, accounting for 62% of morbidity (WHO 2010), 
although the number of non-communicable diseases is rising steadily (Ministry of 
Health 2007). The top three leading causes of morbidity in the entire population are 
malaria (44%), upper respiratory tract infection (7.2%) and diarrhoea (4.3%), with 
malaria, anaemia and pneumonia being the top three causes of mortality (Ministry of 
Health 2007).  Neonatal causes, malaria and anaemia are the three biggest causes of 
mortality of children aged under-five, accounting for 32%, 26% and 10% of deaths 
respectively. However, these levels are lower than the regional averages (WHO 
2010).  
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Figure 4.7: Trends in Health Index values for 1980 to 201317 
b. Health Equity 
General socioeconomic development in Ghana, including health, assumes a similar 
pattern to the trends exhibited by poverty (see section 4.4.1.2). Konadu‐Agyemang 
(2000); Tsikata & Seini( 2004); Langer et al. (2007), attribute the pattern to the 
spatially biased, developmental agenda of the British colonial administration, 
concluding that this ensured that socio-economic development was concentrated only 
in the coastal cities and other cities and towns in the southern area of the country and 
to the detriment of the northern areas.  
Post independence, numerous regimes and governments put in place polices 
designed to address the massive gap in socioeconomic development between the 
regions. The establishment of the Savannah Accelerated Development Authority 
                                                
17 HDRO calculations based on data from World Bank (2014), IMF (2014) and UNSD (2014) 
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(SADA) in 2009 is one example of such a policy. The SADA aims to facilitate the 
rapid development of the savannah region covering most of Ghana’s middle belt to 
the northern sector (Diverse Solutions Ghana 2014). The overall aim of SADA is to 
bridge the gap in socioeconomic development between the North and the South.  
One result of this pattern of socioeconomic deprivation is that the geographical 
distribution of diseases reinforces the north-south, socio-economic divide which is 
characteristic of the country (Ministry of Health 2007). Health status also reflects a 
rural-urban character as, in the main, urban dwellers demonstrate a better health 
status than the poorer, rural dwellers, although the health status of urban residents 
has been deteriorating over the years (ibid).  
Currently, one of the objectives of the Ministry of Health is to bridge the equity gap 
in health care and of which geographic equity is an indicator. Two indicators 
included in this objective are to achieve geographic equity in services as measured 
by supervised delivery and in resources as measured by the nurse to population ratio. 
 
Figure 4.8: Nurse to population ratio18 
                                                
18 Source: Holistic Assessment of the Health Sector Programme of Work 2013 Ghana and The Health Sector In Ghana Facts 
And Figures (GHS 2010; Ministry of Health 2014) 
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The 2013 assessment of the resource situation indicated that the inequity gap in 
resources was widening as, although both the resource poor and resource rich regions 
had improved their nurse to population ratio, the performance of the resource rich 
regions outstripped that of poorer regions (Ministry of Health 2014). Nevertheless, 
the assessment also highlighted that the staffing situations in a number of regions, for 
example, the Upper East region which had the lowest nurse to population ratio in 
2007, had improved significantly with a 50% increment in the nurse to population 
ratio from 2012 to 2013 (Ministry of Health 2014).  
As regards the indicator on skilled delivery the national situation had improved. 
Nevertheless, once again the regional picture showed significant variations with the 
coverage of skilled delivery decreasing in seven out of the 10 administrative regions.  
 
4.4.2 Study Districts  
Four districts were selected for the purposes of the interviews. These districts are all 
located in the Northern and Greater Accra regions. In the interests of analysing the 
socioeconomic deprivation to assist policymaking in the country Ghana is often 
divided geographically into North and South. This is essential to ensure adequate 
representation of the northern and southern halves of the country as poverty 
continues to exhibit a spatial character and, higher levels of poverty are recorded in 
the northern parts of the country (see Figure 4.4). The selection of districts was also 
informed by the need to ensure that analysis covered assemblies of various 
population sizes and character. Thus the four districts selected include, metropolitan 
assembly, a municipal assembly and a district assembly. The selection was also 
motivated by the need to capture the issues of both rural and urban districts. Finally 
the study sought to focus on information rich cases by ensuring that districts chosen 
had been in existence from the beginning of the decentralisation process. Thus, 
section 7.2 provides a detailed discussion on selected districts; the size of each 
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district as well as providing a general demographic profile and a brief economic 
outline for each district. It must be noted that this discussion is, however, limited by 
the scope and availability of data on the districts.  
4.5 Data Collection  
The study examined the effect of decentralisation on inequities in Ghana’s health 
sector. The choice of the health sector was informed by a number of factors 
including the fact that the health sector in Ghana is a relatively large sector in terms 
of the sectors’ share in the national budget and has generally been perceived as a 
challenge as regards the attainment of both national and also the Millennium 
Development Goals.  The sector was also selected because of the central role of 
health in both development and poverty reduction. Sen (2002) argues that health is 
one of the most important conditions of human life and is also a critically significant 
constituent of human capabilities. It is, thus, essential that it is valued. The selection 
of a maternal health variable was motivated by the fact that Ghana has under-
performed in the health-related development goals, particularly so in maternal and 
infant health. The maternal health in Ghana has lagged behind most national 
development indicators with the maternal mortality ratio worsening from a rate of 
580 per 100,000 live births in 1990 to 590 per 100,000 in 1995 (National 
Development Planning Commission 2012). The study thus aims to provide 
significant insights into policies in address maternal health. 
4.5.1 Data Sources 
The study relied on three major sources of data which were collected concurrently in 
Ghana over a four-month period in addition to the GDHS. The data used in the 
descriptive analysis comprised primary data from the interviews and secondary 
archival data from records and, finally, data for descriptive analysis at the district 
level. In addition, the data for the econometric analysis comprised secondary 
household data from the GDHS. 
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Several factors determined the choice of the GDHS as the major source of data for 
the purposes of this study.  Firstly, the option of collecting primary data at the 
household level was abandoned as a result of the high potential for recall bias in 
respondents. The study required a minimum of two data points and an extensive 
survey which would have been needed in order to realise the study’s research 
objectives. Secondly, there are a number of household survey datasets available for 
Ghana19 from 1992 when decentralisation law was enacted to 2011 when the study 
started. Thirdly, due to the availability of extensive socioeconomic and health 
variables within the GDHS the survey is well suited for the purposes of the study  as 
compared to other surveys such as the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) 
which contains a limited range of health variables. The GDHS was thus selected due 
to the availability of the survey for time period that fall within the period of 
decentralisation and the wide range of health variables. The particular years 2003 
and 2008 were chosen mainly due to the fact that the period coincided with an 
intensification of the decentralisation process in Ghana. Also the 1998 DHS that also 
fell within the period had variables that did not conform with the 2003 and 2008 
which made it impossible to combine. Although the 2003 Core Welfare Indicators 
Questionnaire Survey (CWIQ) is the only available data which is statistically 
representative at the district level, it is fairly dated and has been discontinued. The 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) tended to be more specific in its 
objectives and, thus, offered a limited scope of variables. The next sections describe 
these data sources in detail. 
a. Ghana Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS) 
The GDHS is a national and regional representative survey of households in Ghana 
and is designed to provide data with which to monitor the population and health 
situation in Ghana. Since 1988, there have been five such surveys carried, namely in 
                                                
19Four rounds of the Ghana Demographic and Health Survey  
Two rounds of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey  
Five rounds of the Ghana living Standards Survey  
The 2003 Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire Survey  
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1988, 1993, 1998, 2003 and 2008.  The information collected in the later surveys 
provides updated estimates of the basic demographic and health indicators covered in 
the earlier surveys.  This study used the data from the most recent GDHSs carried 
out in 2003 and in 2008. There are some differences between the 2003 and 2008 
GDHS surveys. Firstly, the 2008 GDHS sampled more than 12,000 households in 
such a manner as to enable separate estimates of key indicators for each of the 10 
regions in Ghana, as well as for the urban and rural areas separately.  
In contrast, the 2003 survey sampled approximately 6600 households.  The survey 
uses a two stage sampling technique which involves the sampling frame first being 
stratified into the 10 administrative regions in the country, then into rural and urban 
enumeration areas (EAs). During the first stage of sampling, sample points or EAs 
are selected, each with probability proportional to size and based on the number of 
households.  This provides a complete listing of households in all the selected EAs 
(clusters). During the second stage of selection, the households on the list are 
systematically sampled. 
Households are assigned weights based on cluster, household and individual non-
responses to ensure that the representations were not distorted (Ghana Statistical 
Service 2009; Ghana Statistical Service 2004). In half of the 2008 GDHS sampled 
households, all women aged 15–49 and all men aged 15–59 were eligible to be 
interviewed if they were either the residents of the households or visitors present in 
the households on the night before the survey. However, in 2003, separate 
questionnaires were administered to all males and females, aged 15–49 and 15–59 
respectively, in the households. 
i. Questionnaires and Key Variables  
The GDHS uses three separate questionnaires to interview households, women and 
men. The content of these questionnaires is based on both global DHS models and 
the previous GDHS questionnaires (Ghana Statistical Service 2009). The household 
questionnaire collects information on all members of and visitors to the selected 
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households in addition to general information on the characteristics of the 
households’ dwelling units, including the source of water, type of toilet facilities, 
materials used for the flooring and roofing of the house, ownership of various 
durable goods, and ownership and use of mosquito nets (Ghana Statistical Service 
2009). The household questionnaire also provides basic information on the 
characteristics of each person listed, including age, gender, education, and 
relationship to the head of the household and serves as a means with which to 
identify the women and men who were eligible for the individual interviews (Ghana 
Statistical Service 2004). 
The questionnaire administered to the women specifically sought details on the 
following topics: education, residential history, media exposure, reproductive 
history, knowledge and use of family planning methods, fertility preferences, 
antenatal and delivery care, breastfeeding, infant and young child feeding practices, 
vaccinations and childhood illnesses, marriage and sexual activity, woman’s work, 
husband’s background characteristics, childhood mortality, awareness and behaviour 
as regards AIDS and other sexually transmitted infections (STIs), awareness of TB 
and other health issues, and domestic violence.  
b. Semi-structured Interviews  
The study used a semi-structured interview technique to collect the requisite data, 
especially for the purposes of the qualitative analysis. Semi-structured interviews are 
often used in policy research because they provide a flexible way of gathering the 
required data while also enabling the researcher to probe further to attain clarity and 
explore the in-depth views and opinions of the respondents (Barriball & While 1994; 
Longhurst 2003; Wengraf 2001; Fylan, 2005).  
However, semi-structured interviews are also time consuming, expensive and 
extremely dependent on the competence of the interviewer. Bernard (1988) and 
Longhurst (2003) argue that the semi-structured interview becomes a useful resource 
when the interviewer may not have more than one chance to interview a respondent.  
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The interview guide used in the semi-structured interview technique provides a clear 
set of instructions for interviewers and may provide reliable, comparable qualitative 
data.  
Accordingly, this study used semi-structured interviews as a complementary method 
of data collecting to ensure that nuanced data was gathered (Barriball & While 1994; 
Fylan 2005; Longhurst 2003) . An interview schedule was devised, listing the 
important issues to be addressed based on the conceptual framework, ranging from 
more general issues to specific and detailed issues (Fylan 2005).  The interview 
schedule was piloted using a few respondents to ensure the viability of the 
questionnaire prior to the fieldwork.  Pretesting the interview schedule ensures that 
all unanticipated problems in respect of the questions may be addressed while also 
ensuring that the interviewees understand the questions and that the questions posed 
will elicit relevant answers.   
c. Archival Data 
The study used archival data from the records of the District Assemblies Common 
Fund (DACF) and the districts for the purposes of the descriptive and contextual 
analysis of the districts. The data from the DACF included data on district revenues, 
district size and DACF allocations. The study also relied on the data obtained from a 
number of reports; district medium term plans, annual reports from GHS, district and 
national annual progress reports, records from the DACF office and the DACF 
formulae. The data from the DACF report comprised mainly data on district funding 
and resources and fund disbursements. Table 4.4 presents the various documents 
used and their respective sources. 
Table 4.4: List of administrative and policy documents and national reports 
Document  Source  
District Assemblies Common Fund Formula District Assembly Common Fund office  
Selected Districts Annual Progress Reports (5) NDPC/District  
Districts Medium Term Plans (4) NDPC/District 
Ministry of Health Annual Progress Reports  Ministry of Health  
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District Development Fund Report  Ministry of Local Government and 
Rural Development  
2010 Population and Housing Census Report  Ghana Statistical Service  
Ghana Health Service Annual Reports Ghana Health Service 
Ghana Demographic and Health Survey 
Reports 
Ghana Statistical Service  
Health Sector 5-Year Programme of Work 
2002-2006 
Ministry of Health  
Ghana Shared Growth And Development 
Agenda (GSGDA) 
National Development Planning 
Commission  
Annual Progress Reports (National) National Development Planning 
Commission 
Consolidated Local Government Bill (2014) Parliament  
 
4.5.2 Sample Size 
The qualitative analysis relied on semi-structured interviews with 20  experts  to 
obtain detailed and information on the research topic (see table 4.5). These experts 
from varied backgrounds were selected from ministries, departments or agencies 
(MDA) that work directly within the decentralised health structures in Ghana. Table 
4.3 illustrates the number of interviewees from each MDA. The main respondents in 
the study were at the levels of director and chief director of the selected MDAs.  
The Ghana Demographic Health Survey (GDHS) enumeration areas cover all 10 
regions in Ghana and 18 out of the original 110 districts that were created at the 
initiation of the decentralisation process.  
4.5.3 Study Participants 
The key participants in the study included officials from the decentralised health 
departments, district assemblies and national departments that interact with both the 
health sector and the district structures.  The specifically the study selected 
information rich participants directly interact with decentralised health structures and 
departments.  Ghana is divided into ten administrative regions and within each 
region there7 are a number of districts. The study gathered primary data from two 
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regions (Greater Accra and Northern) and four districts (two in each region). 
Although interviewees provided both verbal and written permission to participate in 
this study, their identities were protected.  In addition, the way in which the data 
analysis was conducted ensured that it would not be possible to identify the 
respondents. 
Table 4.5: Interview participants20 
MDA  Participants Unique ID 
Ministry of Finance  2 NO1&2 
Ministry of Health  3 NO3-05 
Ministry of Local Government  3 NO6-08 
District Assemblies Common Fund  2 N09&10 
District Assemblies Officers 6 DAO 1-8 
Ghana Health Service/District Health 
Directorates Officers 
4 DHDO1-4 
Total  20  
 
4.5.4 Sampling Method 
This study used two different samples: 1) The selection of districts for the 
econometric analysis and 2) The selection of the districts and participants for the 
interviews. There have been several changes to Ghana’s district boundaries since 
1990. For example, in 1990, there were 110 districts. By 2004, the number of 
districts had increased to 130 before rising to 170 in 2010 while, in 2013 and based 
on a review of the 2010 population census, the number of districts had increased to 
216.  For the purposes of quantitative analysis, the study relied on districts surveyed 
in the GDHS (2008).  
                                                
20 NO – National Officer ‒ Includes all the national level officers interviewed, mainly from Ministries of State and national 
level institutions such as the District Assemblies Common Fund  
DAO (District Assembly Officer) ‒ Refers to individuals working with the devolved districts assemblies  
DHO (District Health Officer) ‒ Individuals working with the Ghana health service but at the district health directorate levels 
within the districts  
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The study purposively selected the four districts and the interviewees for the 
purposes of the qualitative analysis. Onwuegbuzie & Collins (2007) and Patton 
(1990) argue that purposive sampling is useful in situations in which the researcher 
has limited financial resources and time.  This technique is also useful when the 
researcher is interested in information-rich cases and possesses an extensive 
understanding of the study area. Thus, the health officials interviewed were “experts” 
with experience in the specific area of the decentralised health system in Ghana.  
Two possible disadvantages of purposive sampling include selection bias and non- 
statistically representativeness.  However, the researcher selected cases not based on 
personal convenience but to ensure that data was available for the selected districts. 
This was especially important as the boundaries of districts in Ghana have changed a 
number of times as the number of districts has been increased (see Chapter 5). 
4.5.5 Data Collection Summary 
Table 4.3 below outlines the data requirements for answering the specific questions 
posed in the study.  The table lists the research questions, provides a summary of the 
methods which were used to collect the required data and outlines the data analysis 
techniques that were applied to achieve the research objectives.
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Table 4.6: Data requirement for research question 1 
To what extent are changes in equity in the utilisation of maternal health services associated with decentralisation? 
Research Question Data requirements / source  Method of data analysis 
What is the level of maternal health utilisation 
and what are the variations in maternal health 
utilisation across regions? 
Household level data from the GDHS Descriptive analysis of variables 
What is the level of maternal health inequities 
in Ghana across regions? 
Household level data from the GDHS and 
district data 
Descriptive analysis of variables 
and econometric analysis using 
concentration curve and index 
analysis 
To what extent are the inequities demonstrated 
a reflection of either inter or intra regional 
variations? 
Household level data from the GDHS Descriptive analysis of variables 
and econometric analysis using 
concentration curve and index 
analysis 
What is the level of inequities in health 
resources across districts? 
Data from District Assembly Common Fund  Analysis using concentration curve 
and index analysis 
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Table 4.7: Data requirement for research question 2 
What are the factors that influence the equitable utilisation of maternal health services in Ghana’s decentralised system?   
Research question Data required/source  Method of data analysis 
How has the intensity of decentralisation 
changed over time?  
Archival data and records  
 
Documentary review 
What is the level of decentralisation within 
the health system?  
Archival data and records  
Primary data from semi-structured interviews 
Review of decentralisation process 
and implementation through 
explanatory analysis.  
What were/are the motives for health sector 
decentralisation in Ghana? 
Primary data from semi-structured interviews 
 
Analysis of qualitative data 
How has decentralisation impacted on health 
inequities in Ghana? 
 
 Primary data from semi-structured interviews 
Household level data from the GDHS and 
district data 
Analysis of qualitative data 
Descriptive analysis of variables 
and econometric analysis using 
inequality index analysis 
What are the perceived threats to health 
equities within Ghana’s decentralised system? 
 
Archival data and records  
Primary data from semi-structured interviews 
Analysis of qualitative data  
What is the prognosis for decentralisation in 
the Ghanaian health system if it is to 
positively influence the attainment of sectoral 
goals and achieve a reduction in inequities?  
Archival data and records  
Primary data from semi-structured interviews 
Analysis of qualitative data  
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4.6 Data Analysis Techniques 
Data analysis is the process of coming up with findings from the data collected and 
requires that the data is organised, scrutinised, selected, described, theorised, 
interpreted, discussed and presented to audiences. The analysis of the quantitative 
data made use of STATA for the regression analysis of the household survey data 
(econometric model specified below), which included an estimation of indirect 
standardised inequality indices and the derivation of inequality curves. STATA was 
also used to conduct a simple descriptive analysis through the use of tables, charts 
and graphs. 
The process for analysing qualitative data begins with transcribing, organising and 
reviewing the data which has been gathered. It is important that this process should 
start soon after the data has been collected. Accordingly, in this study the analysis of 
the qualitative data started during the fieldwork process, when each interview tape 
was labelled by date and level or respondent, then entered on the computer to be 
used for the analysis. The data from the interviews was transcribed verbatim over a 
three-month period.  
The confidentiality of the participants was ensured as the interviewer transcribed the 
interviews personally. The transcripts were then read multiple times to ensure that 
the researcher fully understood and was conversant with the content of the 
interviews. The transcripts were then critically examined using content analysis and 
by comparing and contrasting the information from the interviews. The data from all 
the districts were combined on the basis of the fact that there were no major 
differences between regions in respect of the data reported in the study. On the other 
hand, the national level interviews were treated individually.  
The transcripts were again read repeatedly before, during and after coding to ensure 
the proper categorisation of the data. Initial categories were created based on the 
scope and sections in the interviews. However, these initial categories was then re-
examined based on a better understanding of the data and re-categorised based on 
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emergent themes and sub-themes from the data and as guided by the theoretical 
foundations of the thesis. The redundant data from this process was carefully 
examined once more before being excluded from the study.  
Figure 4.7 outlines the research phases ‒ from the problem development to the 
finalisation of the thesis.  
 
Figure 4.9: Phases of the research 
4.7 Econometric Model 
4.7.1 Standardisation Approach 
The inequity within the decentralised health system in Ghana was empirically 
explored by estimating a standardised inequality index in order to decompose the 
inequity into intra and inter regional shares.  There are various forms of inequalities 
the health system. Some of these inequalities are unavoidable and, thus, they do not 
constitute inequities. As defined in this study inequities reflect those inequalities that 
result from unequal economic and social conditions and which are both systemic and 
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avoidable. Thus, an accurate measure of healthcare inequities should account for the 
variations that are the result of avoidable demographic and pre-existing chronic 
health conditions. In order to do this, the index computed was standardised to 
eliminate the effects of unavoidable inequalities. O’Donnell and Wagstaff (2008) 
suggest that there are two approaches to standardisation, namely, the direct approach 
and the indirect approach.  
The direct approach deals with grouped data by computing the need-standardised 
utilisation of medical care for each income or economic group. The value of the 
computed index depends on the number of groups (Wagstaff et al. 1999). Thus, the 
direct standardisation technique is suitable only when working with grouped data but 
may become a limitation as many studies analyse inequalities at the individual level. 
However, the indirect standardisation technique offers a solution to this problem. 
This approach may be applied to both grouped and ungrouped (individual level) data.  
The approach provides a value for each individual in the sample. This value is 
interpreted as the level of health care the person would have received if the person 
were treated in the same way as others with the same characteristics. Thus, this value 
reflects an individual’s need for care. This study used the indirect standardisation 
technique as this technique relies on individual level ungrouped data.   
Relying on data on maternal health variables means that there is gender uniformity 
and, thus, the need to standardise for the effect of gender does not arise. However, 
this study distinguishes between avoidable and unavoidable inequalities by 
standardising for the effect of both age and pre-existing medical conditions. The 
linear specification of the model is given below. 
Let 𝑦! be the health care outcome variable of interest.  The standardised measure of 
health inequality, yiIS will be given by the difference between actual and expected 
health, and the overall sample mean.  
yiIS = yi − yˆxi + y  
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yiIS ‒ standardised measure  𝑦! ‒ actual value  
yˆxi ‒ expected value of health utilisation  
y ‒ mean value  
4.7.2 Theil’s Index 
The Generalised Entropy (GE) indices provide a means of measuring redundancy in 
data, for example, inequality, lack of diversity, non-randomness, compressibility, or 
segregation (Novotný 2007; Conceicao & Ferreira 2000). For the measurement of 
inequality, the best known GE is the Theil T, also often referred to as the Theil’s 
index. The Theil’s index measures general disproportionality and was developed by 
the economist Henri Theil (Cowell 2006; Theil 1965; Theil 1971). The index may be 
used to sum the difference between the natural logarithm of shares of health and 
shares of population while the Theil’s index is population weighted (Shorrocks 
1980). The values of the GE measures vary between 0 and ∞, with zero representing 
an equal distribution and a higher value representing a higher level of inequality 
(McKay 2002).  
The standard form for the Theil’s T is written as follows;  
T = Pi=1
J∑ iRi lnRi  𝑃! is the proportion of the population in group i 𝑅! is the ratio of the prevalence or rate of health in group i relative to the total rate, 
4.7.3 Decomposition of the Theil’s Index 
The major advantage of the Theil’s index is the ease with which the index may be 
decomposed. In the case of the additive index as shown above, the total value of the 
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Theil’s index is derived from summing up its constituent parts (Novotný 2007; 
Shorrocks 1980; Shorrocks & Wan 2005; Shorrocks 1984; McKay 2002).  Thus, for 
the purpose of the geographic decomposition the breakdown is as follows; 𝑇 = 𝑇! + 𝑇!      Where 𝑇 ‒ Theil index  𝑇! ‒ denotes intra group inequality  𝑇! ‒ inter group inequality  
4.7.4 Concentration Curves and Concentration Indices 
Concentration curves may be used to plot the cumulative percentage of the health 
variable against the cumulative percentage of the population, ranked by living 
standards and beginning with the poorest and ending with the richest. The 
concentration curves plot shares of the health variable against quintiles of the living 
standards variable.  Concentration curves may be used to examine a number of 
equity related issues in health, including inequality not just in health outcomes but 
also in any health sector variable of interest. In addition, concentration curves may 
be used to assess differences in health inequality across time and spatial dimensions 
(Kakwani et al. 1997; Wagstaff & Doorslaer 2000; O’Donnell & Wagstaff 2008; 
Pradhan et al. 2003) In addition, concentration curves help to determine the existence 
of socioeconomic inequality in health and whether such inequities vary over time 
and across space. The concentration curve is, however, limited as it does not provide 
a measure of the magnitude of inequality that may be conveniently compared across 
several time periods, countries, regions, or whatever may be chosen for comparison – 
for this purpose the concentration index may be applied.  
Concentration indices (CI) are linked to concentration curves.  Concentration indices 
(CI) enable the quantification of socioeconomic related inequalities in a health 
variable (Kakwani et al. 1997; Wagstaff et al. 1989). The index is measured as twice 
 
 
 
 
  
 
113 
the area between the concentration curve and the line of equality (the 45-degree 
line), taking the value of zero as denoting either perfect equity or the absence of 
inequities. The convention is that the index assumes a negative value when the curve 
lies above the line of equality (indicating a disproportionate concentration of the 
health variable among the poor) and a positive value when it lies below the line of 
equality. If the health variable is a “bad” such as ill health, a negative value of the 
concentration index would denote ill health as being higher among the poor as 
compared to the less poor. 
4.7.5 Decomposition of the Concentration Index 
Health inequalities may stem from inequalities in the underlying determinant of the 
variable of interest such as inequalities in the quality of the local health facilities, 
access to these local health facilities and opportunity costs.  It is often important to 
know the relative contribution of each of these various inequalities. This study is 
interested in investigating the geographic differences in the inequalities in selected 
health variables. The study does this by applying a geographic decomposition of 
concentration curve (Wagstaff 2005) in order to explore health inequities in a 
decentralised system. This is useful because districts, which are decentralised 
jurisdictions, have geographic bounds. The purpose of the decomposition is to 
attribute shares of the value of the CI to within inter and intra locality inequality. 
The geographic decomposition a concentration index is closely linked to the Gini 
inequality coefficient and is computed on the full sample. The total CI is a linear 
function and comprises between area inequalities (CIA), within area inequalities 
(CIB) and an error term specified as a ranking term R.  
CI = CIA +CIB + R  --------------(1) 
-------------------- (2)  CIB = α i
i=1
n
∑ CIi
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---------(3) 
 Total value of CI 
 Inter area CI 
 Within area CI 
 Product of the ith area’s population share and its share of  the health variable. 
 Residuals  
Thus, with j number of areas, the specific form of equation three above is specified 
below.  
--------------(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CI = CIA + α i
i=1
n
∑ CIi + R
CI =
CIA =
CIB =
α i =
R =
CI = CIA +α jCI j + R
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Table 4.8: Comparison of Theil’s T and the concentration index 
 
4.7.6 Principal Component Analysis  
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a nonparametric statistical tool used to create 
an index. The index generated by PCA technique represents an unobservable 
variable21 from an available set of observed variables (Shlens, 2009; Wall, 2006; 
Cahill and Sanchez, 2001; Ram, 1982). PCA technique works on the principal that 
                                                
21 A variable that is not directly measured  
Index  Strengths  Weakness  
Theil’s T  Theoretically sound tool for 
analysing inequity and 
decomposition as a result of its 
additive nature  
Easy to interpret 
Completely decomposable without 
an error term  
Uses entire distribution  
Scale invariant  
Much more complex measure than 
other statistical tools  
Not well known in the area of 
health inequality measurement as 
a result of its complex nature  
Concentration  Has been extensively applied in the 
measurement of health inequalities  
Uses the entire distribution  
Offers flexibility in interpretation  
Takes into account changes in 
underlying socioeconomic variable  
Scale invariant  
Application in binary variables is 
restricted  
Insensitive to changes in 
socioeconomic variable that do not 
affect the socioeconomic ranking 
Sensitive to the direction of the 
social gradient in health  
Decomposability is limited in it is 
not completely decomposable and 
leaves behind an error term  
Useable only with ordinal 
measures of social grouping 
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the unobserved variable is correlated with a set of directly measured variable by 
examining the correlations between these observed variables (Cahill and Sanchez, 
2001).  
The procedure allows information in many variables to be reduced by decomposing 
the variance in the data into factors or components. Each component is the sum of 
each of the observed variables multiplied by its weight, which is the proportion of 
the variance in the data accounted for by each of the observed variables. One of the 
components is usually chosen to be the index. 
 In this thesis PCA analysis is used in two ways. First due to the fact that the GDHS 
does not have measures of incomes and expenditure but has a wide array of assets 
variables, the PCA approach is used in deriving an asset index which served as one 
of the measures of socioeconomic status for the thesis.  Correlations between 
observed variables in PCA were used to select the variables in constructing the 
health inequality index. This was achieved by running multiple PCAs from various 
combinations of variables available in the dataset.  
4.8 Legitimation, Reliability and Validity  
The level of rigour in the methods and techniques applied determines the utility of a 
research study. Without rigour, research is essentially a worthless endeavour and, 
thus, considerable attention is focused on the reliability and validity of all research 
methods (Morse et al 2002). This study addresses these issues in a number of ways, 
and the use of secondary quantitative data, the GDHS, means that data has been 
checked at the highest level for inconsistencies, thus regression techniques suitability 
and rigour will be tested using specific tests for the regression approaches used. The 
study also used triangulation techniques to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of all 
the data gathered and the approaches used.  
Qualitative analysis techniques have developed significantly since the assertion of 
their lack of reliability and validity in the 1980s (Morse et al. 2002). A number of 
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writers Guba & Lincoln (2001) have suggested terminologies and approaches for 
ensuring the reliability and validity of qualitative analysis, thus resulting in a wide 
array of approaches in discerning rigour in qualitative techniques. This, in turn, 
culminated in the need for standardisation (Morse et al. 2002). In qualitative research 
verification refers to the mechanisms used during the process of the research to 
incrementally contribute to ensuring reliability and validity and, thus, the rigour of a 
study. These mechanisms are woven into every step of the inquiry in order to 
construct a solid product (Kvale 1989; Creswell 2012) by identifying and correcting 
errors before such errors are built into the developing model and before they subvert 
the analysis.  
Thus, verification encompasses ensuring that reliability and validity are relevant in 
the process of theory development and thinking theoretically, methodological 
coherence, sampling sufficiency, as well as developing a dynamic relationship 
between sampling, data collection and analysis. 
Ultimately the study outlined and reflected on the limitations of findings and 
interpretations at all stages of the research process and how these were addressed.  
Overall legitimation is achieved by ensuring consistency between methods and 
questions throughout the study.   
 
4.9 Ethical Issues 
Ethical decisions are required throughout a research project and pertain to all aspects 
of a study. The making of ethical decisions almost always involves facing a series of 
dilemmas. There is rarely one straightforward answer, and it is essential that 
decisions are made on the basis of reflection on balancing certain basic ethical 
principles rather than ad hoc reactions to emerging situations (Miller et al. 2012). 
Ethical issues remind researchers of the formalities that must be adhered to before, 
during and after undertaking research but also of the responsibilities of researchers to 
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the interviewees. This study aimed to ensure maximum social benefits and minimise 
social harm to all, ensuring no local or international laws were infringed upon in the 
process of conducting the study (Diener & Crandall 1978; Miller et al. 2012; Benatar 
& Singer 2000).  
The researcher sought the permission of all relevant bodies in Ghana and received 
ethical clearance for the research instruments from the ethics committee of the 
institution under whose auspices the study was being conducted. The researcher also 
sought the consent of all the interviewees, giving each person the opportunity to 
withdraw from the interview. The research adhered strictly to the following 
principles, namely, confidentiality of information, anonymity of all participants, 
informed consent and providing feedback to the participants and the research 
community as a whole. In addition, all the participants were protected from undue 
intrusion, distress, indignity, physical discomfort, personal embarrassment and/or 
psychological or other harm. The study verified and corroborated the data to ensure 
factual accuracy and avoid falsification, fabrication, suppression or misinterpretation 
of the data.  In writing up the research findings, the researcher ensured the use of 
unbiased language in all the chapters. Finally, all the data emanating from the study, 
including interviews, transcripts of interviews, documents and files have been 
organised and stored for future reference.  
 
4.10 Chapter Summary 
The chapter discusses the processes of the research study. Accordingly, the chapter 
described the research design used in the thesis ‒ the mixed methods design. The 
chapter also provided a sound justification for the application of the mixed methods 
approach, arguing that the nature of the research questions and the need for both 
triangulation and complementarity justified the adoption of a concurrent mixed 
methods design for the purposes of the study.  
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The explanation of the study design was followed by a discussion of the method used 
to conducting the research study. This included a discussion of the motives and 
reasons underlying the sample methods which had been identified and applied.  The 
chapter also outlined the various data sources that were used to realise the objectives 
of the study. It was noted that the study had adopted a purposive sampling technique 
and that it had relied on data from three major sources, namely, secondary data from 
the household survey, primary data from the interviews and archival data from 
records and national reports.  
The chapter then provided a summary breakdown of the research questions; 
specifying the types of data which had been gathered to address each question and 
the analytical approach that had been used to answer each question. This was 
followed by a diagrammatic representation of the research stages.  
The econometric model/techniques used for the data analysis were specified. This 
included a discussion on the concentration index and Theil's indices which were used 
to analyse inequities in maternal health utilisation variables. This was followed by an 
explanation of decomposition techniques which were used to compute within region 
and between region shares for these indices. The chapter concluded with a discussion 
of the presentation of the techniques which were to ensure the reliability and validity 
of the study and adherence to a strict research ethical code. 
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Chapter 5  
The District Assembly and Health System Nexus in Ghana 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of both Ghana’s current decentralisation program 
and of Ghana’s health system and the decentralisation of the health system. In 
reviewing Ghana’s decentralisation program the chapter examines the legal 
institutional, fiscal and administrative framework governing the decentralisation 
reforms. In addition, the chapter also examines the evolution of the process of 
decentralisation since its inception in 1993 to the current period (2013), outlining the 
revisions in the programme which had sought to improve it. 
The chapter also discusses Ghana’s health sector, outlining its structure and 
exploring transformations in the sector. The second section of the chapter presents an 
analysis of the interviews which were conducted with the aim of obtaining a 
comprehensive understanding of the status of the health sector decentralisation by 
examining the motives behind and the nature of health sector decentralisation in 
Ghana.  
The chapter concludes by critically examining the nexus between the health sector 
and the political decentralised structure of the district assemblies, describing the 
current situation and also outlining crucial elements in the process of their working 
together. This addressed the research question on the status of decentralisation both 
in Ghana and in the health sector. The chapter also provided additional country 
specific data on the motives for decentralisation, thus providing a deeper 
understanding of the decentralisation of Ghana’s health sector.  
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5.2 Political Overview and Implications for Decentralisation  
The decentralisation process in Ghana is a product of the political and economic 
conditions in the country, both current and historical. Local government was first 
introduced to the Gold Coast by the colonial government. In a system that was 
known as indirect rule the British colonisers handpicked traditional leaders who were 
then used as local administrators (Inanga & Osei-Wusu 2004).  The local 
government system was structured on Ghana’s traditional pattern of government. 
This system was formalised with the introduction of the Municipal Ordinance of 
1859 and which created municipalities in the coastal towns of the Gold Coast 
(Crawford 2004; Dick-Sagoe 2012; Ahwoi 2010).  
The political history of Ghana may perhaps be described as more chequered than the 
economic history, dominated as it is by coups d’états. However, it must be noted that 
the area that is currently known as Ghana has only existed for 100 years(Daaku 
1970; Crawford n.d.).  This region includes the former British colony of the Gold 
Coast and German Togoland. Ghana’s history may be traced back to the 13th century 
to a region which was dominated by the states of the Ashanti, Denkyira and Fante 
empires and the northern states of the Dagombas and Gonjas. There is, however, 
little documented about this period (Crawford n.d.; Daaku 1970).  
The first Europeans, the Portuguese, arrived on the shores of the Gold Coast in 1471. 
Between 1471 and 1874, when the area became a British crown colony, the Danish, 
Dutch, Swiss and English all landed on the Gold Coast, mainly to trade (Cruickshank 
1966; Rodney 1969; YeboaDaaku 1970). Prior to the formalisation of colonial rule 
the British controlled the region through negotiated treaties with coastal chiefs, with 
the region being overseen by governors. The first such governor was Commander H. 
Worsley Hill who was appointed in 1843 (Crook 1986) . The governors ruled 
through a legislative council comprising a few British colonial officials and chiefs of 
the colony. Under the highly centralised colonial administration the governor worked 
under the supervision of a British minister, the Secretary of State for Colonies.  
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The colony included three distinct territories which had become a single political 
unit, namely the coastal protectorates, Ashanti protectorate and the northern 
territories, and were ruled by proclamation until 1946. The British had instituted a 
system of indirect rule, ruling the citizens of the colony through the traditional rulers. 
The British described this system as both cost effective and practical as it not only 
reduced the number of British officials required in the colony but also minimised any 
opposition to British rule on the part of the local people. This continued until 1946 
when the new Gold Coast constitution was enacted.  
The new constitution was born out of the general discontentment which was 
triggered by the post Second World War economic hardships. The Gold Coast 
colony had helped Great Britain but the post-war economic hardships badly affected 
the general population, including the war veterans. This fuelled discontent among a 
growing core of Gold Coast elites. The elites were of the opinion that the chiefs, in 
return for British support, had allowed the provincial councils to fall completely 
under control of the central government which was mainly British and the elites 
started to demand more adequate representation. The constitution then made 
provision for this by increasing the African representation on the Legislative Council 
which was composed of six ex-officio members, six nominated members, 18 elected 
members and, for the first time, a representative from Asanti Kingdom.  The 
presence of the elected members in the majority on the legislative council initiated 
the process towards full self-government.  
In 1947, a group of educated Africans founded the first post World War Two 
nationalist political movement in the Gold Coast ‒ the United Gold Coast 
Convention (UGCC).  The aim of the UGCC was to achieve “self government within 
the shortest possible time” (Austin 1970)while a more immediate aim was to replace 
the chiefs on the Legislative Council with educated individuals (McLaughlin & 
Owusu-Ansah 1995). The UGCC did not seek drastic and immediate change but 
preferred a gradual approach in terms of which the British leaders would eventually 
be replaced by the elites. However, this changed when the UGCC invited Nkrumah, 
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who had been active in the West African Student Union and in pan-African politics 
while studying in the United States, to become the general secretary of the UGCC 
(McLaughlin & Owusu-Ansah 1995; Crook 1986).  
Nkrumah’s time with the UGCC was stormy and included arrest and detention with 
other leaders of the UGCC for political activism.  Nkrumah then broke away from 
the UGCC with his “veranda boys”, a group of radical young nationalists who 
identified themselves with the ordinary working people, to form the Convention 
People’s Party, in June 1949 which demanded “Self Government Now” (McLaughlin 
& Owusu-Ansah 1995; Austin 1970). The new constitution of 1951 ‒ a response to 
the disturbances in the colony ‒ made provision for an Executive Council which was 
made up of large majority of African ministers, half of whom were elected and the 
other half from the traditional councils. Nkrumah and his CPP appealed to the 
majority of the politicised population and his arrest for sedition as a result of 
initiating a campaign of wide spread strikes and nonviolent resistance which turned 
violent, confirmed him as the people’s choice. Nkrumah went on to win his 
legislative seat from prison in an election in which the CPP won 71 of the available 
104 seats. He was released from prison and offered the opportunity to form a 
government, taking on the role of the Leader of Government Business ‒ a position 
similar to that of a Prime Minister by then governor Charles Arden-Clarke.  
Backed by popular support and under the leadership of Nkrumah and the CPP, the 
government of the Gold Coast was transformed into a full parliamentary system, 
despite opposition from the more traditional elements, especially within the Ashanti 
and Northern Territories. Nkrumah assumed the position of prime minister after the 
1954 elections in which the people elected all the members of the legislative council 
directly. The CPP won a further election in 1956 and passed a unanimous motion 
authorising the government to request independence within the British 
Commonwealth. The British government accepted the results of the vote and the 
Gold Coast was confirmed as a commonwealth On 7 March 1957 the country was 
renamed Ghana with Nkrumah as Prime Minister and Queen Elizabeth II as 
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monarch. The country became a full republic after a national referendum in 1960. A 
summary of Ghana’s political regimes since independence is presented in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Post-independence political regimes in Ghana22 
Political Party Leader Dates Type 
Convention People’s Party 
(CPP) Nkrumah 1957–1966 
Civilian  
National Liberation Council 
Regime (NLC) Ankrah 1966–1969 
Military Regime 
 
Progress Party Administration Busia 1969–1972 Civilian  
National Redemption Council 
(NRC) Acheampong 1972–1975 
Military Regime 
Supreme Military Council 
(SMC) 
Acheampong 
Akuffo 
1975–1978  
1978–1979 
Military Regime 
 
Armed Forces Revolutionary 
Council (AFRC) Rawlings 
June–
September 
1979 
Military Regime 
 
Peoples’ National Party 
Regime (PNP) Limann 1979–1981 
Civilian  
Provisional National Defence 
Council (PNDC) Rawlings 1982–1992 
Military Regime 
 
National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) Rawlings 1993–2000 
Civilian  
New Patriotic Party (NPP) Kufuor 2001–2008 Civilian  
National Democratic Congress 
(NDC) 
Atta-Mills  
Mahama 
2009–July 
2012 
July 2012–
present  
Civilian  
  
The country experienced its first military overthrow of the government in 1966 when 
the government of the Convention People’s Party (CPP), led by Ghana’s first 
president, Dr Kwame Nkrumah, was overthrown (Nkrumah 1968). Three years after 
the overthrow, the military takeover regime led by Col. Ankrah handed over the reins 
of power to the democratically elected civilian prime minister in the person of Dr. 
Busia and his Progress Party. However, barely three years later there was another 
                                                
22 Source: adapted from http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/about-ghana/ghana-at-a-glance/447-ghana-revolution-and-
political-history 
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military coup which saw the overthrow of the civilian government with the country 
reverting to military control in January 1972 (Decalo 1973; Feit 1968).  This ushered 
in a period that may be described as the darkest days in Ghana’s political history as 
successive military regimes were replaced by other military regimes before Lt. 
Rawlings took power in 1981 and banned all political parties.  It must be noted that 
this was the second coup led by Lt. Rawlings (Decalo 1973; Owusu 1989). Lt. 
Rawlings stayed in power as a military leader for 19 years and initiated and approved 
the new fourth republican constitution which restored multiparty politics in 1992.  
Currently, Ghana is viewed as a stable, young democracy with over 20 years of 
democratically elected presidents, spanning 6 multiparty elections, two changes of 
power from the incumbent government to an opposition party and five different 
presidents (Aryeetey & Kanbur 2005). The current democracy was tested in July 
2012 when the then president, Prof. Atta-Mills, died in office and was 
constitutionally succeeded by his vice president, John Mahama. Mahama went on to 
win the December 2012 presidential election, making this the first time that power 
had changed hand from one president of an incumbent party to another. This was 
not, however, without controversy as the opposition party challenged the results of 
the elections in the Supreme Court but lost the case in a ruling delivered in August 
2013 ‒ eight months after the victorious president had been inaugurated in office.  
5.2.1 Overview of Decentralisation in Ghana 
In the early post independence period the government of Nkrumah promulgated the 
Local Government Act of 1961 (ACT 54), which instituted local authorities as the 
agencies of the central government in their respective jurisdictions. However, the 
presence of the executive ministerial layer of government undermined the local 
authorities, rendering them ineffective.  Decision-making at the local level, which 
had to be routed through the ministerial level, was an extremely lengthy process and 
has been described by certain writers (Nkrumah 2000; Crawford 2004) as a 
weakening of the local government system. Other attempts at decentralisation 
 
 
 
 
  
 
126 
included a deconcentration by the military regime of Col. Acheampong in 1974. This 
was described as a means of strengthening central government control at the local 
level rather than ceding power and decision making to lower levels (Nkrumah 2000; 
Ahwoi 2010).  
The current form of decentralisation has been described as an outcome of the 
populist policies of the PNDC government and a requirement for development 
assistance under the SAP/ERP, which happened in the country in the early 1980s. 
These were further motivated by a demand for infrastructure and services at the local 
levels. The IMF led SAP/ERP focused primarily on reducing the size of the state 
through economic liberalisation, deregulation and an embracing of the private sector 
(Dick-Sagoe 2012; Amanor & Annan 1999).  In its second phase the SAP/ERP 
focused on institutional reforms and the promotion of democracy at the local levels 
through the strengthening of linkages between the state and civil society. 
Decentralisation inevitably became a channel through which effective linkages 
between civil society and the state could be used to promote an improved and more 
responsive government (Mohan 1996; Amanor & Annan 1999).  
According to Ayee (1994, pp.200–202), decentralisation was also an attempt by the 
military government to increase its legitimacy and simultaneously to rid itself of 
political problems. The decentralisation process in 1992 included a combination of 
political, administrative and economic decentralisation. The local government 
system which was developed Consists of a Regional Co-ordinating Council, a four-
tier Metropolitan and a three-tier Municipal/District Assemblies Structure. A 
Metropolitan/Municipal/District Assembly (MMDA) is responsible for the overall 
development of the district(Crook 1994; Akramov & Asante 2008; Goel 2010; 
Hoffman & Metzroth 2010).  
5.2.1 Legal and Administrative Framework 
The legal framework governing the current decentralised system in Ghana is the 
1993 Local Government Act (Act 462). This Act covers the establishment and 
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functions of the local government system, its administration and other activities, 
planning, by-laws and financing (Government of Ghana 1993).  The Act mandates 
that executive instruments establish decentralised units with recommendations from 
the National Electoral Commission.  In addition, the Act limits the size of districts by 
population23, requiring geographic contiguity. The Act also mandates that districts 
should be economically viable units in that they should be able to generate resources 
internally to provide for the basic infrastructural and developmental needs of their 
inhabitants.   
The District Assemblies include the following functionaries; the District Chief 
Executive (DCE), an elected representative from each electoral area, the member/s of 
parliament from the electoral constituencies within the geographic bounds of the 
district and additional appointees by the president in consultation with traditional 
authorities and local interest groups and not exceeding 30% of the total membership 
of the District Assembly. Elections to the District Assembly (DA) must be conducted 
on a four year cycle at least six calendar months before a general election and any 
resident of the district who is a registered voter and in good standing may be a 
member of the District Assembly.  
The District Assemblies have legislative and executive functions and formulate and 
implement a medium term plan (usually five years) and budget, both subject to the 
approval of the central government. The DAs are assigned the overall responsibility 
of coordinating, integrating and harmonising the activities of all the development 
agencies in the district, including the central government ministries, departments and 
agencies and non-government organisations. The grassroots level of the district 
assembly structure is composed of two-tier sub district structures, namely; zonal and 
town/area councils and unit committees (UC). These bodies carry out the duties 
delegated to them by the District Assemblies but without budgets of their own. The 
UCs are responsible for settlements comprising approximately 500 to 1000 people in 
                                                
23The Assemblies are either metropolitan (population over 250,000), municipal (population over 95,000 and less than 250,000) 
or District (population 75,000 and less than 95,000) (CLGF). 
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the rural areas and approximately 1500 in the urban areas and act as a link between 
the remotest rural locations at the grassroots to the district levels (Crawford 2005). 
5.2.2 Ghana’s Institutional Context 
Ghana currently has four layers of government below the national level, increasing to 
five in the metropolitan areas which have an additional intermediate level ‒ the sub 
metropolitan council. The first level of Ghana’s local government comprises the 10 
Regional Coordinating Councils. These councils are appointed by the president and 
consist of the regional minister as chairman, a deputy/deputies, two traditional 
leaders (chiefs) the district chief executives or mayors in metropolitan areas and 
presiding members (Chairman) of the District Assemblies (Crawford 2005). 
 
Figure 5.1: Structure of local government system in Ghana24 
The second layer below the regional level consists of metropolitan (population over 
250,000), municipal (population between 95,000 and 250,000) and district 
                                                
24 Source: Adapted from (Goel 2010, p.2) 
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(population less than 95,000 and not smaller than 75,000) assemblies. These 
assemblies are assigned the overall responsibility of coordinating, integrating and 
harmonising the activities of all the development agencies in the assemblies, 
inclusive of central government ministries, departments and agencies and non-
government organisations. The assigned legislative and executive functions of 
assemblies mandate them to formulate and implement a medium term plan and 
budgets, both subject to approval by the central government.  
At the lower levels are the two-tier sub district structures namely; zonal and 
town/area councils and unit committees (UC) which carry out the duties delegated to 
them by the assemblies but without budgets of their own. The UCs cover settlements 
of approximately 500-1000 people in the rural areas and approximately 1500 in the 
urban areas and act as a link between the remotest rural locations at the grassroots to 
the district levels (Crawford 2005). The UCs are partially elected bodies consisting 
of ten elected members and five government appointees again selected by the DCE. 
In essence the UCs constitute the mechanism for representation, participation and 
accountability from the lowest levels (Crawford 2005). 
Local governments are mandated to be non-partisan and they conduct elections for 
70% of the assembly members. In an inclusive process the president, in consultation 
with local interest groups, nominates the remaining 30%, subject to approval by the 
assemblies (Goel 2010). Local government elections are organised by the electoral 
commission and financed by the central government. 
In a move clearly designed to distinguish the Civil Service made up of the personnel 
of the central planning agencies and the local government services, (designated to 
represent the personnel rendering services at the level of decentralised institutions), 
Act 656 of 2003 established the Local Government Service (LGS). In addition the 
cabinet endorsed a National Decentralisation Action Plan (NDAP) in February 2004. 
The NDAP initiated the transition process towards the development of a 
comprehensive, well-sequenced and costed approach to decentralisation. The NDAP 
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is primarily an operational plan that seeks to promote work on the harmonisation of 
development funding and capacity building (Hoffman & Metzroth 2010; Ministry of 
Local Governmnet and Rural Development 2003). It also includes a specific new 
policy direction.  
 
5.2.3 Fiscal Decentralisation 
In terms of the legislature which made provision for their establishment District 
Assemblies are required to be economically viable and to generate revenue locally 
for developmental purposes within the districts. In addition, as developmental 
agencies at the local level, these assemblies are supposed to possess adequate 
financing to meet the developmental needs of the local population. Accordingly, 
districts, at the point of decentralisation, were provided with three major sources of 
revenue, namely, internally generated revenues (IGRs), the District Assemblies 
Common Fund (DACF) and other transfer funds from the central government such 
as; ceded revenues and recurrent expenditure transfers. Inanga and Osei-Wusu, 
(2004) argue that this situation may have led to the over-reliance of local 
governments on central government transfers. Other sources of funds for districts 
include direct donor funds. However, these funds are made available to some 
districts but not all. In many instances the DACF has been replaced by the District 
Development Fund (DDF) as a result of disbursement delays. The DDF was 
established to provide additional funding for the districts to enable them to meet 
local developmental needs and to minimise the financing gap at the district level.  
a. Internally Generated Revenues (IGRs) 
Internally generated revenues include all locally generated revenues available to the 
districts. As a result of the fact that the IGRs are the only funding source under the 
full control of the districts they have the potential to be the most reliable sources of 
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district funding to the district assemblies. An official at the Ministry of Finance 
explained; 
We have been encouraging them to develop their IGF sources because that it 
is for you. A donor can refuse to give you, you cannot take them anywhere, 
there is nothing you can do but, if by by-law, you are supposed to pay basic 
rates or property rates and you refuse to pay you can be arrested and, if 
central government is also having challenges with the fund flow, you still 
have to wait but the IGF, you are sitting with it, so you need to develop it and 
collect it.25 
National Officer 01 
The districts are also mandated to generate local revenues from both taxes (incomes 
of the self employed, businesses and property) and non-taxes (user fees, licences, 
royalty payments and permits) based on guidelines issued by the local government 
ministry. These funds are categorised as internally generated revenues (IGRs).  The 
process of collecting IGRs involves area councils which, as stipulated in the Area 
Councils Act, collect revenues on behalf of the DAs. The councils are entitled to 
retain 50% of all the revenue collected for local development activities within the 
districts.  
However, the IGR component of the District Assemblies’ revenues tend to exhibit 
wide disparities with some districts being barely able to generate any revenue at all 
and, therefore, being almost solely dependent on transfers from the central 
government to meet their obligations to their citizenry. According to Akramov and 
Asante (2008), while certain well-endowed assemblies are able to cover up to 70% 
of their total expenditures from their IGRs, the more deprived assemblies may 
manage a meagre 5% of their total public expenditures and, thus, rely heavily on 
transfers.  
                                                
25Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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The data from the DACF report (Table 5.2) reveals that, while the revenue 
generations of some districts were extremely low, the revenue generations of others 
were significantly high ‒ for 2010 the minimum revenue generated was USD 
5807.53 while the maximum was USD 6082474.227. In addition, a further 
examination of the per capita revenues from the districts reveals a minimum of close 
to zero (USD 0.005) for 2010 and a maximum of USD 14.00. The mean of USD 
1.624 and the median of USD 1.2547 for the per capita revenue prove that the 
majority of districts do not perform that well as regards revenue generation and that 
revenues for both 2010 and 2011 were positively skewed.  The large standard 
deviations in the data reflect significant variations between districts.  
Table 5.2: Distribution of district revenues in USD26 
Year 2010 2011 
Revenue  Mean  Median  Min  Max  Mean   Media
n  
Min  Max 
Total  
23953
7.784 
100379
.897 
580
7.53
1 
608247
4.227 
365175
.361 
118754
.330 
14627.
820 
158762
88.660 
Per 
capita  1.624 1.2457 
0.00
5 14.000 2.297 1.316 0.003 
110.83
2 
Source: Author’s own computation based on District Assemblies Common Fund 
(2013) 
The reasons provided by some of the districts and officers interviewed for their 
inability to generate substantial IGRs ranged from capacity issues to district size and 
location. Some of the assemblies have also raised issues in respect of the classes of 
taxes and fees available to them as these are generally taxes from informal sector 
activities such as user fees, licences, royalty payments and permits. Thus, those 
                                                
26 Based on exchange rate for April 2013 when data was published of 1.94 Ghana Cedis to the USD 
(http://www.bog.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=298). Did not use purchasing power parity 
conversion because the study did not conduct any international or cross country comparisons.  
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districts that do not, for example, receive royalties and award permits are 
significantly disadvantaged.  
b. The District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) 
Article 252(2) of the Ghanaian constitution established the District Assemblies 
Common Fund (DACF) in 1993.  The actual levels of the fund are set annually by 
Parliament with the allocations “not less than 5% of the total revenues of 
Ghana”(Government of Ghana 1993, pp.v–3484). The DACF is an 
intergovernmental transfer fund which is shared among the DAs and based on a 
revenue sharing formula approved by Parliament.  The sections of the district budget 
that may be financed using common fund resources are determined jointly by the 
Ministers of both the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Ministry 
of Local Government, Rural Development and the Environment, in consultation with 
the DACF Administrator.  Although the fund was established to complement local 
revenues only many districts have come to rely on the DACF as their primary source 
of funding. In 2004, transfers from the central government accounted for more than 
80% of the total local revenues (Akramov & Asante 2008).  
The formula for the allocation is based on a basic-needs-based approach to 
development and takes into account health service, educational services, water 
coverage and tarred road coverage. The formula further includes indicators for 
responsiveness which capture the efforts made by assemblies to generate their own 
revenues while a service pressure indicator takes into account the district size and the 
rural/urban nature of the districts. In short, the formula includes the following 
indicators; need factor, responsive factor, equalisation factor and service pressure 
factor27. 
                                                
27 The DACF formula is flexible and has changed almost annually since its inception in 1994. As a need based formula the 
formula comprises the following elements; “NEED”, “RESPONSIVENESS” and “SERVICE PRESSURE”. Each category 
comprises a number of sub indicators, which are transformed using various functions. A district’s share of the fund is calculated 
as a weighted linear combination of the transformations, increasing in some indicators and decreasing in others. Every year 
three scenarios are presented to parliament for the allocation of which is recommended and often approved.  
EQUALITY indicator is a simple division of a portion (50% in 2013 calculations) of the fund by the number of districts.  
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To date the DACF has been used for a number of socio-economic activities. The 
largest component of DACF spending is the administrative cost which includes 
capacity building, rural housing, security, accommodation, logistical support and 
project management. The DACF is clearly the funding source on which the 
assemblies place the most reliance as it continues to constitute the largest component 
of the revenues of many assemblies.  
However, the fund faces a number of challenges which do not augur well for the 
developmental purposes it is required to serve with assemblies pointing to delays and 
a lack of reliability in fund disbursement as the major challenges  
To us the Common Fund is virtually losing its purpose because the DACF is 
not regular. 
District Assembly Officer 02 
These were the comments of a District Officer who was interviewed.  Another major 
issue in respect of the DACF is what the districts term interference from the central 
government in the use of DACF. This refers to several expenditures being 
undertaken from the central government and deducted even before these funds 
reached the districts. A district assembly officer who was interviewed explained the 
situation as follows; 
We have a lot of interference from the central government where there are 
always deductions, the central government does a lot of things for the district 
assemblies and deducts from the allocations before it comes. When this 
happens you realise that, when you have some allocation of about 2 million 
Ghana Cedis and you have planned here and budgeted for some activities to 
be done and maybe it is coming and some resources are deducted from the 
                                                                                                                                     
RESPONSIVENESS indictor looks at at district’s improvement in revenue generation and collection and is computed as a 
percentage increase in the revenue generation over previous years.  
SERVICE PRESSURE compensates primarily urban assemblies for the over utilisation of services by travellers/visitors (for 
commercial activities) 
NEED factor measures a district’s lack of services relative to other districts in the country and includes indicators such as the 
number for health facilities, education services, tarred roads coverage and water coverage. 
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common fund, certainly what will be coming will affect your 
implementation.28 
District Assembly Officer 04 
For the districts the situation referred to above has impacted significantly on their 
ability to plan regarding the DACF allocations. The assemblies also complain about 
the lack of reliability of the funds disbursement. The DACF allocations, which are 
based on the tax revenues generated, are, by unwritten agreement between the 
assemblies and government released a quarter in arrears. However, the arrears in 
many instances have gone beyond a quarter and this, in turn, creates challenges, 
especially for those assemblies that do not have alternate sources of funding nor the 
ability to generate substantial IGRs. 
It is not regular too so it does not make the development plans and budgets of 
the assemblies realistic because you are planning for this year, you would not 
believe that, as we sit now, we are in almost the 3rd quarter of the year and 
not even the first quarter has been released yet or disbursed. It means all the 
activities you planned for this year will be rolled over to next year and then 
the next year plan is also on hold. Certainly it has a bearing on the 
development process of the district and between the districts.29 
District Assembly Officer 04 
After several calls to increase the allocation to DACF in 2007 the fund minimum 
was raised in practice to 7.5%, although the minimum established by law remains at 
5% of the total government revenues.  The increased fund minimum was 
implemented the start of the 2008 fiscal year.  Owusu (2005) argues that increased 
transfers to districts will result in the economic growth of the districts. Currently the 
                                                
28Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
 
29Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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common fund administrators transfer an estimated 7% of revenues annually to the 
districts (Government of Ghana 2013). 
c. District Development Facility (DDF) 
The Districts Development Facility (DDF) was established in 2006 as a means to 
provide additional developmental funds to the assemblies. The DDF is a 
performance based funding mechanism which is available to the districts as an 
additional funding source for meeting local developmental needs. Districts are 
evaluated in terms of key criteria.30 The results of the evaluation are published in 
local newspapers to ascertain whether the districts qualify for the district 
development fund in the following fiscal year.  The fund is a partner fund of the 
Government of Ghana and donors and aims both to minimise the “projectising” of 
donor support to districts and to ensure that funds are available for each district to 
use on its own priority sectors and programmes of choice. Currently, together with 
the Government of Ghana, four active donors31 contribute funds to the DDF. The 
fund aims to increase this number on the basis of a track record of accountability and 
developmental outcomes.   
The focus of the fund is to meet local development needs and, thus, the local 
government is not allowed to use the funds for recurrent expenditures and the 
purchase of office equipment and vehicles.  However, it is the view of the DACF 
administrator that the restrictions on the use the DDF and other donor funding 
mechanisms place undue pressure on the Common Fund and also result in the abuse 
of the Common Fund.  
The effect of those restrictions is that they fall on the Common Fund to do 
those things they cannot use the DDF for. Let me give you a classic example 
‒ you say you cannot use the DDF to travel and you cannot use the DDF for 
                                                
30 Functional and Organisation Assessment Tool (FOAT) which assesses compliance with existing, rules, regulations and 
policies. 
31 Agence Francaise de Development, Canadian International Development Agency, Danish International Development Agency 
and KFW Development Bank 
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accommodation and you go to the districts and invite the assemblies for a 
meeting in the regional capital. Who should fund that? They use the Common 
Fund. 
National Officer 09 
The fund includes a capacity building element which is available to all local 
governments which who do not necessarily meet the performance criteria. This, in 
turn, ensures that those District Assemblies that are not able to meet the qualifying 
criteria as a result of capacity issues are not left out and may, possibly, with the help 
of the capacity development grant, be able to meet the criteria at a later date.  The 
fund is also allocated on the basis of a formula which takes into account the 
following factors; land size, population and poverty level. 
 
5.3 Amendments to Decentralisation in Ghana 
In an effort to improve the decentralisation process the decentralisation policy has 
undergone a number of significant reviews and amendments.  These include; the 
creation of the local government service, increasing the number of district 
assemblies, creation of a members of parliament fund, raising the level of the DACF 
and the creation of additional funding for development at the district level.  
Ghana’s decentralized system of government was designed to transfer political 
administrative and financial authority to devolved district assemblies. This is clearly 
provided for by the 1992 constitution of Ghana. However within a decade of 
adoption and practice of decentralization under the 1992 constitution (1993-2003) it 
had become evident that the intended purposes had only been partially achieved. 
Article 14 section 5 (d) of the constitution required the state to “make democracy a 
reality by decentralizing the administrative and financial machinery of the 
government to the regions and districts and by affording all possible opportunities to 
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the people to participate in decision making at every level in national life and in 
government.  
Chapter 20 of the 1992 constitution has listed the essential prescriptions for 
achieving this objective: 
a. Transfer of function and powers, responsibilities and resources from the 
central government to local government. 
b. Measures to build the capacity of local authorities to plan, initiate, 
coordinate, manage and execute policies. 
c. Establish a sound financial base with adequate and reliable sources of 
revenue. 
d. Vest control of persons in the service of local government in local authorities. 
e. Create opportunities for people to participate effectively in governance to 
ensure the accountability of local authorities. 
To achieve these parliament enacted the necessary legislation to empower local 
authorities but the allocation of human and other resources to facilitate the 
performance of the functions was not achieved. There were serious complains about 
the lack of accountability on the part of local political authorities, in particular the 
Chief Executive who is the political head. Some service and financial management 
laws which were passed tended to undercut the devolution of power to the 
assemblies. In addition the role of the region in the decentralization scheme was 
unclear and administration at that level inadequately financed. In order to rectify 
these inherent weaknesses a National Decentralization Action Plan (NDAP 2004) 
was adopted and implemented (Republic of Ghana. 2004). 
Cabinet endorsed a National Decentralisation Action Plan (NDAP) (February 2004). 
The NDAP has initiated a transition process towards the development of a 
comprehensive, well-sequenced and “costed” approach to decentralisation. The 
NDAP is foremost an operational plan that seek to progress practical work on 
harmonisation of development funding and capacity building (GoG and DPs, 2007).  
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 Among the key achievements of NDAP 2004 were the adoption of the functional 
organizational assessment tool (FOAT), the legislation to establish the local 
government service and a plan to decouple local government from the central 
government civil service (Republic of Ghana. 2010). The achievements of NDAP 
2004 led to the adoption of NDAP 2010 and now the formulation of the National 
Decentralization Action Plan on a four-year basis has become official policy and 
standard practice in order to ensure consistent implementation and improvement of 
Ghana’s decentralization programme on a sustained basis (Republic of Ghana. 
2010). 
The current decentralisation process was initiated in 1988 with the creation of 85 
district assemblies in the 10 existing administrative regions in the country under the 
Local Government Law of 1988 (Law 207).  By the time the current legal and 
organisational framework of the decentralisation program had been created in 1993 
in terms of the 1993 Local Government Act (Act 462), the number of district 
assemblies had increased to 110. Currently there are 216 districts in the 10 regions of 
the country. There are several factors which account for the increasing number of 
districts with the most important being the large size of certain districts and 
population growth.  
In 1997 a call from sitting Members of Parliament (MPs) and a brewing conflict 
between the District Chief Executive (DCEs) and MPs over which of the two parties 
was responsible for the developmental needs of the local people resulted in the 
creation of a members of Parliament common Fund. The conflict was a result 
constituency members demanding that MPs meet the developmental needs of the 
constituencies. Though the MPs were not being allocated any funding for local 
development. This, in turn, resulted in MPs being allotted 4% of the DACF for 
developmental projects in the districts (MPs’ Common Fund).  
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The MPs’ Common Fund was used primarily by the MPs to provide social services 
at the local level. The funds were used mainly in the education, health and sanitation 
sectors with several MPs establishing scholarship programmes for members of the 
local communities. However, the MPs Common Fund was done away with in terms 
of the most recent amendment to the decentralisation policy (2010 policy review). A 
Members of Parliament Development Fund to be accessed directly by the Members 
of Parliament and that would not come from the district level resources was 
established in place of the MPs’ Common Fund.  
Since its inception in 1993 the DACF, had been funded at the rate of 5% of the 
national tax revenue. This was, however, seen by the Assemblies as grossly 
inadequate and it was argued that, if districts were to be able to perform their 
function as agents of development in the locality, more funds needed to be made 
available from the central government. This culminated in an increase in the DACF 
allocations in 2008 to 7.5% of the total national revenues (Appiah-Agyekum 2013; 
Akramov & Asante 2008). The District Development Facility (DDF) was also 
initiated in 2009 with the aim of modernising and improving the funding to sub-
national government. This fund ensures increased finance to local government and 
has had the direct outcome of strengthening the decentralisation process.  
5.4 Ghana Health Sector 
5.4.1 An Overview 
The two main institutional players in Ghana’s public health system are the Ministry 
of Health (MOH) and the Ghana Health Service (GHS). The Ministry of Health is 
primarily responsible for the policy planning processes and information 
management, specifically in the areas of health financing, human resources and 
development of health infrastructure and equipment. The Ministry is also responsible 
for overseeing both public and private health facilities. Prior to the health sector 
reforms of 1996, the Ministry was also solely responsible for the implementation of 
activities and budget within the health sector.  
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Figure 5.2: Ghana health sector structure32 
The 1996 health sector reforms (Act 325) resulted in the current structure of the 
Ghana Health system and the establishment of the Ghana Health Service as an 
autonomous public agency responsible for implementing national policies in the area 
of health. These reforms took place under the auspices of the Ministry of Health 
through the medium of the Council of the GHS. The GHS is organisationally 
deconcentrated at three levels, namely, national, regional and district levels. Each 
level is headed by a health director who is responsible for making decisions ‒ , see 
structure presented in Figure 5.2 above.  Below this level are the sub-district levels.   
The Regional Health Administration or Directorate (RHA) is responsible for 
providing supervision and management support to the districts and sub-districts 
within each region. On the other hand, the District Health Directorate, headed by the 
district health director, is responsible for setting health priorities within a given 
                                                
32 Source Adapted from (Government of Ghana 1996) 
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district, in accordance with both general guidance from the regions and the 
overarching national goals in the area of health. The district health directorate is 
required consult with the district health committee of which a representative of the 
district assembly is a member.  
As regards the health services at the regional level curative health services are 
provided by the regional hospitals while public health services are provided either by 
the District Health Management Teams (DHMTs) or the Public Health division of 
the regional hospital. At the district level, curative services are provided by district 
hospitals, although many of these remain mission and faith based. At this level the 
public health services continue to be provided by the DHMT and the Public Health 
Unit of the district hospitals.  
The District Health Administration (DHA) provides supervision and management 
support to the sub-districts. Further down, at the sub-district level, both preventive 
and curative services are provided by the health centres as well as outreach services 
to the communities within the catchment areas of the health centres. Some basic 
preventive and curative services for minor ailments are offered at the community and 
household level by the Community-based Health Planning and Services (CHPS) 
facilities.  
5.4.2 Health Sector Reforms 
As part of the Ghana’s health sector reforms the health services have been 
decentralised with the goal of improving access to basic services, quality of care and 
the efficiency and equity in service provision (Mayhew 2003; Government of Ghana 
1995; Government of Ghana 1996). This decentralisation is perceived by some to 
constitute the third cycle of health sector reforms in Ghana (Asante et al. 2006). 
Specifically within the health sector, new institutional structures and the roles and 
functions of the various national, regional and district agencies have been defined in 
a number of legal instruments covering civil service reform, local government 
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restructuring and health sector deconcentration. This was as a result of the fact that 
this period emphasised an overall strengthening of the health system.  
The law that established the current form of decentralisation in Ghana was very 
specific as to the nature and type of the country’s decentralisation system. A system 
of devolution was prescribed and all sectors in the country were effectively to fall 
under the DAs. Under this DAs were expected to prioritize and allocate district funds 
to each sector through the District Executive Committees (DECs). This meant that 
effectively district health services along with all other sectors were to be transferred 
to the DAs. However, the policy was never implemented as prescribed and health 
services were never transferred to the assemblies. 
 
Consequently an autonomous agency was established to take responsibility of health 
delivery from the central Ministry of Health (MOH). The MoH was left with the 
responsible for policymaking. Service delivery to providers was contracted out and is 
controlled by the Ghana Health Service (GHS), who did this through the use of 
regional and district hospitals and non-governmental providers. This resulted 
effectively in a decentralised structure of the public health system as illustrated in 
figure 5.2. At the apex of the decentralised health system based on the 1996 Ghana 
Health Service and Teaching Hospitals Act (Republic of Ghana Act 525) was the 
GHS tasked with the role of running a decentralised health system with the aim of 
providing access to basic health services to all Ghanaians as close as possible to 
where they live and work (MOH, 1996; 1997). 
Further down the decentralised stream the Regional and District Health Management 
Teams and regional hospitals are accorded the status of Budget Management Centres 
and they have signed performance contracts in place with the GHS. There are 
District Health Management Teams in each district in the country with sub district 
structures existing as the next level under these District Health Management Teams. 
However, some of these sub-district structures are not in place while several have 
limited capacity.  
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In terms of the current arrangement the Ministry of Health retains control over staff 
salaries, budgetary allocations and planning specifications, while staff recruitment is 
controlled by the GHS. Human resource management in the health system remains 
one of the more centralised areas in Ghana as delegation of powers to the GHS has 
done little to change the unified hierarchical structure.  Decisions on salaries, hiring 
and firing, contracting and all other benefits remain at the national level of the GHS 
(Bossert 1998).  
This is, nevertheless, not surprising because, as Kolehmainen-Aitken (2000) points 
out, in most cases the implications of decentralisation for human resource 
development in the health sector are largely neglected. This is primarily the result of 
the complexity involved in decentralising human resource to the lower level as this 
may require new organisational structures, specifying the linkages, revising job 
descriptions and reporting relationships, defining new processes for personnel 
management, deciding how to re-allocate existing staff to new organisational 
structures and transforming and transferring personnel records and staff members 
(ibid). 
5.4.3 Health Financing  
There are four major sources of funds for the health sector in Ghana, namely, 
transfers to the regional health directorate and the district health directorate from the 
central government, internally generated funds, National Health Insurance Funds 
which are also transferred by the central government from the National Health 
Insurance Authority and donor funds. Currently transfers from the central 
government account for the majority of the health sector funding. The government 
share of health expenditure was 54%, 41% and 25% for 2010, 2011 and 2012 
respectively, as against donor contributions of 15%, 22% and 11% for the same years 
respectively. Table 5.3 illustrates that, with the exception of 2012 when internally 
generated funds exceeded the government share, health expenditures were financed 
primarily from government funds.  
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Table 5.3: Sources of health sector expenditures for 2010 to 2012 in USD33 
Year 2010 2011 2012 
Government of 
Ghana 202,056,916 209,609,505.2 228,577,462.9 
Internally 
Generated Funds 107,309,433 183,715,222.7 241,236,613.4 
Donors 56,824,963.4 113,137,693.3 106,108,986.6 
Total 374,676,000 509,007,993.3 927,543,716 
Source: (Send Ghana 2014) 
The funding of Ghana’s health sector has also been subject to both deconcentration 
and sector-wide streamlining as part of the policy reform that increased the 
coordination of donors through a sector-wide approach (SWaps). There has been 
significant progress made in deconcentrating the health budgets.  
Based on the arrangement above the health budget is divided into the following four 
items, namely, salaries, which remain under the control of the Ministry of Health, 
administrative and service cost, which is under the control of the decentralised units, 
and, finally, investment cost, which the Ministry also controls. Returning to Table 
5.3, it is worth noting that a significant proportion of the government share of health 
expenditures (estimated to be approximately 90%) is spent on remunerating health 
personnel, thus leaving 10% for other needs such as investment (Send Ghana 2014).  
These allocations from the central government are done based on a population-based 
formula, which is often adjusted in consultations with the regional authorities. The 
formula contains the following elements, namely, fixed cost of administration, 
distance to national capital, population density, physical size of the region, facility 
size and infant mortality rates. In the initial stages these funds were allocated to the 
regions. The regions then decided on a basis on which to allocate the funds to 
districts under their jurisdiction using factors such as district population and 
remoteness (Asante & Zwi 2009). 
                                                
33 Based on exchange rate for April 2013, when data was published of 1.94 Ghana Cedis to the USD 
(http://www.bog.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=298). Did not use purchasing power parity 
conversion because the study did not conduct any international or cross country comparisons. 
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Since 1999 when the Budget Management Centre concept came into operation, 
financial allocations for recurrent budgets now go directly to the districts from 
central government.   Budget and Management Centres also known as or Cost 
centres are the decentralized functional units responsible for administering 
Government of Ghana and Developmental Partner Funds.  
These BMCs are hierarchically ordered and the national level BMCs supervises 
regional BMCs, which in turn supervise district level BMCs. There are a total of 
entire 350 BMC units under the MoH/GHS.  
The hierarchical organisation of the BMCs means that money is still channelled 
through the regional health administrations; though this has significantly improved 
disbursement times although the budget approval process remains cumbersome. The 
process requires that all district and regional budget plans are drawn up according to 
the national guidelines developed by the National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC). These plans are then approved against nationally set ceilings 
and priorities and this tends to delay disbursements.  Figure 5.3 illustrates the 
structure of the health administration and the linkage with the district assembly. 
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Figure 5.3 Structure of Ghana Health Service34  
5.4.4 The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS)  
In a discussion of health sector financing it is important to point out the role and 
importance of the national health insurance scheme, which currently forms the bulk 
of funds transferred from the central government. Ghana’s National Health Insurance 
Scheme (NHIS) established by an Act of Parliament (Act 650) in 2003, and passed 
into law as legislative instrument, LI 1809, in 2004 (Government of Ghana 2004). It 
is considered as an important home-grown policy. The policy aims to provide 
universal health insurance coverage to all persons as the country moved away from a 
user fee system of health financing.  The aim was to reduce inequalities in health, 
ensure equitable allocation of resources and increase the overall resources in the 
health sector. The scheme itself was the outcome of a series of experiments which 
had been conducted in the 1990s with a number of community based health 
insurance schemes as pilot projects (Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011). In 2013 there are 145 
registered district level schemes that were overseen and managed by the National 
Health Insurance Authority (NHIA). These district schemes are mandated to operate 
exclusively to the benefit of their members. All the schemes have a single benefit 
                                                34	  Source Adapted from (Government of Ghana 1996)	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package that has been described by management as covering up to 95% of the 
disease conditions that afflict Ghanaians (Government of Ghana 2004).    
The scheme is funded from three major sources; 2.5% Value Added Tax (VAT) levy, 
2.5% contribution from the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 
mainly from contributions of public and private formal sector employees and annual 
premiums paid by registered members of the scheme, mainly informal sector 
workers (Government of Ghana 2004).  Of these three funding sources the national 
health insurance levy which is tax financed provides the bulk of the funding 
approximately, 70% of the with between 20% to 25% sourced from SNNIT 
contributors and user fees making up approximately 5% of the schemes 
financing(Ghana. 2003).  
In terms of benefit package for members, a coverage of approximately 95% of 
diseases that afflict people in Ghana means that the NHIS has a fairly generous 
package. The specifics of the benefits includes; general and specialist consultations 
reviews, general and specialist diagnostic testing such as laboratory investigations, 
X-rays and ultrasound scanning, and drugs from the NHIS medicines 
list(Government of Ghana 2004). The scheme also covers a number of surgical, 
physiotherapy and inpatient services. On oral and dental health the scheme provides 
services such as; tooth extraction, temporary incision and drainage, as well as dental 
restoration, including simple amalgam filling and temporary dressings.  
In 2008, the scheme was expanded to include free maternal care (See chapter 7 for 
details). In 2012 the scheme went on to provide for treatment of opportunistic 
infections for HIV/AIDS (Act 852, 2012). In other to benefit from the scheme all 
members, between the ages of 18 and 69 must pay an annual insurance premium, set 
by their local schemes.   
The scheme has an exemption policy which excludes specific groups from paying 
premiums and yet still enjoy the benefits. The following categories of people fall 
under the scheme’s exemption package; all children under the age of 18 years whose 
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parents both enrol, pregnant women, persons with mental disorders, SSNIT 
pensioners (60 years and above), and those aged 70 years and above, and the very 
poor who are defined by the scheme as unemployed with no visible source of 
income, no fixed residence, and not living with someone who is employed and with a 
fixed residence (Government of Ghana 2004). Formal sector employees under the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) are also exempt from 
premiums as their 2.5% of their SSNIT contributions are deemed as insurance 
premiums and paid directly to the scheme through the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA). However, in other to use the scheme these SSNIT contributors 
are still obliged to pay an annual registration fee, which is also determined by the 
local health insurance scheme.  
 
5.5 State of Health Sector Decentralisation in Ghana 
5.5.1  Is Ghana’s Health Sector Decentralised? 
A major objective of this study was to understand fully the case for health sector 
decentralisation in Ghana and the exact form it was to take.  The existing literature 
on health sector decentralisation defines it as the transfer of powers from a central 
authority (typically the national government) to more local institutions(Levaggi & 
Smith 2005). One of the most popular applied approaches to defining 
decentralisation in health care is the public administration approach which is 
summarised in the often-cited, four-part framework which includes delegation, 
deconcentration, devolution and privatisation (Rondinelli et al. 1983) While some 
countries choose to devolve responsibility to the lower political levels, others choose 
deconcentration to lower administrative levels within the central government. This 
may also take the form of delegation to lower level, quasi-independent, 
governmental entities such as hospitals which are structured as public organisations 
and also to non-governmental agencies.   
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Health care decentralisation may encompass most of the functions within the health 
care system. The only function that is often left untouched by decentralisation is 
strategic planning and policy making within the sector and this usually remains the 
domain of the central government. Thus, a formal definition of decentralisation in 
health system may be as follows  “The transfer of formal responsibility and power to 
make decisions regarding the management production distribution and/or financing 
of health services, usually from smaller to larger number of geographically or 
organisationally separate actors”(Saltman et al. 2007). Thus, according to this 
definition the health sector in Ghana may be regarded as decentralised as it includes 
elements of deconcentration, delegation and even devolution. The responses of the 
interviewees and the literature on decentralisation in Ghana provided the motivation 
for the deeper probing of the status of health sector decentralisation in Ghana.   
During the interviews the respondents were asked directly whether the health sector 
in Ghana was decentralised. The complex nature of the responses to this question 
revealed how complicated the status is of the health sector decentralisation. While a 
majority of responses indicated that the sector was, in fact, decentralised these 
answers were almost always followed with a “but”. It emerged that 27% of the 
participants were of the view that the health sector was not decentralised as against 
the 66% who felt the sector was decentralised. The three main themes were 
identified from the discussions – Each category had its reasons. 
a. A fully decentralised health system  
Although 66% (14) of the participants stated that the health sector was decentralised, 
13% (3) only stated this without any doubt, believing firmly that the health sector 
was the most effectively decentralised department within the national system of 
decentralisation. It should be noted that these respondents were all from within the 
health sector and included senior management staff at the Ministry of Health and the 
Ghana Health Service. One of these respondents stated; 
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The health sector is the most fully and effectively decentralised unit with 
structures and trained personnel. It just needs to be unified with the district 
assemblies. 
National Officer 04 
Those respondents who believed that the health sector was the most effectively 
decentralised unit also argued that decentralisation should go beyond the “so called” 
transfer of power and that it is only in the health sector that local capacity has been 
strengthened. In addition, the health sector has invested in structures at the local level 
to improve local managerial capacity. These respondents presented the case that the 
health sector currently transfers the bulk of its funds to be dispensed at the local level 
(an estimated 35%) and that the health sector aims to increase this to 45%. 
According to them the only gap in the health sector decentralisation was where to 
position it effectively in the national decentralisation process so as to ensure 
effective collaboration between the sector and the district assemblies.  
A lot of people think that the health sector is fairly decentralised. This is because, 
as part of our health sector reforms, we concentrated on financial 
decentralisation and we also concentrated on ensuring that districts have their 
own plans and they also own their own performance. So, we have put in place 
mechanisms that will allow districts to plan and have access to their own funding 
and they can also generate their own funding. We have also put in place 
mechanisms that would ensure that districts can define their own performance, 
report on their own performance and also own their own performance.  
National Officer 03 
b. A Partial/Incomplete Decentralisation  
The majority of the participants, namely, 53% (11), although stating that the health 
sector was decentralised, provided various reasons why they deemed the 
decentralisation to partial or incomplete.  They argued that full decentralisation of 
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the sector would be attained if the current decentralised structure that operates within 
the sector were unified with the devolved district assembly system. They felt that 
very few amendments would have to be made as the health sector structure already 
exists and works in the current form. It only remains for this structure to be owned at 
the district level.  The narrative cited below provides a view of this perspective; 
Health and education have always been deconcentrated. By the nature of the 
service they deliver they have to be deconcentrated, so the whole idea of the 
decentralisation was to devolve power to those at the lower level, indeed, at 
the district level.35 
National Officer 06 
This narrative points out that, although the sector is deconcentrated, the current 
structure continues to defeat the aim of the current decentralisation programme, 
namely, to bring these services closer to the local people. The fact that the current 
system includes a combination of deconcentration and devolution operating within 
the same system often means that is unclear where responsibilities lie and how these 
two systems should coexist. In addition, in this situation cooperation or coordination 
between these two units is arbitrary is completely removed.  In fact, it is believed 
that this would be possible only if the health sector were part the devolved system of 
local government although many of the respondents are sceptical about the ability of 
the local government to manage the health sector.  Others respondents who agreed 
that the sector was decentralised were of the opinion that the system was working 
extremely well, primarily because the health sector had put in place several 
structures to ensure that the decentralised structure worked. They maintained that the 
health sector is one of the most effectively decentralised units in the country but that 
there is a need to be cautious about bringing the sector within the structures of the 
district assemblies as the assemblies may not yet be ready for this, arguing that the 
assemblies lack the capacity to manage the health sector.  
                                                
35Author’s fieldwork  
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c. A Health System not Decentralised  
The seven participants who argued that the health sector was not decentralised 
presented two main arguments in support of this view. They argued that, although 
there has been significant deconcentration even within the health sector structure and 
funds are made available to the district health directorate, these funds are often 
transferred with specific directions as to how they should be used, while the centre – 
the Ghana Health Service continues to make decisions about and plans many of the 
health programmes. The district directorates are allowed only to effect minor 
modifications to ensure the proper implementation of such programmes in their 
districts. Thus, these seven participants argued that this is not decentralisation as the 
major decisions are all taken by central government.  
In a comparative analysis of health sector decentralisation in Ghana, Zambia, 
Uganda and the Philippines, Bossert and Beauvais (2002) pointed out that the 
structure of the GHS as a national council ensures the supervision and a high degree 
of centralised control over the regions and the districts. Bossert and Beauvais (2002) 
term this “decentralised centralism”. They further point out that this system leaves 
little or no room for local governance or popular participation in health sector 
decision-making.  Ayee (2002) contends that, while district administrations were 
represented on the District Health Committees, their role was deliberately limited to 
advising the GHS and may, at best, be described as minimal. A number of 
researchers have also conclude that district administrations do not play a significant 
role in health sector governance (Crawford 2008; Crawford 2004; Mayhew 2003; 
Ayee 2008; Bossert & Beauvais 2002; Bossert 1998).  This situation stems from the 
overall structure (see Figure 5.2) of the GHS as, while the GHS is deconcentrated, its 
regional and district directorates are overseen by the national council, which also has 
the responsibility of appointing the directors at each level. Thus, reporting to and 
being directly under the oversight of the national council, which appoints the 
members of the GHS, leaves little room for autonomous decision taking at the 
regional and district levels.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
154 
The second major argument is the fact that the current structure of decentralisation 
within the health sector is contrary to what is clearly stated in the constitution, which 
categorically mandates a devolved structure for Ghana’s decentralisation. The 
respondents who presented this argument cited the decentralisation law, the Local 
Government Act 1993, in support of their argument.  The quotation below from the 
Consolidated Local Government Bill 2013 sheds further light on this issue.  
While the Local Government Act, 1993, Act 462, included the Ghana Health 
Service, the Ghana Education Service, the National Fire Service and the 
Department of Fisheries Forestry and Game and Wildlife in the list of 
decentralised departments, the Local Government Service Act, 2003 Act 656, 
excluded them from the schedule of decentralised departments. This has 
become a major challenge for practitioners on the ground to deal with 
(Government of Ghana 2013b, p.3).  
These respondents who are of the view that the sector is not decentralised  maintain 
that, as long as the health sector maintains it deconcentrated structure ‒ which they 
feel is contrary to the devolved structure mandated by the constitution ‒ and its 
strong ties with the central government, thus not falling under the district assemblies 
in all aspects of its operation, it is not possible to see the sector as decentralised.   
 
5.5.2 Motives for Health Decentralisation in Ghana 
The study also sought to ascertain the main motives behind decentralisation in the 
health sector. The decentralisation processes in the health sectors of the developing 
countries have many objectives and are generally said to be aimed at improving the 
efficiency, equity, accessibility, and quality of health service delivery as well as the 
responsiveness of the health service to local needs and, ultimately, improving the 
health of a country’s population (Levaggi & Smith 2005; Jimenez & Smith 2005; 
Smith et al. 2008). Generally the economic rationale for decentralisation in health 
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care focuses on both health system efficiency and on accommodating a diversity of 
preferences for government services (Oates, 1972).  According to documents on 
decentralisation in Ghana, the objectives of the health sector decentralisation are to 
ensure equity, efficiency, quality and financial soundness (Ministry of Health 2014; 
Ghana Health Service. 2011; Ministry of Health 2007). Based on the data from the 
interviews and the literature review, the responses were broadly categorised into 
general thematic categories of economic, political, social and administrative. The 
more specific sub category headings are discussed below.  
a. Political Motives  
i. As a tool to enhance local participation in decisions pertaining to health  
The vast majority of the responses of the interviewees pointed to the need to ensure 
the local participation in decision making that would enhance the governance and 
democracy of the health sector specifically and also, in general, as the major motive 
for decentralisation.  
ii. A global political arrangement  
Another important political argument that was raised was the global importance of or 
push for decentralisation. The participants alluded to the fact that decentralisation 
itself was included in the reforms of the Structural Adjustment Programme36 in 
Ghana and that donors had pushed for the policy to be implemented.  A respondent 
in interview comment below pointed this out: 
One of the key reasons for that is that, as part of the health sector reforms, 
we actually made it an indicator of performance under the health sector 
reforms and that over 43% of our budget should be shared at the district 
level. So we actually push money there and make sure that the regions do not 
touch it and that is how come we are able to roll out. And because it was an 
indicator our partners held us to it and they are still holding us to it. Before 
                                                
36See Chapter two on the political economy of decentralisation  
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they even disburse funds they want to see that indicator as being achieved so 
that, apart from capacity building, we also made sure that we gave them the 
resources. 
National Officer 03 
This above narrative highlights powerful global interests in the decentralised health 
system, indicating that donors who contribute to the health sector budget regard the 
financial decentralisation of the sector as a key indicator of the sector’s performance.  
iii. A means to improve national governance and overall democracy  
The interviews also revealed that decentralisation was also crucial at the point in the 
nation’s history when the country was moving from a military regime to a 
democratic dispensation. Decentralisation would ensure that the people at the local 
level felt that they were a part of the new system and that true democracy prevailed. 
This is obvious in the following response of one interviewee;  
Improve governance of all sectors and local democracy as we moved from a 
dictatorial to a democratic system.   
National Officer 06 
In explaining this view another respondent noted that  
Ghana at that period was moving from a military regime to constitutional 
rule and local democracy was part of the agenda.  
National Officer 07 
The participant further argued that, in the process of democratisation after a long 
period of military dictatorship (1981–1992), decentralisation, which ensured local 
participation in decision making and a strengthening of the local authorities as an 
important level of government as regards improving service delivery, governance, 
and local democracy, was a crucial element in the democratisation process. 
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iv. Local participation in development and governance  
Other respondents cited the need for the local ownership of polices and a local 
content in the implementation of policies as a motive for decentralisation. Finally the 
accessibility argument was presented when a participant pointed out that a major 
motive for decentralisation was to ensure that services were brought nearer to the 
local people. 
Supposed to bring governance to the doorstep of the local people so that they 
will participate in development because someone cannot sit somewhere and 
you will know what they need. 
District Assembly Officer 06 
b. Economic Motives  
i. Enhance equity in the health system  
All the participants interviewed were of the view that equity was a major motive for 
health sector decentralisation. This view of the participants was further corroborated 
by documentary evidence that explicitly cited equity as a goal of the decentralisation 
process. The respondents stated that the aim of decentralisation was to improve 
equity in a number of dimensions including equity as regards access to health as well 
as equity in health care and the utilisation of health services and also to address 
inequity in health resources allocations.  
ii. Improve efficiency in the health service delivery  
A second economic argument that was presented by the respondents as a major 
motive for decentralisation was the fact that decentralisation was important in order 
to increase efficiency in the delivery of the health services. The respondents believed 
that, by bringing these services closer to the people through decentralisation, local 
management and the local people would be able to identify the sources of 
inefficiencies in the system more quickly than would otherwise have been the case 
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and eliminate such inefficiencies before they took root in the system. They also 
believed that the level of engagement on the part of the local people that 
decentralisation would bring would substantially promote and encourage overall 
efficiency in the delivery of the health services. This argument is linked to the issue 
of accountability.  
iii. Provide innovative solutions  
Other economic arguments presented for in favour of decentralisation were generally 
in line with improving performance, enhancing efficiency, improving health service 
delivery and enhancing equity, especially in the area of health resources. Another 
argument cited was that of the decentralised units being enabled to access funds 
available from all sources. 
iv. Provide information on unique local situation/s and knowledge of local 
preferences  
The respondents were of the view that ultimately realising many of the aims and 
goals of the national policies, including the decentralisation policy, lay in the access 
to and availability of information on local issues. They argued that the past failure of 
many of the policies has been the result of the lack of access to information on both 
the local situation and the local preferences (see below) and that it is not possible for 
remote national governments to all the opportunities and constraints that affect the 
supply of local services. This lack of information affects all aspects of the 
management and the provision of services and often leads to managerial solutions 
that are inappropriate for local circumstances.  These information gaps may be as 
simple as the signing of local contracts or information on historical patterns in 
disease and even how local residents have reacted to past policies.  
The respondents maintained that local management in a decentralised system was 
better placed to understand and respond to local preferences in the design of services 
and that this would ensure that service design reflected local priorities. They argued 
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that, although the all regions belonged to the same country, unique features and 
peculiar characteristics often resulted in the failure of policies to realise their stated 
goals if these unique features and peculiar characteristics were not taken into 
account.  
v. Enhance cooperation and local coordination to achieve a unified approach to 
development and poverty reduction  
The participants argued that development and poverty reduction must happen 
simultaneously for every member of the society or they would be unsuccessful. They 
believed that decentralising the health sector would open up the sector to a wider 
scope for consultations to find solutions to problems within the sector, both locally 
and even at the national level. In addition, they believed that this would, in turn, 
result in a wider collaboration between the local government system and its members 
and the local community than would otherwise have been the case.  
d. Administrative Motives 
i. Support human resource motivation  
A more specific motive that was voiced during the interviews was the need to 
provide support for human resource motivation. The participants indicated that the 
supply of health human resources is a major challenge facing the health sector in 
Ghana. These human resource supply challenges are exacerbated by the fact that 
majority of the health personnel are not motivated to work in remote and deprived 
communities. In the view of the officials interviewed a major consideration in the 
design of the decentralisation policy was to provide a solution to the issue of the lack 
of motivation of health workers as regards working in the distant, deprived and 
remote parts of the country. A local solution may be the only option as the national 
level has failed to solve the problem, all the attempts and a number of policies. 
However, the health officials interviewed admitted that, to date, no attempt had been 
made to decentralise the health human resources (recruitment and motivation). The 
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participants believed that the health human resource motivation had been a major 
motivation in the decentralisation process and that it is one area that decentralisation 
could help to improve significantly.  
 
5.6 Nature of cooperation between district assemblies and the health sector 
The existence of the two strands of decentralisation in some major sectors, including 
health and education, and which, in the case of the health sector, had been created by 
the delayed take-off or full implementation of the health sector decentralisation 
programme, has meant that the ability of the decentralisation process to realise its 
specified objectives in terms of the health the sector has been heavily dependent on 
the level of cooperation/collaboration between these two systems.  Currently there 
are two lines of responsibility in the decentralisation process in Ghana.  
These include the devolved public services, such as the construction and 
maintenance of feeder roads and the delivery of relief and sanitation services, and 
development planning which is entirely the responsibility of the district assemblies. 
Another category includes the delegated public services which may be delegated 
directly by the central government, ministry concerned or an agency.  In the 
instances of these delegated services the DAs act as agents of either the central 
government or the agency to which authority has been delegated but without 
significant discretionary power in these services.  These services comprise primarily 
health, education and water and sanitation.  In the area of health specifically the 
district assemblies support the provision of public health services in consultation 
with the Ministry of Health and through the Ghana Health Service as the 
implementing agency. However, this has often been cited as the main factor 
influencing the poor outcomes of decentralisation in the health sector and the weak 
co-operation between the district assemblies and the district health directorate. The 
district assemblies make every effort to coordinate with the district health 
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directorates. However, this is difficult as the Health Directorate maintains reporting 
lines to the regional and national offices.  
The district assemblies interviewed admitted that, in drawing up medium term 
district development plans, they often consulted the District Health Directorates to 
include health-specific issues after they had made every effort to capture the issues 
of the local citizenry.  They admitted, however, that, since health issues are highly 
technical, they had to rely heavily on the inputs from the District Health Directorate 
in compiling district health priorities. However, most often than not the assemblies 
discovered that these priorities stemmed from national health policy directions rather 
than specific district level health issues. A district officer interviewed revealed that 
health priorities are set in consultation with the District Health Directorate and, in 
actual fact, the district assemblies merely include in their plans the priorities 
provided by the district health directorates. 
Yes, the district has set health priorities but what we normally do is that, the 
health division, they will prioritise their needs and then they will give it to us. 
They prioritise their needs ‒ they have their plans which they receive from 
the headquarters so, at the end of each year, like getting to November, they 
have to bring their plans and we will also incorporate it into our district 
plan. 
District Assembly  Officer 02  
The implementation stage follows the priority setting stage. However, it would 
appear that the District Assemblies generally tended to adopt a hands off approach to 
implementation, choosing to rely on the technical abilities of the District Health 
Directorates.  For the assemblies the technical nature of the health sector and the dual 
reporting lines meant that, if assemblies become involved in health matters, they 
would be perceived to be interfering in the work of the Health Directorates. A 
participant from the Ga South District succinctly stated  
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The only problem has to do with the fact that they have two reporting lines; 
they report to the Assemblies and their mother agencies (Ghana Health 
Service) so, because of that, that strong will of the Assembly taking full 
responsibility for their activities is not there. We are not fully accountable for 
their activities in the municipality for now.  
District Assembly Officer 04 
In many instances the District Health Directorate regards the district assemblies as a 
last resort for support in a situation in which the funding from the regional 
directorates proves inadequate. This is primarily as a result of the fact that the health 
directorates perceive the district assemblies as unwilling to support them financially 
and they have often had numerous financial requests turned down by the assemblies.  
A respondent from the District Health Directorate expressed the following views on 
the situation; 
The Assembly has not provided any support to us even though they know 
money has not come from government yet. We have discussed this with them 
so many times. When we came we didn’t have furniture and even an office to 
sit. We were only lucky they had once built a structure there to be used as a 
laboratory and that is what we are occupying now. The last encounter we 
had with them was about this National Immunisation Day. We had some 
money so we recruited a lot of volunteers. The money given to us was just 
something small so we wanted them to support us to at least motivate the 
volunteers to do the work. They have taken the memo on the request and 
everything, according to them, they have sent it for endorsement at the 
regional level but, up till now, we have not received anything and the 
volunteers are still following us. 
District Health Directorate Officer 04 
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Another perspective on the matter is the fact that the health directorate admitted that, 
even in the rare instances in which the districts they may be ready to finance 
activities, the districts often appear to be extremely biased in favour of spending 
money on the construction of physical buildings and structures rather than financing 
health programmes and projects. The health directorate attributed this to the political 
nature of the assemblies with the37 clientelist nature of local politics requiring 
physical evidence of development.  
The district assemblies also argued that the health sector is adequately funded from 
the central government while the funds available at the district level are limited.  In 
view of the fact that the health directorates often do not share with the assemblies 
information about of their funding, including how much they have received and the 
gaps they had to fill, this makes it difficult to redirect funds for meeting pressing 
local needs to servicing the health sector.  
In addition, the health directorates regard their reporting and monitoring functions 
and their links with their regional offices as superseding their reporting 
responsibilities to the districts and, thus, they tend to neglect their reporting to the 
districts assemblies. It would also appear that the district assemblies are merely 
copied on reports submitted to the regional health directorates.  The district 
assemblies routinely participate in district health management meetings but also 
admitted to limited decision making responsibilities as regards health issues as they 
viewed such issues as technical in nature and, thus, better left to the experts in the 
district and regional health setups.  
5.7 Chapter Summary 
In a bid to improve the decentralisation process, the decentralisation policy has 
undergone a number of significant reviews and amendments in all aspects since its 
formalisation into law.  These processes have aimed at refining and improving the 
process of decentralisation and, ultimately, ensuring that both the policies and their 
                                                
37This is discussed into more detail in Chapter 7  
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implementation incorporate local content. This, in turn, has invariably led to the 
intensification of the national decentralisation programme.  
However, some major concerns have remained unaddressed, namely, the districts’ 
concerns with funding inequalities, the status of the decentralisation of the health and 
education sectors and the concerns of several districts, especially rural districts, as 
regards securing their financial base.  
While the health sector views itself as highly decentralised with its deconcentrated 
structure the sector continues to remain outside the devolved system of the district 
assemblies. The 1993 Local Government Act envisaged the health sector 
decentralisation as the devolution of the responsibility for the district health services 
to the district assemblies. However, the passing of the Ghana Health Service (GHS) 
and Teaching Hospital Act (1997) brought about a conflicting situation with the 
GHS becoming responsible for running the decentralised health services. Thus, 
whereas the Local Government Act envisioned the health sector as competing with 
other sectors for decentralised funds, held by the Ministry of Local Government at 
the district level under the 1997 Ghana Health Service (GHS) and Teaching 
Hospitals Act (Act 650), the Ministry of Health retains financial autonomy.  
The chapter highlighted that decentralisation is a multidimensional concept and that, 
even with the passing of a law declaring a sector to be decentralised, there are still 
conflicting varying views of what decentralisation is and it remains a problem to 
formulate a simple definition of the term ‘decentralisation’. 
The main issue in the area of the health sector decentralisation is how to effectively 
link the deconcentrated structure of the health sector to the current, devolved local 
assembly system with clear guidelines and institutions in place to ensure the 
assembly and the health directorate  are able to work together seamlessly. In terms of 
the current structure the regional level remains important in the decentralised health 
system although the regional level does not play a significant role in the devolved 
district assembly structure.  
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Chapter 6  
Inequities in Maternal Health Utilisation: Measurement and Decomposition 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a quantitative examination of the health inequalities in Ghana. 
The chapter first describes the analysis which was conducted in inequalities in the 
health resources between districts in Ghana using data from the Ghana District 
Assemblies Common Fund. This is followed by a descriptive analysis of the 
inequalities in maternal health utilisation and selected maternal health variables.  
Inequality curves and indices are then estimated using two rounds of the Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey (GDHS), which provides data on the changes in 
maternal health inequities in Ghana.  
The chapter uses two unique sets of variables in terms of which to assess inequities 
in health resources at the district level (section 1) and inequities in maternal health 
utilisation at the individual level (section 2). The chapter first discusses inequities in 
a number of health resource variables at the district level using data available from 
the Ghana District Assemblies Common Fund. The resources analysed include health 
facilities, doctors and nurses.    
The chapter then continues to examine health inequities using micro data inequities 
in selected maternal health variables.  This commences with an examination of 
certain variables for the analysis, the importance and techniques to use in dealing 
with missing variables in the dataset. The chapter then provides a summarised 
description of the variables to be used in the estimation and descriptive analysis. This 
is followed by a detailed analysis of health inequities at the household level by 
indirectly computing need standardised health inequality indices for the selected 
maternal health utilisation variables. This is followed by a decomposition analysis of 
the computed indices. In addition, the chapter also presents the statistical tests and 
model diagnostics used in the study.  
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SECTION 1: District Level Inequalities in Health Resources 
6.2: Inequalities in Health Resources 
It was pointed out in Chapter 3 that, in any analysis of health inequity, the question 
of the way in which resources in health are distributed requires further probing. This 
section attempts to do this by analysing inequalities in selected health resources at 
the district level. The section uses data from the District Assemblies Common Fund 
(DACF) records to conduct an inequality analysis of the selected health resource 
variables.   
The data provides records of district land size, district population, total health 
facilities in the district, number of key health personnel such as; doctors and nurses, 
as well as data on district revenues. The analysis of health resources focuses on 
district generated revenues and not on transfers from the central government other 
sources, mainly because it seeks to provide an accurate assessment based on the 
fiscal strength and the prevailing inequalities of the districts. The variables of interest 
include healthcare health facilities and number of doctors and nurses.  Thus, the 
analysis of inequities in health resources at the district level measures inequality in 
the per capita values of these resources using the concentration indices38 across the 
districts.  
A major aim of the health system in Ghana is to ensure equity in the use of and the 
accessibility to health in general. If this is to be achieved it is essential that to ensure 
some degree of inequity in the distribution of health resources. However, the 
equitable distribution of health resources continues to be constrained by a number of 
factors and districts experience unequal levels of distribution on an ongoing basis.    
 
                                                
38Other indices such as the Gini and Theil were used. However, the concentration index was presented Where? because, 
although the general trend remained unchanged, the concentration index provided a gradient which enabled a conclusion to be 
drawn as to whether the inequalities were in favour of either the rich or the poor.  
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6.2.1 Summary of Data 
For the purposes of the district level analysis the analysis uses data on 216 districts; 
district size, district population estimates, revenues, number of doctors in the district, 
number of nurses in the district and the total number of health facilities in the district 
as indicated in the DACF records.  Table 6.1 below presents a summary of the data 
used for the districts.  The table reveals that the districts vary significantly in 
features, both in terms of landmass, population and population density and in terms 
of revenues and health facilities.   
Of the 216 districts in Ghana, the average area for a district is approximately 1,186 
square metres. However, one district covers 9,528 square metres, thus indicating the 
wide variation in size of the districts by area. This wide variation is not restricted to 
area only for the population size of the districts also varies widely with the largest 
district having a population of 1,810,000 and the smallest a population of 42,364.  
The magnitude of the variations in district size and population means that an analysis 
of any resources at the district level must include a means of controlling for the 
demand on the resources, given the service pressure as indicated by either the 
population to be served or the need to ensure that people do not have to travel vast 
distances in order to access basic services in the larger districts.  
Accordingly, in order to ensure these are taken into account the health resources are 
converted into per capita values and district area is included as a size variable in the 
computation of the index.  
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Table 6.1: Summary of district level data39 
Variable Observation      Mean Std. Dev.   Min       Max 
Area 216 1186.04 1439.28 74    9602 
Population 
(2010)  
216 1089645 3014154 42,364   1,810,000 
Number of 
Health 
Facilities 
216 12.10 6.041039      3   40 
Doctors  216 5.23 21.48 1 261 
Nurses  216 46.64 143.8458   1 1,778 
2010 
Revenues  
216 
235,081.29 622,423.20 0 6,082,474.23 
2011 
Revenues  
 
216 363,476.86 1,389,962.37 0 15,876,288.66 
Source: Author’s own computation based on data from the DACF Formula 2013 
Report (Government of Ghana 2013a) 
6.2.2 Overall Inequity in Health Resources 
The three health resources investigated all demonstrated a pro rich inequality, that is, 
there was a greater availability of the health facilities in the richer districts with the 
inequality being highest as regards the distribution of nurses. The analysis also 
indicated that the distribution of health facilities was generally better than the 
distribution of health human resources as the two measures of human resources used 
show significantly higher levels of inequality as compared to health facilities as 
indicated by the concentration index values of 0.29 and 0.32 for doctors and nurses 
respectively. 
                                                
39 Although all previous financial data has been converted into the USD values for ease of understanding (Chapter four) have 
been maintained in Ghana Cedis they are used in regression analysis and the exchange rate had no bearing on this.  
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Table 6.2: Overall inequality in per capita health Resources40 
Category  Estimate STE LB UB 
Facilities  0.084  0.03 0.03  0.14  
Doctors  0.29 0.04 0.21  0.37 
Nurses  0.32  0.03 0.25  0.39  
Source: Author’s own computation based on data from the DACF Formula 2013 Report  
It must, however, be noted that, although the inequality as regards the health 
facilities appeared to be relatively lower, the quality and types of these facilities 
varied between the districts and the bracketing together of these health facilities does 
not necessarily provide an accurate depiction of the actual situation. Health facilities 
in Ghana are categorised as public, private not-for-profit and private self financed 
health facilities. Private facilities include hospitals, maternity homes, clinics and 
chemical sellers.  It must be noted that this analysis was been conducted at the level 
of public health facilities only.  These public facilities also vary significantly in 
terms of quality and include a variety of hospitals under the auspices of the Ghana 
Health Service, for example, community health planning services (CHPS) 
compounds, small clinics, district hospitals, 10 regional hospitals and autonomous 
teaching hospitals.  
Primary healthcare in Ghana has been structured according to the need and priority 
to serve communities. Rural areas that are severely lacking in permanent health 
infrastructure have been prioritised as regards the establishment of CHPS that 
provide clinic based, primary health care and reproductive health services. These 
compounds are run by community health officers and the services provided include 
immunisations, family planning, supervising delivery, antenatal, postnatal care, 
treatment of minor ailments and health education (Nyonator et al. 2005).   
                                                
40Computed at 95% confidence interval  
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However, in the cases of health workers the distribution showed even wider 
inequalities, with index values of 0.29 and 0.32 respectively for doctors and nurses, 
thus indicating that many of these health facilities are without the necessary staff.  In 
an interview at the District Directorate of Health Services in the Kunbungu district 
assembly, a rural district in the Northern Ghana, the respondent asserted that   
We just created two new CHPS compounds. Though we do not have the staff 
but the people also need the services. Since so we created them and sent some 
people there we have been able to acquire some basic equipment for them. 
District Health Directorate Officer 04 
This statement confirms the reason why the situation, where the seems health 
facilities show a better distribution as compare to doctors and nurses persists and 
reveals that the existence of a health facility does not necessarily imply that the 
facility is equipped with the resources required to operate. Even in staff members are 
sent to these facilities many of them do not remain there for long.  
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6.2.3 Inequity in Health Resources by Revenue Quintile 
Table 6.3: Concentration Index for health resources by revenue quintiles41 
Quintile  Category  Estimate STE LB UB 
1  Facilities 0.25 0.06 0.12 0.36 
Doctors  0.30 0.06 0.17 0.43  
Nurses 0.27 0.08 0.11 0.43 
2 
 
 
Facilities 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.32 
Doctors  0.32 0.08  0.16 0.48 
Nurses  0.33 0.07 0.20 0.47 
3 Facilities 0.23 0.05 0.12 0.33 
Doctors  0.22  0.08  0.06 0.37 
Nurses  0.26 0.07 0.11 0.40 
4 
 
Facilities 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.19 
Doctors  0.17 0.06 0.05 0.29 
Nurses  0.01 0.06 -0.12 0.14 
5 Facilities 0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.13 
Doctors  0.14  0.11  -0.07 0.35  
Nurses  0.03 0.09 -0.15 0.22 
Source: Author’s own computation based on data from the DACF Formula 2013 
Report (Government of Ghana 2013a) 
In further investigating the extent of the inequalities Table 6.3 provides an analysis 
of the distribution of the health resources in question by district revenue quintiles. 
The quintiles are generated in order to understand the relationship between the 
                                                
41Computed at 95% confidence interval 
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inequalities exhibited and the revenue strength of districts. The districts have been 
divided into five subgroups (quintiles) depending on their per capita revenues42, with 
each quintile representing 20% of all the districts.  The positive values of the indices 
computed show that, consistent with the overall national trend, the health facilities in 
question are available to the richer districts.  The general downward trend of the 
index values as we climb up the revenue quintiles also depicts a situation in which, 
in the main, the richer districts demonstrate lower levels of inequality in the terms of 
health resources as compared to the poorer districts.  
The two lowest revenue quintiles consistently showed the highest inequalities of 0.30 
for doctors and 0.27 for nurses and 0.32 for doctors and 0.33 for nurses in the poorest 
and poor quintiles respectively. The exception was the situation of the health 
facilities where the level for the middle quintile was worse than that for the poor 
quintile. It would appear that this stems mainly from the fact that, in the poor but less 
deprived districts, it is difficult to retain the services of the health workers assigned 
to such districts and, even should they take up the positions, many of these workers 
do not stay for long.  
Thus, the ability to retain the services of such workers in a given deprived district is 
heavily reliant on the policies put in place at the district level to ensure that, should 
these districts obtain the services of health workers, such workers are prepared to 
stay the duration. Two respondents from the Shai Osu-Doku district and the 
Kumbungu district explained that these two districts had used similar approaches but 
with mixed results. These districts had ensured that students from their districts who 
were interested in careers in the health services were supported in the hope that they 
would return to serve in the districts.  
                                                
42 Quintiles are computed based on the internally generated revenues (IGR) of districts for 2013 
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“Because our district is more rural the turnover rate of staff is high such that 
when you post43 teachers, nurses and doctors they find it difficult to stay, 
especially in the more deprived areas”  
District Assembly Officer 02 
We support health workers in tertiary education and, when we do it, we bond 
them so that, when they complete their studies, they come back. But most of 
the time when we bond them because it is a rural place they do not want to 
come back.   
District Assembly Officer 06  
In the first extract a district officer points to the fact that the rural nature of the 
district often means that, when staff members are allocated to the district, they do not 
come to take up their postings. This situation is even worse when the specific duty 
post of the staff is in the deeper, more rural sections of the district.  The second 
respondent stated that his district has even gone as far as financing the training of 
health officers and bonding them to the district for a number of years. However, even 
under this system of bonding, the officer argued that many trained health officers 
refused to come back to the rural communities.  
 
SECTION 2: Inequities and Inequalities in Maternal Health Utilisation 
6.3 Summary of Data 
6.3.1 Selection of Variables  
In order to assess the inequalities in maternal health utilisation indirectly 
standardised inequality indices were computed at the household level. The index 
                                                
43 In Ghana the education of most health sector and education sector staff members is heavily subsided by the state. These 
categories of staff are also guaranteed jobs after the completion of training through a posting system. The posting system is 
managed at the central ministry level and, in the case of health and education, is delegated to the Ghana Health Service and the 
Ghana Education Service. All medical professional and teachers who have completed their training in a given year under public 
funding are posted throughout the country.  
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computed was standardised and controlled for the effect of; age, health status, body 
mass index, educational level and employment status. These variables were selected 
based on both a detailed study of the literature on socioeconomic inequalities in 
health, both at the global level and with specific focus on Ghana (Abor et al. 2011; 
Arthur 2012; Obeng et al. 2006; Nyonator et al. 2005; Addai 2000) and also on the 
principal components analysis in order to explore the determinants of maternal health 
care utilisation for both rounds of the GDHS. The membership of the national health 
insurance scheme was identified as an important confounder, however due to the 
unavailability44 of adequate data in both rounds of survey used this variable was 
dropped. The study used two rounds of the GDHS data, based on an increase in the 
intensity of decentralisation (see Chapter 5). The decentralisation reforms over the 
years have been intensified in terms of more responsibility for development 
transferred to the local levels, an increase in the number of districts and an increase 
in the financial base of districts in the hope of significantly improving the overall 
outcomes.  
Another major consideration was the level at which the quantitative analysis was to 
be conducted ‒ either at the district assembly level or at the regional level. The 
mixed/incomplete nature (further discussed in Chapter 7) of the decentralisation 
process presented a challenge to determining the level at which the micro level 
analysis of health inequities should be conducted (regional or district).  The law on 
decentralisation prescribes the devolution of a number of key functions to the 
districts assemblies. However, Ghana’s health sector remains a delegated system 
within which the highly centralised structure of the Ghana Health Service is 
deconcentrated. This, in turn, implies that, although the importance of the region in 
the overall devolved structure of the districts has been reduced, within the health 
sector the regional level remains extremely important.  The role of the regional 
hospitals and the fact that not every district has a district hospital reinforces this 
conclusion (see Chapter 5).   
                                                
44 NHIS variable was not included in the 2003 survey as the scheme had just been introduced and though was available in the 
2008 survey majority of the participants had not registered.  
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A number of actions were taken to overcome the hurdle that the incomplete nature 
and manner of design of decentralisation may pose to the study the research adopted 
two approaches.  Firstly, the research design used in the study took this into 
consideration and this is the reason why the researcher chose a mixed methods 
design which would provide complementary qualitative data from all levels. In 
addition, although subject to data availability, the quantitative analysis was 
conducted at both the district level and the regional level. Thus, the analysis of the 
inequities in health resources, for example, focused on the district level, examining 
three health resources; the number of health facilities, the number of doctors and the 
number of nurses. On the other hand, the micro level household analysis on the 
inequities in the utilisation of maternal healthcare services was conducted at the 
regional level.   
6.3.2 Variables 
The GDHS dataset provides a unique opportunity to fully investigate the socio-
economic disparities in the health sector as it provides an array of socioeconomic and 
health variables. The variables below were used in the econometric analysis.  
Additional data required was computed from the survey data.  
a. Outcome Variable 
a. Health utilisation variables: The major health utilisation variable of interest 
for the purposes of this study was the antenatal care use. A descriptive 
analysis provided a presentation of an additional maternal health variable, 
namely, delivery services.  Antenatal care, as defined by the survey, refers to a 
pregnant woman going for consultations on the condition of her pregnancy 
before childbirth. It is important to note that the woman need not necessarily be 
ill in order to distinguish the use of antenatal care as opposed to the general use 
of health care facility for illness or injury. This, in turn, ensures that antenatal 
care visits are not counted twice.  
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b. Independent variables and control variables  
The study controlled for other variables that influence the dependent variables. 
For the purposes of this study the independent variables were grouped as follows; 
Need variables; The following variables from the survey proxied health care 
need, age, whether or not respondent had used a health facility, Body Mass Index 
(BMI) which has been found to be related to the use of maternal health care 
services.   
Socioeconomic variables: These variables included level of education, 
employment, economic status and Wealth index which was computed using an 
asset index derived from Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
Other variables: included region of residence and religion. 
6.3.3 Treatment of Missing Variables 
Missing variables are extremely important in research as they may lead to biased 
outcomes, decrease the statistical power of the data set and, finally, complicate the 
processes that must be carried out in order to analyse the data (Acock 2005; Tanguma 
2000).  When examining the missing variables in a data set it is important to identify 
and understand the codes for the missing variables in the dataset. These codes help the 
researcher to understand a particular missing variable and, thus, to determine the 
treatment of that variable. These codes may include codes for (a) Unable to answer, (b) 
Unwilling to answer (c) Not applicable as a result of a valid skip pattern in the 
questionnaire, or (d) Data entry failure/interviewer error. In the case of the GDHS 
these are all indicated as missing. Other special responses and codes that may signify 
absence in the GDHS include “Inconsistent,” “Don’t know,” and “Blank” or "Not 
applicable." “Missing,” “Inconsistent,” “Don’t know” and “Blank” codes are excluded 
when calculating statistics such as means or medians; otherwise they are treated as real 
values (Ghana Statistical Service 2009). Missing variables and response rates are 
important because a high non-response may affect the reliability of the results.  
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In this type of survey datasets, for example, the GDHS, non-responses occur for two 
main two reasons. Firstly, there is a respondent’s unwillingness or inability to answer 
a given question and secondly the data entry operator’s failure to enter the data for 
that particular question. In such a case the variable is deemed to be a genuine missing 
variable. In a situation in which the question was not applicable, this is picked up by 
given the skip pattern of the questionnaire. Not applicable questions are not regarded 
as missing and not included in the analysis. If a question was not posed to a particular 
respondent it is regarded as a missing variable.  The GDHS does not impute values for 
missing values and defines them strictly as variables that should have a response but 
which do not have a response because of the following two reasons: the question was 
not asked (as a result of interviewer error) or the respondent did not want to answer 
the question. Such variables are designated as missing values in the data file. 
In the specific case of this study the focus on maternal health care meant that the 
domain of the study was limited to the women section of the GDHS questionnaire 
(see, chapter Four) and, specifically, to those individuals in the 2003 and 2008 
surveys who had used the maternal health care services. The first encounter with 
missing variables was, thus, with those variables that were missing per the definition 
of the sub-group/sub-population. These missing variables are dealt with by dropping 
all variables that were not in the study’s domain (Acock 2005; Juster & Smith 2004) 
before any analysis or description of the data, including the ongoing analysis of 
missing variables, was conducted.  This, in turn, ensured that the study was able to 
differentiate between variables that were missing per the definition of the sub group 
‒ not problematic for the analysis ‒ as compared to those variables in the defined 
study sub groups but which had missing values.   
For the purposes of the thesis, of the full sample of the GDHS 2003 ‒ 6628 
households of which 6333 were occupied, 6251 were successfully interviewed, thus 
implying a response rate of 98.7%.  The domain, as defined by the purposes of this 
study, implied that the actual sample of interest was limited to the women who had 
utilised maternal health services ‒ a total of 5949 eligible women of whom 5691 
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(Ghana Statistical Service 2004) were interviewed successfully. However, not all 
these women had availed themselves of the maternal health care health services ‒ 
See Table 6.1 for details.   
In the 2008 GDHS sample of 12,323, 11,913 households were occupied, of which 
11,778 were successfully interviewed, thus giving an overall response rate of 98.9% 
(Ghana Statistical Service 2009). Also as regards the 2008 GDHS sample of 5,096 
eligible women, 4,916 were successfully interviewed, thus giving a female response 
rate of 96.5%. 
6.3.4 Summary of Variables 
Table 6.4: Summary statistics of variables 
GDHS 2003  GDHS 2008  
Statistic Obs. Mean  Std. 
Dev. 
Min/ 
Max 
Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min/ 
Max 
Age 
(Years)  
2663   30.45 7.40  15/49 2088   30.21  7.26  15  /       
49 
Antenatal 
care 
utilisation   
2663    5.24 3.33 0/30 2088    5.79 3.30 0/32 
BMI 2663 2640.6
3 
1704.
88 
1391/5
943      
2088 2446.16 1011.35 1218  /     
4814 
Total 
Number of 
Children  
2663   3.70 2.39 1   /13 2088 3.48  2.26 
 
1/14 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
Table 6.4 and 6.5 presents a summary of the characteristics of women interviewed in 
the 2003 and 2008 GDHS who had utilised maternal health services. Women who 
participated in this section of the survey for both years examined were aged from 15 
to 49 years old with an average age of approximately 30.45 years for 2003 and 30.21 
years in 2008.  On the use of antenatal care services, majority of women had had 
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some prenatal care during their pregnancies with the average number of antenatal 
visits of for 2003 slight lower than that for 2008; 5.24 and 5.79 respectively. The 
mean number of children for a woman dropped from approximately 4 children per 
women in 2003 to 3 children in 2008.  
Of the sampled women for both years the majority lived in rural communities 71.01  
% of women sampled in 2003 and 64.42% of 2008. In 2003 60.42% of women 
sampled had no schooling this figure had dropped in 2008 to 53.64%.   In both 
survey years the predominant religion was Christianity, followed by Islam. 7.29% of 
women in 2003 compared with 4.75 in 2008 reported not religion. For details see 
tables 6.4 and 6.5.  
 
Table 6.5: Summary of Categorical Variables 
 GDHS 2003 GDHS 2008 
Locality   Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  
Rural 1,891    71.01   1,345    64.42   
Urban  772    28.99 743 35.58 
Total  2,663 100 2,088 100 
Attended School Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  
No Schooling 1,609   60.42     1,120    53.64 
Some Schooling  1,054 39.58  968 46.36 
Total  2,663    100 2,088 100 
Religion  Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  
Christian 1,806   67.84 1,429   68.50   
Moslem 521     19.57      405   19.42 
Traditional 140   5.26    150 7.19    
No religion 194   7.29 99    4.75 
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Other 1 0.04      3   0.14     
Total 2,662      100 2,086    100 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
 
6.4 Descriptive Analysis45 
This section presents the summary descriptive analysis of the inequalities in the use 
selected maternal health variables across Ghana for the two surveys. The analysis 
used contingency tables and charts.  At bottom, the analysis involves an analysis of 
the variables pertaining to the source of antenatal care and the location of the 
antenatal care delivery by wealth level, location and region. The aim of the analysis 
was to provide a more general representation of the levels of inequality in the 
country with regards to maternal health use. The wealth variable used is derived 
from creating quintiles from the wealth index variable outlined in the selection of 
variables earlier in the chapter. Significant tests are conducted for each categories 
and probabilities for significant changes in the variables are reported.  
6.4.1 Antenatal Care Use46 
In analysing the antenatal care use, the variable of interest was the source of the 
antenatal care. The reason for this was primarily as a result of the fact that the 
inequities in the utilisation rates were examined in more detail using concentration 
curves and the inequality index analysis. Fewer rural women received antenatal care 
in 2008 from a doctor or a nurse than in 2003, though the difference was not 
statistically significant [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.63)]. A further examination of the data revealed 
that fewer rural women in 2008 also had not received any antenatal care than in 
2003. The decrease in rural women not receiving care was statistically significant at 
99% [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***. This, in turn, means that, although these women had not 
received their care from a doctor they had received some form of antenatal care 
                                                
45 All though this section significant level are reported as;  *p≤0.1 **p≤0.05,  *** p≤0.01 
46The tables related to this discussion are presented in Appendix E 
 
 
 
 
  
 
182 
either from a nurse or an auxiliary nurse. Overall there was an improvement in the 
use of doctors for antenatal care, mainly driven by the improvement in the use of 
doctors  for antenatal care in urban areas which was significant with a probability of  
[Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***.  There was also an improvement in the use of other health 
personnel while the percentage of pregnant women who did not use any antenatal 
care dropped from 2003 to 2008, details presented in table 6.6.   
Table 6.6: Source of antenatal care from a doctor (column percentages in 
parenthesis) 
Location 
/Year  
2003 2008 
Category  Doctor Nurse/ 
Midwife 
Other  No one  Doctor Nurse/   
Midwife 
Other  No one  
Rural 112 
(53) 
1603 
(69.6) 
12 
(92) 
200 
(94.79) 
72 
(42.60) 
1095 
(63.29) 
4 
(80) 
72 
(87.80) 
Urban 99 
(46.92) 
700 
(30.40) 
13 
(92.86) 
200 
(94.79) 
97 
(57.40) 
635 
(36.71) 
1 
(20) 
10 
(12.20) 
Total  211 
(100) 
2303 
(100) 
14 
(100) 
211 
(100) 
169 
(100) 
1730 
(100) 
5 
(100) 
82 
(100) 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
The regional level47, however, presented extremely mixed results with a number of 
regions seeing declines in the use of doctors and nurse services for antenatal care. 
The number of people who did receive antennal health care from any qualified health 
person increased in two regions, namely, the Western region and the Brong Ahafo 
region.  In the three Northern regions, well documented for their high levels of 
poverty and social deprivation, there were relatively large declines in the use of 
doctors health personnel for antenatal care over the period. Of the women who did 
receive antenatal care, the Ashanti and the Greater Accra region respectively 
recorded the highest levels of antenatal care from doctors ‒ 28.91% and 26.54% 
respectively ‒ while the three northern regions ‒ the Northern, upper West and 
Upper East regions ‒ recorded the lowest levels of antenatal care from doctors of 
3.79%, 3.79% and 1.42% respectively.   
                                                
47The tables for the regions available in Appendix E 
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Table 6.7: Wealth quintile and antenatal care from doctors (column percentages 
in parenthesis) 
Location 
/Year  
2003 2008 
Categor
y  
Doctor Nurse/Midwif
e 
Other  No 
one  
Doctor Nurse/Midwif
e 
Othe
r  
No 
one  
Poorest 28 
(13.27
) 
710 
(30.83) 
6 
(42.86
) 
132 
(62.56
) 
24 
(14.20
) 
468 
(27.05) 
2 
(40) 
39 
(47.56
) 
Poor 32 
(15.17
) 
501 
(21.75) 
6 
(42.86
) 
45 
(21.33
) 
29 
(17.16
) 
377 
(21.79) 
2 
(40) 
26 
(31.71
) 
Middle  41 
(19.43
) 
432 
(18.76) 
1 
(7.14) 
25 
(11.85
) 
30 
(17.75
) 
320 
(18.50) 
1 
(20) 
11 
(13.41
) 
Rich 32 
(15.17
) 
366 
(15.89) 
1 
(7.14) 
7 
(3.32) 
36 
(21.30
) 
344 
(19.88) 
0 
(0) 
5 
(6.10) 
Richest 78 
(36.97
) 
294 
(12.77) 
0 
(0) 
2 
(0.95) 
50 
(29.59
) 
221 
(12.77) 
0 
(0) 
1 
(1.22) 
Total 211 
(100) 
2303 
(100) 
14 
(100) 
211 
(100) 
169 
(100) 
1730 
(100) 
5 
(100) 
82 
(100) 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
When analysed together with the wealth level the trend generally showed that, in 
both 2003 and 2008, the more wealthy individuals had used more specialised 
antenatal care (Doctors and nurses) though the change registered was not statistically 
significant for all five wealth quintile groups. A closer examination of the data 
revealed that all the income groups, with the exception of the poorest income group, 
had shown an increase in the uptake of doctors’ services for antenatal care.  For 
mothers who reported as receiving antenatal care for others the poorest quintile 
recorded a statically significant decrease from 2003 to 2008 [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***.  In 
terms of those who had not used any specialised personnel for antenatal care, 
although the poor constituted the largest group, there was a decline in all the income 
groups not using any specialised antenatal care. The poorest quintile recorded a 
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significant decline from 2003 to 2008 in not using any antenatal care 
[Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***.  The details are presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. 
There is no doubt that there is need for some extra care during pregnancy, though 
questions remains regarding what should constitute antenatal care and at which level 
this care should be provided.  Also the benefits on antenatal care directly to pregnant 
women remains a debate and studies have suggested that routine procedures 
conducted during antenatal care have minimal benefits to outcomes but rather the 
gains are mainly from screening of maternal history (Say & Raine 2007; Bloom et al. 
1999; McDonagh 1996; Carroli et al. 2001). Additionally it has been established that 
women who attend antenatal care are more likely to use skilled assistance at delivery 
compared to women who received low levels of antenatal care (Bloom et al. 1999). 
There is however little standardisation globally in what antenatal care should entail 
and further to this in developing countries there wide variation in content and quality 
of antenatal care received due to factors related to facility where care was gotten 
(Bloom et al. 1999).  Poor quality of antenatal care received has been noted as an 
impediment to preventing diagnosing and treating complications in pregnancy 
(McDonagh 1996; Rani et al. 2008).   It has been noted that to maximise the benefits 
from antenatal care attention needs to be paid to the quality and coverage of care 
(Mrisho et al. 2009).  
In terms of providers literature is not emphatic with regards to differentiating 
between antenatal care by doctors or nurses. Evidence suggests that especially in 
developing countries antenatal care is general given by any trained provider or health 
officer and it is less likely to be given by a doctor. In many developing countries 
antenatal care is given by a nurse or midwife however, Pallikadavath et al. (2004) 
reported that in rural northern India antenatal care was predominantly given by 
doctors. Some studies have suggested a variation in quality of care depending on 
whether the provider is a doctor, nurse/midwife (Afulani 2015; Rani et al. 2008; 
Nigenda et al. 2003).  The availability of doctors suggests that coverage would be 
greatly constrained if the provision of antenatal care limited to doctors only and 
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issues with quality of care are more related to the availability of services and 
facilities.  
6.4.2 Maternal Delivery Services 
The overall trends depicted in Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show an overall increase in the use 
of formal facilities for delivery purposes from 2003 to 2008. However, urban areas 
recorded a decrease in the use of heath facilities from 2003 to 2008. Delivering at 
home also noted a statistically significant decline from 2003 to 2008 for both rural 
and urban areas [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***.  Both rural and urban areas recorded 
statistically significant increases in the sue of health facilities for delivery both 
reporting probabilities of [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***. It is also significant to note that there 
was a significant reduction in the number home births in the rural areas between 
2003 and 2008. Details are presented in table 6.8.  
Table 6.8: Distribution of Place of Delivery by Location (column percentages in 
parenthesis) 
Location/Place of 
Delivery  
2003 2008 
Home  Health 
Facility 
Other Home  Health 
Facility 
Other 
Rural  1,385 
(89.07) 
560 
(46.59) 
6 
(66.67) 
798 
(86.83) 
575 
(47.33) 
10 
(83.33) 
Urban 170 
(10.93) 
642 
(53.41)  
3 
(33.33) 
121 
(13.17)  
640 
(52.67)  
2 
(16.67) 
Total  1,555 
(100) 
1,202 
(100) 
9 
(100) 
919 
(100) 
1,215 
(100) 
12 
(100) 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
Once again the trend as regards wealth, when analysed, reveals that the more wealthy 
make greater use of Health facilities for delivery in Ghana as compared to the other 
income groups. However, from 2003 to 2008, two wealth quintiles; the poor and the 
middle recorded statistically significant decline in delivering at home with a 
probability of [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***.  For the same period all wealth quintiles 
examined, with the exception of the richest noted statistically significant increases in 
the use of health facilities for delivery purposes [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]***.  In the use of 
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other health facilities for delivery purposes all wealth quintiles recorded statistically 
significant increases with probability of [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.00)]*** for the poorest, poor, 
middle and rich and a probability of [Pr(|T|>|t|=0.08)]* for the richest quintile. 
Details of percentage changes are reported in table 6.9.  
Table 6.9: Place of delivery by wealth quintile (column percentages in 
parenthesis) 
Wealth 
Quintile/Place of 
Delivery 
2003 2008 
Home  Health 
Facility 
Other  Home  Health 
Facility 
Other  
Poorest 719 
(46.24)  
163 
(13.56)  
4 
(44.44) 
476 
(51.80) 
154 
(12.67) 
4 
(33.33) 
Poor 410 
(26.37) 
177 
(14.73) 
2 
(22.22) 
230 
(25.03) 
238 
(19.59) 
4 
(33.33) 
Middle  283 
(18.20)  
218 
(18.14)  
1 
(11.11) 
125 
(13.60) 
247 
(20.33) 
3 
(25.00) 
Rich 107 
(6.88)  
 306 
(25.46)  
2 
(22.22) 
69 
(7.51) 
321 
(26.42)  
0 
(0.00) 
Richest 36 
(2.32)  
338 
(28.12) 
0 
(0.00) 
19 
(2.07)  
255 
(20.99) 
1 
(8.33) 
Total 1,555 
(100) 
1,202 
(100) 
9 
(100) 
919 
(100) 
1,215 
(100) 
12 
(100) 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
The general trend in all the services examined revealed the inverse care hypothesis 
(Hart 1971) in antenatal health utilisation in Ghana as utilisation of the antenatal 
health services by the poor and rural residents continued to be lower than that of their 
wealthier counterparts and those living in urban areas. According to the inverse care 
hypothesis, the people or populations who require good medical care are the ones 
who are the least likely to have this made available to them, thus implying that, for 
any given population, the accessibility and utilisation of proper healthcare and the 
need for proper healthcare are inversely related (Hart 1971).  
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6.5 Inequality Indices and Curves 
6.5.1 Standardising the Antenatal Care Health Variable 
It is typical and justifiable for health utilisation variables to exhibit inequality in 
relation to some socioeconomic variable of choice.48 These inequalities may 
obviously not be interpreted as inequities as they may be attributable to demographic 
conditions (see Chapter three). Thus, the only way in which to approximate a 
measure of health inequity is to standardise the inequality for differences in need and 
other confounding variables.  The following two approaches are possible, namely, 
direct and indirect standardisation (see Chapter four for details). This section 
discusses the indirectly standardised prenatal health utilisation variable using the 
specification outlined and discussed in Chapter four. Principal component analysis 
(PCA)49 was used to determine the variables that best predict antenatal care use in 
Ghana. This analysis was combined with conclusions from relevant literature and 
subject to data availability in the GDHS survey.50  
The PCA technique is based on the principle that a specific unobserved variable, also 
known as the latent variable, is correlated with a set of directly measured variables 
(Jolliffe 2005; Yi 2002; Wood 2009). In this study the latter are a range of 
socioeconomic and health variables that influence the use of the antenatal health care 
services which were selected based on the literature review. This latent variable may 
be predicted by examining the correlations between these observed variables (Yi 
2002).  The PCA procedure provides a means of summarising the information 
provided by several variables by decomposing the variance in the data into factors or 
components. Each component is the sum of each of the observed variables multiplied 
by its weight, which is the proportion of the variance in the data accounted for by 
                                                
48This may be incomes, consumption, wealth or even education.  
49Find results of this analysis in Appendix H  
50The choice of GDHS was made after examining all the available household datasets on Ghana including; the Ghana Living 
Standards Survey and the MICS and determining which of these contained the most relevant variables available ‒ see Chapter 
four. 
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each of the observed variables. One of the components is chosen to be the index 
which measures the observed variables based on a selected criterion such as the 
component that has the highest eigenvalue or produces the best explanation of the 
variance in the data. 
The first component of a PCA result is usually the component that best explains the 
significant majority of the variation. The result of the PCA shows that the first 
component explained 30% and 29% for 2008 and 2003 surveys respectively of the 
variation with an Eigenvalue of 2.7 and 2.6 in the same order.  The Kaiser-Meyer 
Olkin (KMO) test was applied to examine the robustness and sampling adequacy of 
the PCA performed on the data and which produced an overall correlation of 0.65 
and 0.63 for the 2008 and 2003 samples respectively. According to the decision rule 
this means that the PCA may be performed on this data.51 
6.5.2 Regression Model and Results 
The negative binomial regression model is part of the class of non-linear regression 
models estimated by maximum likelihood (Hilbe 2011; Gardner et al. 1995). The 
model employs a natural log link function and it is a count data model. Count 
response models are a subset of discrete response regression models and include; 
binary logistic, probit regression, grouped logistic, grouped complementary loglog, 
ordinal logistic, ordered probit regression, discrete choice logistic regression, poisson 
and negative binomial regression (Hilbe 2011). These discrete models address non-
negative integer responses. Of these model two that are used for count data, which 
consists of discrete responses of counts are the poisson and negative binomial 
regression. These models aim to explain the number of occurrences of an event by 
their nature these counts themselves are heteroskedastic, right skewed, and have a 
variance that increases with the mean of the distribution.  
The negative bionomial model thus relaxes the equidispersion restriction of the 
Poisson model through the introduction of latent heterogeneity in the conditional 
                                                
51Decision rule KMO of greater than 0.5 means that the PCA may be performed  
 
 
 
 
  
 
189 
mean of the Poisson model (Greene 2008; Hilbe 2011). This makes it the model of 
choice for overdispersed count data.   
 
The results of the negative binomial model were interpreted as the expected log 
count of the dependent variable. In the case of the model specified for antenatal care 
use a negative significant coefficient would imply that a one-unit increase in the 
respective independent variable would decrease the expected log count of antenatal 
care use by the value of the coefficient and vice versa. The results may also be 
interpreted as incidence ratios with the use of the respective command.  
Health care use data typically comprises nonnegative integer counts which require 
the application of nonlinear estimators (Cameron & Trivedi 2013; Hilbe 2011; 
O’Donnell & Wagstaff 2008). The nature of health count data52 is such that it often 
collapses the assumptions for the ordinary least square estimations, potentially 
rendering the parameters estimates inaccurate (O’Donnell & Wagstaff 2008; Hilbe 
2011). In the case in which the predictors are skewed, for example, measures of 
service use or cost data, the best models are nonlinear count regression models.  For 
the purposes of these models the dependent variable is a non-negative integer while 
the predictor variables may take any form (Elhai, Calhoun & Ford 2008). The section 
discusses the negative binomial regression model which was adopted as the 
dependent variable, while the use of antenatal health services was a count variable, 
which was also over dispersed. The mean was significantly different to the variance 
(Byers et al. 2003; Elhai et al. 2008).   
Based on the variables identified the model estimated is specified below;  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃! = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑋! 
Where Pi = is the health count variable of interest (antenatal care) 
α = intercept parameter 
                                                
52Graphs and charts are provided in appendix to show over dispersion and the need for a negative binomial estimator  
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β = vector of slope parameters 
Xi = vector of explanatory variables  
Total number of children 
 BMI 
Age of mother  
Visited health facility,  
Wealth index (Quintiles) 
Employment status   
Religion 
Highest Education level attained  
Religion affiliation  
Location (rural or urban) 
The regression results indicated that the following factors demonstrated a significant 
positive association with the use of antenatal care; total number of children, Body 
Mass Index (BMI) of the mother, age of the mother, whether or not the mother had 
been ill or injured, level of wealth of the household, religion of the mother and 
whether or not the mother had ever attended school.  After setting the survey and 
applying survey weights, a negative binomial regression command53 was run. The 
command used presented the output in the form of rates and was interpreted as the 
effect of a unit change in the independent variable on the rate of using antenatal care.  
The results for 2003 showed that an additional child decreased the rate of prenatal 
                                                
53svyset psu  [pweight = sampwt], strata(v022) 
global xvar "total_child BMI age Visited_health_facility"  
global zvar "i.Wealth_quint worked_in12months i.religion Attended_sch Location " 
nbreg prenatal  $xvar $zvar [pw=weight], irr  
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care by 0.95. An additional year for a woman increased her use of antenatal care by 
1.02. Illness or injury (necessitating a visit to a health facility) increased the rate of 
antenatal care use by 1.11. Having an education increased the rate of antenatal care 
by 1.15. Finally on the 2003 regression relocation from a rural area to an urban area 
increased the rate of antenatal care use by 1.19.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
192 
Table 6.10: Negative Binomial regression results54 
Variable/ Year  2008 2003 
Total child 0.95*** (-4.67) 
0.95***	  
(-5.45)	  
BMI 1.00* (2.37) 
1.0	  
(0.59)	  
Age 1.02*** (5.51) 
1.02***	  
(6.27)	  
Visited health facility  1.12*** (4.12) 
1.11***	  
(4.44)	  
Wealth_quint 
1.07* 
(1.99) 
1.07*	  
(1.79)	  
1.13** 
(2.80) 
1.10* 
(2.33) 
1.28*** 
(6.0) 
1.23*** 
(4.56) 
1.399*** 
(6.76) 
1.43** 
(7.30) 
Employment  0.96 (-0.75) 
1.07**	  
(1.88)	  
Religion 
1.00* 
(0.09) 
1.23**	  
(3.13)	  
0.83** 
(-2.84) 
0.85 
(-1.51) 
0.84* 
(-2.52) 
0.31*** 
(-17.53) 
1.26*** 
(5.32) 
2.83*** 
(15.53) 
Education  1.07* (1.98) 
1.15*** 
(5.62)	  
Location 1.09** (2.64) 
1.19***	  
(5.35)	  
constant  3.06*** (14.65) 
2.08***	  
(7.65)	  
N 2084 2661 
Wald Chi2 492.33 664.93 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
*p≤0.1 **p≤0.05,  *** p≤0.01 t- values in parenthesis 
                                                
54 Full regression tables presented in Appendix I 
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For the 2008 regression the total number of children a woman reduced the rate of 
antenatal care use by 0.95 while BMI, that had not emerged as significant in 2003, 
was significant in 2008, maintaining its positive association with antenatal care use.  
Surprisingly the employment status of the mother was not significantly related to the 
use of antenatal health services. This may, however, be attributable to the fact a 
significant proportion of individuals surveyed had been employed at some time. The 
regression results for 2003 and 2008 are reported in the table 6.10. The goodness of 
fit statistics reported that the negative binomial model was the appropriate model for 
the data as indicated by the dispersion parameter and the log likelihood statistic.  
Both the variance inflation factor and the tolerance levels showed that 
multicollinearity was not an issue of major concern in this model. This may be 
observed in the correlation between the variables presented in the appendix G. 
Graphs and other regression diagnostic test are also included in the appendix I.  
Table 6.11: Mean of antenatal care use post standardisation 
Year 2003 2008 
Quintiles  Observed Need adjusted  Observed 
Need 
adjusted  
Poorest 4.04 3.94 4.56 4.62 
Poor 4.50 4.47 5.16 5.13 
Middle 5.13 4.96 5.77 5.62 
Richer 6.34 6.07 6.88 6.54 
Richest  8.20 7.60 8.11 7.47 
Total 5.24 5.05 5.79 5.63 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
Table 6.11 presents the quintile means of the antenatal care utilisation variable both 
before and after it had been standardised.  It may be observed that primarily the 
means of the standardised variables are less than the mean of the observed prenatal 
utilisation variable. This situation changed only with the 2008 level for the poorest 
group which reported a higher level of need-adjusted prenatal care than was 
observed. The overall mean of the need-adjusted variable for both 2003 and 2008 are 
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lower than was observed. This shows that pregnant women are actually using less 
antenatal services than observed when adjusted for their need.  
6.5.3 Concentration Curve (Standardised Antenatal Care Variable) 
As discussed in Chapter 4 the health concentration curve55 for prenatal care is used 
to illustrate pictorially the presence of inequality in the use of prenatal health care. 
The concentration curves in figures 6.1 and 6.2 illustrate the trends in overall 
inequality in maternal health over the period. Although the concentration index 
discussed in the next section is computed, the aim of the curves is to provide a 
general overview of inequality in antenatal care across the country and, thus, the sub 
groups presented are both rural and urban in order to ensure a more nuanced analysis 
than would otherwise have been the case. Figure 6.1 and 6.2 presents the 
concentration curve for antenatal care utilisation for the two years.  
 
Figure 6.1: Concentration index for antenatal care utilisation ‒ 2003(Author’s 
Construct, 2014) 
                                                
55See specification and details in methodology chapter 
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Figure 6.2: Concentration index for antenatal care utilisation ‒ 2008 (Author’s 
Construct, 2014) 
The figures 6.1 and 6.2 show a situation in which the overall inequality in antenatal 
health utilisation declined between 2003 and 2008 in both rural and urban areas. 
Depicted as the gap between the curve and the line of equality it is clear that the 
inequality was relatively wider in 2003.  This was worse in the urban areas as 
compared to the rural areas. However, in 2008 there had clearly been a significant 
improvement in the overall inequality which was seemingly triggered by a marked 
improvement in the urban inequality situation. Nevertheless, the situation in the rural 
areas had also improved and both curves virtually coincide with the line of equality.  
This will, however, be analysed in detail when the concentration indices are 
computed using the standardised utilisation variable. Both curves continued to lie 
below the line of inequality, thus indicating that the equivalent index values would 
be positive and the inequality depicted as pro-rich.  The next section discusses the 
equivalent concentration index values for these curves and also presents a regional 
breakdown of the indices.  
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6.5.4 Concentration Index: Measurement and Decomposition 
In 2003 the overall inequity in antenatal care utilisation as measured by the 
concentration index was 0.15.  As illustrated by the concentration curve depicted 
above this value indicates the existence of positive pro-rich inequity in prenatal care 
use.  Of this figure of 0.15, 0.09 constituted interregional inequities in health, thus 
explaining the differences between the various regions (see specification of index in 
Chapter four) while the figure also showed a pro-rich distribution in antenatal care 
use between the various regions. The inequities within regions accounted for a total 
of 0.82  (see Table 6.12 for details). The fact that the level of within region inequities 
was much higher than the level of inequities between regions indicated a need to 
examine the inequities in the regions. 
Table 6.12: Concentration index decomposition result 
CI 2003 2008 
Between Regions  0.0898  
(0.0006) 
0.0645  
(0.0006) 
Within Region 0.8182 0.6135 
Residual -0.7594 -0.5716 
Total  0.1486  
(0.0083) 
0.1064  
(0.0072) 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
Table 6.13 presents the regional level of the concentration indices. The performance 
is generally mixed with some regions showing much higher levels than others. The 
Western Region recorded the highest level with an index value of 0.13, followed by 
the Greater Accra region, which reported an index of 0.11. All the regions surveyed 
in 2003 recorded pro-rich inequalities in antenatal care use.  
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In 2008 the overall concentration index value was 0.11 with this value indicating that 
the inequities exhibited were pro-rich.  The between region component was 0.06, 
which was lower than the overall index and much closer to zero, thus showing that 
the level of inequities between the regions was markedly better than the overall 
inequities. However, the between regions inequities maintained its pro-rich character 
with a positive sign, thus indicating that the better off regions were faring much 
better than the poorer regions in the area of antenatal care use.   
The examination of the within region component of the concentration index revealed 
the reason why the national level was much higher than the value for the between 
region. With an index value of 0.61 the inequities within the various regions was 
both extremely high and pro-rich, thus indicating that distributions within the regions 
may require more attention than they were being accorded. The regional levels of 
inequities showed that, in 2008, of the 10 regions, only the Upper East was 
exhibiting pro-poor inequities in antenatal care with a negative sign while the 
remaining 9 were all showing pro-rich inequities. This region also had the lowest 
level of inequities as measured by the magnitude of the index.  The Western region 
had the highest level of inequities in antenatal care use and this was also pro rich (a 
level of 0.12), followed by the Ashanti region with a value of 0.09.  
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Table 6.13: Regional concentration indices 
Region  2003 2008 
Western 0.1282  
(0.0214) 
0.1223 
(0.0232) 
Central 0.0761 
(0.0210) 
0.0555 
(0.0264) 
Greater Accra  0.1123  
(0.0176) 
0.0425  
(0.0160) 
Volta  0.1043  
(0.0349) 
0.0524  
(0.0173) 
Eastern 0.0753  
(0.0236) 
0.0602 
(0.0204) 
Ashanti 0.0926  
(0.0129) 
0.0864  
(0.0166) 
Brong Ahafo 0.0572 
(0.0138) 
0.0782 
(0.0212) 
Northern 0.0761 
(0.0214) 
0.0622 
(0.0181) 
Upper West 0.0387 
(0.0243) 
0.0581  
(0.0172) 
Upper East 0.05741  
(0.0239) 
-0.0044 
(0.0181) 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
 
From 2003 to 2008 the inequities in antenatal care use reduced at the national level 
from 0.15  to 0.11  although they maintained their pro-rich character. This reduction 
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in the level of pro-rich inequalities was a sign of an improvement in the situation of 
the poor with regards to antenatal care use. It would appear that this decrease was 
triggered by a decline in both the between regional component and the within 
regional component, the former declining from 0.09 to 0.06 and the latter from 0.82  
to 0.61. However, both the within region inequities and the between region inequities 
continued to exhibit a pro-rich character.  A detailed exploration of both the 
magnitudes and the signs of the regional index values for all 10 regions revealed a 
mixed performance over the period. Two of the 10 regions in the country, Brong 
Ahafo and the Upper West regions, had experienced an increase in inequity levels 
with their index values increasing from the 2003 level to the 2008 level (see Table 
6.13 for details). On the other hand, only one out of the 10 regions in Ghana, the 
Upper East, had experienced a change in the sign of the index, thus indicating a 
movement from exhibiting pro-rich inequities to exhibiting pro-poor inequities.  In 
addition, this region also reported the lowest level of inequities as indicated by the 
magnitude of the absolute value of the index.  
6.5.5 Theil’s Index: Measurement and Decomposition 
The decision to combine the concentration index (discussed above) and the Theil 
index was as a result of the complete decomposable nature of the Theil’s index (see 
Chapter four for details) while the concentration index provides additional 
information on the gradient of inequality. However, an analysis of this index 
revealed that although the actual level of the index varied both indices indicated that 
inequities in antenatal care utilisation were best explained by differences within the 
regions as the Theil’s index recorded a higher level of within region inequities for 
both 2003 and 2008. The Theil’s index also confirmed the results based on the 
concentration index, namely, that both the between region inequities and within 
region inequities declined from 2003 to 2008. 
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Table 6.14: Theil index decomposition result 
Theil (1) 2003 2008 
Between 
Regions  0.0105 0.0071 
Within 
Region 0.1627 0.1299 
Total  0.1732 0.1371 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
 At the regional level all but two regions (Central and Brong Ahafo) recorded 
decreases in the Theil’s index values from 2003 to 2008. It is worth mentioning that 
the concentration index analysis also indicated that the Brong Ahafo region had 
recorded an increase in antenatal care inequities although the Central region, which 
had recorded a decrease in the level using the concentration index, recorded a 
significantly higher level using the Theil.   These specific variations may be 
attributable to the fact that the concentration index formula computes based on ranks 
of a wealth measure while the Theil’s index uses only the standardised health 
variable. The details of the Theil index are reported in tables 6.14 and 6.15.  
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Table 6.15: Regional level Theil 
Region  2003 2008 
Western 0.1776 0.1619 
Central 0.1528 0.1651 
Greater Accra  0.1563 0.0906 
Volta  0.1759 0.1405 
Eastern 0.1885 0.1242 
Ashanti 0.1359 0.1326 
Brong Ahafo 0.1062 0.1278 
Northern 0.2276 0.1254 
Upper West 0.1624 0.1107 
Upper East 0.1924 0.1321 
Source: Author’s own computations based on GHDS 2003 and 2008 
 
6.6 Limitations of the Analysis 
The results of the analysis were based on an increasing intensity of decentralisation.  
However, this, in turn, implies that a before and after comparison does not fully 
reflect the true nature of the relationship between decentralisation and health inequity 
in Ghana. Nevertheless, the design of the decentralisation process in Ghana and its 
roll out meant that this model represented the only feasible way of analysing the 
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decentralising reforms.  In order to overcome this limitation the study combined 
methods and techniques to identify other country specific factors that had influenced 
health inequity within Ghana’s decentralised system.  This was achieved by means of 
a qualitative analysis.  
The nature of decentralisation in Ghana and within the health system implied that, in 
order to conduct an analysis of this nature, data was required from a variety of 
sources. However, this was a problem as the majority of the household surveys 
(GLSS, MICS, GDHS) in Ghana do not contain adequate data at the district level.  
Nevertheless, the potential adverse effect of the latter on the research findings and 
results was countered by using data from a number of sources with household data 
from the GDHS providing a way of conducting a micro level analysis of health 
inequities and the administrative data from the Ghana Districts Assembly’s Common 
Fund enabling the researcher to conduct a district level analysis of inequities in the 
health resources in the country.  
The measurement of horizontal equity, as carried out in this study, is essential to the 
process of need assessment.  One ways of assessing health needs is the use of a self-
rated health variable. Self-rated health variables have been found to be associated 
with health care use in a number of studies(Abdulrahim & El Asmar 2012; DE LA 
HOZ & Leon 1996; Arnadottir et al. 2011; Miilunpalo et al. 1997). This variable is 
often available in surveys of this nature. However, the GDHS as well as the majority 
of other household surveys in Ghana do not include the self-rated health variable. 
Similarly a variable of the membership of the national health insurance scheme was 
required as a confounding variable was also not available in the two rounds of the 
survey. This meant the study was not able to adequately control for the effect of the 
introduction of the health insurance (Discussions in chapter 5) on maternal care 
utilisation. Accordingly, this study conducted a principal component analysis 
technique to determine the variables that best predict antenatal health care use.  
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6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter contained two strands of quantitative analysis which  examine the levels 
of inequities in health in Ghana. The section 1 of the chapter revealed the existence 
of significant levels of inequities between districts in all the health resources 
examined, specifically; nurses, doctors and health facilities. It emerged that the 
inequities in all these resources were pro-rich, thus implying that the richer districts 
in Ghana were characterised by higher levels of these resources as compared to the 
poorer districts. Of the three resources examined, health facilities recorded the lowest 
level of inequities. This may be explained by the fact that the data used did not 
distinguish between facility type and, thus, a closer examination based on facility 
type and status may reveal a different outcome.  
The chapter then discussed the descriptive analysis of the selected maternal health 
variables. This analysis revealed a general increase in the use of maternal health care 
from 2003 to 2008. The analysis also revealed an obvious pro-rich gradient in the use 
of maternal health services in Ghana as, for all service categories explored, the level 
of use by the rich was higher than that of the poor. The revelation of pro rich 
gradient in selected health utilisation variables reinforces revelation that inequities at 
the district level favour richer districts. In terms of localities, it emerged that women 
living in the rural areas demonstrated a lower level of utilisation of maternal health 
services as compared to women living in urban areas, especially in the case of more 
specialised services such as doctors and hospital delivery services.  The regional 
level analysis revealed an extremely mixed pattern However, the three northern 
regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West) consistently demonstrated a lower 
utilisation levels of all the services explored as compared to the other regions.  
The inequality curves analysis of the use of antenatal health care services indicated 
pro-rich inequities in the use of these services as depicted by the concentration curve 
lying wholly below the line of equality.  The situation was shown to have improved 
in 2008 as compared to 2003.  This finding was corroborated by the concentration 
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index analysis which provided the actual level of inequities as measured by the 
concentration indexes for 2003 and 2008. The concentration index analysis revealed 
that the general level of inequities in antenatal care use had dropped from the 2003 
level of 0.15 to the 2008 level of 0.11.  This drop was noted in both the between 
group inequities and the within group inequities.  The analysis also showed that, for 
both time periods, the within group inequities were significantly higher than the 
within group component. The Theil’s index confirmed these results as it showed an 
overall decline in inequities from 0.17 in 2003 to 0.14 in 2008. Once again, as with 
the concentration index, the Theil’s index demonstrated a drop in both the within 
group and the between group components. The Theil’s index also further confirmed 
the fact that inequities in antenatal care utilisation are driven primarily by within 
group inequities with within group levels of 0.16 and 0.13 for 2003 and 2008 
respectively and the corresponding between group components of 0.01 and 0.01 
respectively.  
Overall the quantitative analysis in this chapter reveals that whether at the household 
level or at the district level inequities in maternal health service in Ghana generally 
favour the rich.  
The chapter also highlighted a number of limitations of the study, namely, data 
limitations and design limitation. These limitations are addressed in the next chapter. 
The next chapter also discusses the qualitative analysis which provided a more 
detailed and nuanced examination of the question of the way in which 
decentralisation has impacted on inequities in Ghana from the perspectives of policy 
makers within both the health system and the decentralised structures.  
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Chapter 7  
A Qualitative Analysis of Inequity in Ghana’s Decentralised Health System 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter contained a quantitatively investigation into the existence of 
health inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system. This was achieved at two levels by 
using district level data in order to examine inequities in the health resources and, at 
the individual level, by examining the existence of inequities in the antenatal care 
utilisation variables.  
Based on the data collected from the interviews and in line with the arguments 
presented in respect of the theoretical basis for the study, this chapter discusses the 
qualitative analysis of health inequities in Ghana which was conducted. The 
perspectives of the relevant policy makers are analysed, thus helping to provide 
insights into the patterns of health inequities revealed in chapter 6. The main 
objective of this chapter is to provide a nuanced understanding of the impact of 
decentralisation on health inequities and to determine from the perspective of the 
policy makers whether and how decentralisation is achieving its objectives in the 
area of inequities in the health sector in Ghana.  
The chapter also identifies and examines both the channels through which 
decentralisation has reduced inequities in the health system and the major factors that 
continue to threaten equity in health in Ghana.  
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the data gathered from four districts in 
Ghana; two in the northern half of the country and the other two in the southern half 
of the country. These four districts56 include two metropolitan assemblies (Accra and 
Tamale), a municipal assembly and a district assembly (Ga-South and Kumbungu). 
                                                
56 The map presented in chapter four outlines the study area.  
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The details on the motivation for selecting these districts and a summary profile of 
each district are provided in next section of this chapter.  In each of these districts 
interviews were conducted with officers from the Ghana Health Service and the 
District Assembly.  
The chapter also includes interviews with officers from the relevant national level 
institutions working with the decentralised structures in the country such as the 
District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF), District Development Facility (DDF), 
Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD), Ministry of 
Health (MoH) and Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP). The 
details of the sampling methods and interview techniques were outlined in Chapter 4.  
The analysis is guided by the theoretical, conceptual arguments and empirical 
discussions presented in Chapters 2 and 3 and on which the responses from the 
interviews are generated and discussion are grouped/outlined. 
7.2 A Preamble to the Selected Districts  
7.2.1 Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) 
Of the four districts in which the interviews were conducted the Accra Metropolitan 
Assembly is, by all standards, the most developed and is also viewed by many as the 
most privileged district in the country. The Accra Metropolitan Assembly comprises 
a district of 117 sq. metres in landmass with a population of approximately 
1,232,409.00 (GoG 2013), thus making it the most densely populated district in the 
country. The district is located in the south-eastern corner of Ghana and is bordered 
by four districts, namely, Ga West, Ga East, Ga South and Asiahman and also the 
Gulf of Guinea to the south. The district is also home to the national capital city, 
Accra, making it the most cosmopolitan of all the districts in the country.  The AMA 
is an urban district comprising a total of approximately 101 communities, a number 
of which are urban slum areas. In terms of infrastructure, the AMA is the most 
developed in the nation and most of the district is accessible by tarred, trunk roads 
(Accra Metropolitan Assembly 2010). The vegetation of the district is coastal 
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savannah.  In keeping with its cosmopolitan character a varied range of economic 
activities are carried out in the district with the inhabitants of the district being 
employed in all the major sectors of the economy. These are primarily formal sectors 
with trading being the most significant(Accra Metropolitan Assembly 2013).  
7.2.2 Ga South Municipal Assembly (GSMA) 
The Ga South Municipal Assembly (GSMA) is located in the Greater Accra Region. 
The municipality shares boundaries with five other districts, namely; Accra 
Metropolitan, Akwapim, Ga West, West Akim, Awutu-Effutu Senya and Gomoa and 
is bordered in the south by the Gulf of Guinea. The Ga South Municipal Assembly 
occupies a land area of approximately 81 sq metres and includes an estimated 
population of 242,822 people.  In view of the proximity of the municipality to the 
national capital, Accra, there is considerable pressure on land for both residential 
settlement and industrial land use(Ga South Municipal Assembly 2010). The 
vegetation of the assembly comprises predominantly coastal savannah with 
secondary forests in some parts of the area. The municipality is generally considered 
to be a peri-urban community. The population density of 550.5 persons per sq. meter 
is higher in those areas of the municipality that border Accra but becomes less dense 
the further away from the capital(Ga South Municipal Assembly 2010).  The main 
economic activity in the district is trading and a huge proportion of the inhabitants 
commute daily to Accra, the national capital, to work(Ga South Municipal Assembly 
2010). 
7.2.3 Tamale Metropolitan Assembly (TaMA) 
The Tamale Metropolitan Assembly is the largest district in the northern part of the 
country. The major city in this district, Tamale, is also the district capital and serves 
as the economic hub of the northern part of the country. The only domestic airport in 
the northern part of the country is in Tamale and, the city serves as a major transit 
point for travellers to and from Burkina Faso, Ghana’s landlocked neighbour to the 
north. However, despite the fact that the TaMA is also classified as a metropolitan 
assembly, it is very different from the AMA. The geographic spread of the district is 
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extremely wide with a landmass of 360 sq. metres. The population of 247,567 means 
that the district is not as densely populated as either AMA or many of the southern 
metropolitan assemblies. TaMA is predominantly an urban assembly although many 
of the communities within the district are classified as rural areas. In terms of 
accessibility the district is serviced by a number of trunk roads, the vegetation of the 
district is savannah and the inhabitants are mainly farmers and traders (Assembly 
2010). The district shares boundaries with five other districts in the north, namely, 
Savelugu-Nanton to the north, the Yendi Municipal Assembly to the east, Tolon to 
the west, Central Gonja to the south west and East Gonja to the south. The main 
economic activities in the district are farming and trading (Assembly 2010).  
7.2.4 Kumbungu District Assembly (KMA) 
The Kumbungu district is a relatively new district which was carved out of the 
Tolon/Kumbungu district that was part of the original 45 districts created in 1988. 
The district shares its boundaries with Savelugu-Nanton Municipal to the east, the 
Tolon District to the south, the North Gonja District to the west and, to the north, the 
Mamprugo/Moaduri District. The district covers a landmass of 1205 square 
kilometres and includes an estimated 118 communities and a population of 
approximately 56,165 people.  The main reason for the creation of this new district 
was the extensive size of the previous Tolon/Kumbungu district as this had made it 
difficult to provide services and hampered its management by a single assembly. The 
district’s vegetation is mainly savannah. It is considered a rural district with a 
population density of approximately 50 people per sq. km.  
The presence of a number of rivers that form the tributaries of the White Volta in the 
district means that fishing is a major economic activity in the district. The other main 
economic activities carried on in the district are peasant and subsistence farming. 
High levels of unemployment have driven many of the youth in the district, in 
common with the youth from other parts of northern Ghana, to migrate to the 
southern parts of the country to find informal sector jobs such as porters in markets, 
popularly known as “kayayee”(Kumbungu District Assembly 2010). Both the 
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physical and the social infrastructure in the district is poor and the district is served 
by two main trunk roads only (Kumbungu District Assembly 2010).  The other roads 
in the district are feeder roads which are extremely difficult to navigate. A unique 
feature of this district is that a huge portion of the district across the White Volta is 
cut off from the rest of the district and cannot be accessed during the raining season. 
In local parlance this area is known as “overseas”(Kumbungu District Assembly 
2010).   
7.3 Decentralised Structures within the Districts 
In terms of Ghana’s decentralisation system there is little or no variation in the 
decentralised structures within the districts. What differentiates districts is the quality 
and the number of staff employed. The more rural districts face challenges as regards 
retaining staff members who have been posted or allocated to these districts and they 
often have to make do with staff members who have with significantly lower levels 
of qualifications as compared to staff in the urban and much larger districts. The 
chart below illustrates the structure of decentralisation as it exists in the districts in 
Ghana. 
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Figure 7.1.0: Administrative structure of a decentralised district57
                                                
57 Source: Adapted from District Development Plan Kumbungu District page 44(Kumbungu District Assembly 2010) 
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7.3.1 Funding Sources for Districts 
As was discussed in detail in Chapter 5 there are a number of revenue funding 
sources available to all districts. However, in the main, all the districts tend to rely on 
the following three major sources, namely, internally generated revenues (IGRs), the 
District Assemblies Common Fund (DACF) and the District Development Funds 
(DDF). Some districts also maintain direct relationships with donors although such 
donor funds have significantly reduced with the inception of the DDF to which a 
number of donors allocate funds for the support of districts. However, there are a few 
donors still supporting districts directly in the form of specific projects. A number of 
urban districts are also part of an urban district funding mechanism which is financed 
by donors58.  Table 7.1 below illustrates the IGRs and the DACF allocations to the 
districts for the 2010 and 2011 financial years. 
Table 7.1: District internally generated revenues59  
District  Accra Metro Ga South Tamale Metro Kumbungu 
Rev 2010 (USD 5,991,781.00 465,949.60 330,113.79 18,511.91 
Per Capita Revenue 
2010 4.86 1.92 1.33 0.33 
Rev 2011 (USD) 15,895,279.23 2,857,873.74 352,428.59 40,904.79 
Per Capita Revenue 
2011 12.90 11.77 1.42 0.73 
Population 2010  1,232,409.00 242,822.00 247,567.00 56,165.00 
Area 117 81 360 1205 
Source: Author’s own computation based on data from the DACF Formula 2013 Report  
                                                
58See chapter six  
59 Revenues are based on exchange rate for April 2013, when data was published of 1.94 Ghana Cedis to the USD 
(http://www.bog.gov.gh/index.php?option=com_wrapper&view=wrapper&Itemid=298). Did not use purchasing power parity 
conversion because the study did not conduct any international or cross country comparisons. 
59Computed at 95% confidence interval.  
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Source: District Assemblies Common Fund Formula 2013 (Government of Ghana 
2013a) 
Of these sources of funding the most reliable, according to the districts in which 
interviews were conducted, tend to be the DDF, IGR and the DACF, although most 
of the districts complain about the delayed disbursement of the DACF60. While the 
DACF continues to remain the most significant revenue source for the districts, the 
representatives from the districts interviewed alluded to the fact that its value in 
terms of development impact was gradually being eroded (see Chapter 5). In terms 
of the internally generated revenues, these have tended to show the widest gaps 
between the various districts. Table 7.1 above depicts both the total and the per 
capita IGRs for the four districts in which interviews were conducted. The table 
reveals that the urban districts recorded the highest level of IGRs with the Accra 
Metropolitan Assembly showing the highest amounts. A participant from the 
Ministry of Finance explained this situation as followings;  
If you go to some of the assemblies their “revenue health status” is not the 
same. If you take those at the northern side they do not get much revenue 
and, because of that, they are not able to support all the departments, 
including health, but, if you come down south, you could see that, if you take 
Greater Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi, those MMA, metro and municipal 
assemblies, they get a lot of revenue and, so if you see the disparities in the 
performance indicators per the Accra Metropolitan Assembly (AMA) or the 
Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (KMA) compared to rural districts, this is 
where the problem is coming from. 
National Officer 01  
                                                
60Chapter six  
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The statement highlights the well-documented gap between the north and the south 
of the country (see Chapter 4 on contextual analysis). It emerged from the interviews 
conducted in the districts interviewed that the DDF was the most useful grant in 
terms of meeting developmental needs although many complained about the 
restrictions placed on the use of the DDF by its fund administrators61. In further 
explaining the usefulness of the DDF to the assemblies, a participant asserted that; 
So far when it comes to DDF and the recent urban development fund there 
have been improvement, so, if a district does not have the DDF or any other 
fund, they cannot implement most of the programmes.62 
District Assembly Officer 04 
For the districts the timely disbursement of the DDF means that they are able to draw 
up appropriate plans for the use of these funds and allocate such funds to their 
various projects in such a manner as to maximise the benefits to their communities. 
The allocation of the DDF funds is based on the qualification criteria (as discussed in 
Chapter 5). In terms of the DDF funds the AMA met the qualification criteria for the 
2009 financial year only, the TaMA qualified for years 2008 and 2010 while the Ga 
south district has qualified for the DDF funds every year since the inception, namely, 
2008, 2009 and 2010. The Kumbungu district, however, a new district recently 
created but it did qualify for the 2010 disbursement. The sectors for which DDF 
funds have been used include education, health and water and sanitation as well as 
the economic sectors. However, in the four selected districts the DDF funds were 
spent primarily on education and health with education always commanding the 
larger share.  The table in Appendix K provides a breakdown of the sector shares of 
the DDF funds in the selected districts.  
 
                                                
61See Chapter 5 
62Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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7.3.2 Health Facilities and Resources 
Similar to the patterns identified in the revenues of the selected districts, the health 
resources in the selected districts showed even wider disparities.  Once again the two 
metropolitan assemblies showed the highest numbers of health resources both in total 
number and per capita terms.  The Accra Metropolitan Assembly recorded 40 health 
facilities, 261 medical doctors and 1778 nurses as compared to the situation in the 
Kumbungu Assembly which recorded seven health facilities only and in all less than 
10 medical doctors and nurses. Table 7.3 presents a detailed breakdown of the health 
resources in the selected districts.  
Table 7.3: Health resources in the selected districts63 
District Accra Metro Ga South 
Tamale 
Metro Kumbungu 
Facilities /Ratio 40 3 33 7 
District facility ratio 0.0153 0.0011 0.0126 0.0027 
Doctors /Ratio 261 1 18 1 
Doctors to population 
ratio  0.2328 0.0009 0.0161 0.0009 
Nurses /Ratio 1778 1 340 8 
Nurses to population 
ratio  
0.1811 0.0001 0.0346 0.0008 
Source: Author’s own computation based on data from the DACF Formula 2013 Report  
 
According to the participants interviewed in the rural districts even these low 
numbers in the health resources may be further reduced over the years as many of 
these staff members posted to these districts actually fail to report for duty or, even 
                                                
63For uniformity throughout the chapters the study relied on the DACF data for all statistics on districts where available  
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when they do report for duty, they soon leave when they discover that the conditions 
at the duty stations are undesirable. A participant from the Common Fund office 
explained this in the following statement when interviewed; 
We have a lot of problems with the health workers. We have indicated that it 
is very fluid when it comes to the health professionals as they do not stay in 
places for long.64 
National Officer 10 
7.3.3 Health Priorities 
The respondents from the selected districts admitted to setting health priorities for 
the districts on an annual basis. However, it was often left to the District Health 
Directorate to set these priorities and, as the directorate often used guidelines from 
the central ministries and planning guidelines set by the National Development 
Planning Commission (NDPC). The priorities set by the District Health Directorate 
tended to have a common theme and centre around national priorities in the area of 
health, driven primarily by the aim of attaining the MDGs in health. The comments 
of two of the participants sums up the situation; 
“For now the country has priority health objectives, which are mainly geared 
towards the attainment of the MDGs by 2015, so naturally all districts will 
more or less flow in that direction. There are commonalities across board but 
then, when you go to certain districts, there are certain situations which are 
more acute than others and, therefore, the focus will be on those particular 
issues pertaining to those particular districts. 
District Health  Directorate Officer 04 
Thus, in the comment quoted above, the District Health Officer indicates that all the 
districts tend work to achieve the nationally set priorities in the area of health. 
                                                
64Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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However, the extent of a specific problem in a particular locality may lead to a 
district focusing more on one priority than the other. The second district health 
officer presented a similar view, noting that his district had prioritised the MDG 
goals related to health care.  
 … Our main objective as a district is to make sure that women and children 
are adequately taken care of in terms of health, provision of services that will 
reduce maternal mortality, reduce infant mortality and even take care of 
HIV/AIDS. Those 3 goals, the MDGs goals 4, 5 and 6, are our main 
priorities.”65 
District Health Directorate  Officer 02 
However, according to the participants, differences may also arise as regards the 
approaches which each district may apply to mitigate the particular health issues 
identified and also how effectively the specific strategies are implemented. A policy 
maker at the Ministry of Health explained this as follows; 
“Universal priorities are there but strategy and initiative may differ from 
place to place, and it also may depend on particular conditions that may 
pertain within the geographic area and, in that vein, programmes can be 
fashioned to address these issues”66. 
District Health Directorate  Officer 01 
The information provided above indicates that the district health directorates 
formulate unique programmes to address the health priorities in their local areas.  In 
the instances of the selected districts, for example, the Ga South assembly indicated a 
particular focus on improving the health infrastructure in the district. However, 
although this assembly does occasionally support programmes, this is because the 
                                                
65Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
 
66Authors fieldwork, 2012 
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assembly believes that health programmes are part of the core function of the health 
directorate which is budgeted for by the Central Ministry. Table 7.4 presents the 
priority areas and the specific focus of the sampled districts.  
Table 7.4: District Health Priorities 
District  Priorities  Specific Focus Area  
AMA Maternal Health  
Child/Infant Health 
HIV/AIDS  
None  
Ga South Maternal Health  
Child/Infant Health 
HIV/AIDS 
Health Infrastructure  
TaMA Maternal Health  
Child/Infant Health 
HIV/AIDS 
None  
Kumbungu  Maternal Health  
Child Health  
HIV/AIDS 
Health Human Resources  
Source: Author’s Field Work, 2012 
The participants from the Kumbungu district indicated that, as a rural and 
disadvantaged district, although they are not able to focus on any one or two specific 
items to the detriment of others, they are, however, extremely concerned about the 
inadequate health human resources in the area. A participant from the district also 
indicated that, although they are working closely with both pregnant women to 
encourage them to use the health services and teenage girls on sex education, they 
were experiencing a major problem with health human resources: 
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Our main problem here is getting trained midwives to do deliveries. Most of 
our deliveries are done by the Traditional Birth Attendants (TBAs) in the 
communities. However, we are doing whatever we can to encourage them to 
always come to the hospitals but we have few midwives in the district. For 
now we have only 3 and one is not well so we are left with only 2 and we 
have 10 facilities. So you can see that the two of them cannot be at all the 
facilities at the same time. Our community of nurses are doing that job. 
Sometimes they try to see whether they can deliver the emergency ones or, if 
not, the TBAs are doing those jobs. 
District Health Directorate  Officer 04 
On the other hand, the participants from the AMA and the TaMA indicated that their 
efforts were very much evenly focused on all issues regarding maternal, infant and 
child health. They argued that this is the result of the large and cosmopolitan nature 
of their districts. As regards engaging with the District Assemblies in the setting of 
health priorities, the participants from the selected districts alluded to the fact that the 
assemblies were, in essence, not interested in these activities and would rather invite 
them to present after they had set the priorities and ask for copies for the District 
Development Plans. According to the participants this system worked well as it 
ensured minimum interference from the assemblies into their performing of their 
duties.  
7.3.4 Funding of Health in Districts 
The funding for health activities in the selected districts derived primarily from four 
major sources, namely, funding from the central government (Ghana Health 
Service), direct donor funding to the health sector, internally generated health funds 
and, finally, a degree of support from the district assemblies. As regards the funding 
of health activities within the districts all the respondents interviewed explained that, 
in view of the nature of decentralisation in the health system in Ghana, funds for 
health activities were transferred mainly from the central government to the district 
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health directorates. According to the District Assemblies they had no interaction 
whatever with these funds and the District Health Directorate did not often inform 
them of the exact amount of the funds they had received from the central 
government. This, in turn, implies that the District Assemblies were adopting a hands 
off approach, especially with regards to what they perceived to be the core functions 
of the health system. A participant explained in his interview; 
Ghana Health Service keeps supporting them in the management aspects of 
health. So, and ironically, the health directorates’ one reason why we 
sometimes shy away from taking full responsibilities of decentralised 
departments is that they do not want to be accountable to the district 
assemblies. What we have we share with them but, when they get from their 
mother agency, it is very difficult to get us informed about the resources they 
are getting from their mother agency and, for us, it is very difficult assessing 
their funding gaps.67 
District Assembly Officer 01 
Some of the district assemblies did, however, make an effort to support the health 
directorates but tended to stay aloof from the core function of the health system.  
However, of the four districts in which interviews were conducted; the Ga South 
District Assembly was the only assembly that had provided any support to the health 
directorate. According to their health directorates the TaMA and the AMA had not 
ever directly offered support in any form to the Health Directorate for projects.  
On the other hand, the Kumbungu district, which was at the time of interviews a new 
district, had committed to supporting the Health Directorate but had been unable to 
do so mainly as a result of the lack of funds for the assembly. It must, however, be 
noted that, although direct requests for support from the health directorate are often 
turned down, the assemblies on their own often expend money on health, specifically 
on infrastructural support such as accommodation for out of town health workers, 
                                                
67Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
 
 
 
 
  
 
220 
construction of health centres and clinics and the renovations of health facilities. One 
interviewee observed:  
Since we came in January we have not received anything from the assembly.  
Though we have made request to the assembly for support they have not been 
able to give us anything for our programmes but I have seen that they are 
building a “nurses’ quarters” and they have in their plans to do more and 
even to build more CHPS compounds. But when you are talking about 
support to carry out services they will not mind you. If you mention a 
structure I think that is what they are interested in so that people will actually 
see that they are working but, for them to support you, give you something to 
support you in providing the services, that one is a problem.68 
District Health Directorate  Officer 04 
Tale 7.2 presents a breakdown of the support from the District Assemblies to the 
Health Directorates and a possible reason for the lack of support if this were, indeed, 
the case. The District Health Directorates of AMA indicated that they had not 
received any direct support from the assemblies, attributing this to the poor 
relationship between the health directorate and the assembly and also the fact that the 
assemblies believed the Health Directorates possessed adequate funds. However, this 
is said to be a misconception by the officers interviewed at the health directorates.    
Table 7.2: Status of support to health directorates by assemblies 
District  Status  Reason/s given 
AMA No  Poor relationship  
Ga South Yes - 
TaMA No  Assembly feels health 
directorate adequately funded  
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Kumbungu  No  Lack of funds  
Source: Author’s Field Work, 2012 
7.4 Health Equity 
In view of the limitation of the quantitative design in fully addressing the issue of 
decentralisation and its effect on health inequities in Ghana, the mixed methods 
approach which was used in the study enabled the study to address this issue in some 
detail. In order to do this interviews were conducted to obtain information from the 
respondents on their perceptions of inequity in the health system and how 
decentralisation had affected equity as regards the utilisation of health services.  The 
discussion below presents the results of these interviews. The majority of the 
participants interviewed were of the view that inequities in the health services and 
the local services in general were better addressed within a decentralised system and 
that, in Ghana, this had, in fact, been the case. They noted, however, that this would 
happen only under certain conditions.  In the specific case of Ghana the respondents 
indicated that decentralisation had, in fact, reduced the level of inequities within the 
system.  They were, however, cautious as they explained that, although inequities 
had been reduced, in their opinion, this was marginal. They argued that many 
districts and regions continued to experience levels of health care utilisation and poor 
health outcomes as a result of a number of factors. These will be discussed in the 
second part of this chapter.  
7.4.1 Defining Equity in the Ghanaian Context 
It is important for the objectives of this thesis to determine how inequity is defined in 
the context of Ghana and also the role which the degree of importance ascribed to 
inequity plays in national policy.  The review of policy documents and the analysis 
of the responses of the respondents indicated that equity is a major priority in both 
the design of the decentralisation programme at the national level and in the health 
sector reforms.  One of the objectives of the Ghana Health Service Act is “to 
increase access to improved health services” (Government of Ghana 1996).  In order 
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to realise this objective it is essential that the health service in Ghana ensures access 
to the health services at all levels and that it “develop mechanisms for the equitable 
distribution of health facilities in rural and urban districts”. In operationalising this 
the Ministry of Health (MoH) has as its main equity objective 
… to ensure that every individual, household and community is adequately 
informed about health; and has equitable access to high quality health and 
related interventions (Ghana Ministry of Health 2003, p.8) . 
In a more recent document (GGSDA) the Government of Ghana continued to outline 
the following principal objective in the medium term, namely, “Bridge the equity 
gaps in access to health care and nutrition services and ensure sustainable 
…”(Ghana Health Service. 2011, p.16). Overwhelmingly these official policy 
documents point to equity as regards access to the health services as the main goal of 
the health sector. This goal will be achieved through ensuring financial accessibility 
by means of the National Health Insurance Scheme and by improving access to both 
resources and health infrastructure (Ghana Health Service. 2011).   
As regards decentralisation in terms of the current framework for the implementation 
of decentralisation in Ghana, one of the major goals of the Ministry of Local 
Government and Rural Development is the following:  
… to achieve sustainable, equitable economic growth and poverty reduction 
through citizen participation and accelerated service delivery at the local 
level within a decentralised environment (Ministry of Local Government 
2010).  
The specific objective of the social agenda reads as follows  
To promote a rights-based orientation to local level development, ensuring 
equitable access to public resources and inclusiveness in decision-making 
(Ministry of Local Governmnet and Rural Development 2003) . 
 
 
 
 
  
 
223 
Once again the policy document tasks the Inter-Ministerial Coordinating Committee 
on Decentralisation with overseeing the policy implementation, focusing on 
efficiency in service delivery and an equitable and sustained economic growth and 
poverty reduction at the local level. Policy documents prior to this (Ghana Ministry 
of Finance 2002; Ghana Ministry of Finance 2007)all pointed to the need to ensure 
equity as regards access to services as well as equitable resource allocation, both 
human and financial.  
These observations were confirmed when the interviews revealed that, at all levels of 
the health system and the decentralised structures, the respondents clearly understood 
these objectives and admitted that the goal to ensure equity in the health system in 
general is important at the policy level. 
The Ministry also has that policy of ensuring equitable distribution across 
board but, first, we must be able to define what is equitable. Basic services 
are a right so, when it comes to basic services, the Ministry of Health has 
targeted to provide that limited level of an equitable system.69 
National Officer 04 
The discussions revealed that, despite the fact that the need to ensure equity is 
paramount, the actual conceptualisation of what equity is remains a huge challenge. 
This is primarily because, in the context of a developing country where resources are 
scarce across all levels, promoting the needs of specific groups above others and 
systematically redirecting resources to such groups remain a massive problem. There 
is an intense fear that other regions and sectors will derail in their attempt to attain of 
equity goals and objectives and also a strong concern that scarce national resources 
should be shared equally.  
The participants elaborated on the three main sub-themes with regard to equity 
which, if achieved, will ensure that the equity objectives are met, namely; equity in 
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the allocation of resources, especially in the area of human resources, equity as 
regards access to health services and equity in the utilisation of health services.   
In terms of equity in the allocation of resources, the respondents were keen to point 
out that, despite the years of decentralisation, little had changed in the areas of 
human, financial and physical resources. As regards the issue of equity in human 
resources, the respondents believed that the inequity transcended the issue of health 
sector workers to include the managerial capacity required to utilise the funds 
available. They felt that this would be best addressed or resolved under a fully 
decentralised system which would not only invest in training locally but which 
would also actually boost local capacity by dispatching staff to the lowest levels, 
meaning the districts.  
As regards equity in terms of access to health services, the respondents highlighted 
the wide gaps which existed in the access to health facilities and the wide differences 
between the types of health facilities available as major constraints. They alluded to 
the fact that, at the time of decentralisation, the situation as regards the issue of 
access had been far worse than it was in the present situation. They noted that the 
decentralisation process had resulted in increased access to services as many districts 
and regions had focused on providing these services to their populations.  
As regards equity in the utilisation of health services, the respondents highlighted 
wide gaps in the utilisation of services, even when access to such services had been 
improved. They also suggested that merely improving access to services may not 
address this problem as the use of these services does not only depend on their 
availability. According to the respondents, full decentralisation was an option in 
terms of safeguarding equity in the utilisation of services with local health managers, 
members of the district assemblies and residents of the local areas participating in 
decision-making about health. The managers would have solutions to the unique 
challenges in a particular location and which acted as a barrier to utilisation of the 
services.  They believed that the evidence over the period illustrated this claim and, 
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thus, that it was necessary to scale up the decentralisation process with regards to the 
health sector in order to achieve the full benefits of the process.  
7.4.2  Channels by which Decentralisation Reduced Inequities 
The participants at all levels were emphatic in their belief that decentralisation had, 
indeed, reduced the inequities in health utilisation and that, were it not for certain 
challenges, inequities may have been further reduced under the decentralised system.  
Six main themes were identified based on the discussion and these are discussed 
below.  
a. Increased Funding to Sub-national Level Health Programmes (Districts And 
Regions) 
The interviews revealed that all the respondents strongly believed that a major 
channel through which inequities had been reduced under the current decentralised 
system was the provision of increased funding to the sub-national level structures. 
The district officials and policy makers pointed to the increased share of health 
funding being allocated to the districts and regional health directorates.  
Financial decentralisation is also one of the key factors; in our budget we 
actually do allocate funds for the district even though we send the money through 
the regions. The district health directorates have their own funds and that money 
is not touched by anybody.70 
National Officer 03 
The participants also maintained that, at the level of the devolved District 
Assemblies, the increased access to funds was also responsible for reductions in 
inequities across the country that they perceived. However, many of the respondents 
were at pains to point out that this remained woefully inadequate.  The respondents 
from the District Assemblies pointed out that, despite the fact that the district health 
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directorates were still funded from central government and their funds did not come 
to the districts, they still made sure that they shared their funds between all the major 
sectors in the districts.  
The problem with the assembly is that the funds have not been available that 
is why people think we neglect some sector departments. We try to allocate 
resources across sectors in a manner that there is a balanced development in 
the municipality.71   
District Assembly Officer 02 
The district officers interviewed admitted that the bulk of the funds were taken up by 
recurrent spending, especially in the case of the rural and deprived districts. 
However, they argued that they did try to maintain a balance in the sharing of the 
funding to all the sectors. They also pointed out that, since the Common Fund share 
had been increased by the DACF authority, all the sectors, including the health 
sector, has received higher proportions of the funding from them.  They also 
explained that, whenever the districts were able to access complementary funding, be 
it from donors or government sources, for example, when they qualified for funds 
from the District Development Facility, the Urban Development Fund and other 
direct donor support, these funds were shared in such a way so to ensure that all the 
sectors benefit in some way at least. A district officer who was interviewed 
explained in this statement; 
We however use our internally generated funds for recurrent activities 
because it is not even much. However with the common fund that one you 
have to spread it and every sector has a percentage of it.  
District Assembly Officer 04 
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It is worth noting that this view regarding increased funding for district programmes   
is well supported by the literature as studies have noted that decentralisation reforms 
have, in a number of cases, led to an increase in the level of fundings for health 
sector programmes (Schwartz et al. 2002; Robalino et al. 2004; Uchimura & Jütting 
2009; Bossert et al. 2003).    
b. Local Content and Context in the Operationalisation and Design of Health 
Policies  
Although it would appear that in many cases the district priorities stemmed from the 
universal national priorities, the districts were able to operationalise these priorities 
and define them in such a way so as to suit their unique context. The respondents 
strongly believed that this was a major reason why decentralisation had helped in 
reducing the inequities in maternal health utilisation.  The statements of two 
participants cited below illustrate the situation.  The first example refers to the case 
in which a district which had been characterised by a low life expectancy had 
localised the national policy on free medical care to the aged by dropping the lower 
age limit to 60 years from 70 years. The district in question had presented that 
argument that the life expectancy in the district was extremely low and that, at 70 
years, scarcely any of the aged residents of the district had benefited from the policy.  
For instance, in one area in parts of the Northern Region, when we said that 
we are providing free services for the aged, and we pegged the age at 70 
years some districts decided that, when we talk about 70, we don’t get 
anybody to come for free services because a lot of them die before 70. So they 
pushed it down to 60, and decided to run the free services at 60. That tells 
you the power of the district. 
In fact with the free maternal services some of them have stretched the policy 
to the extent that it has meaning for them but, at the same time, keeping the 
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objectives of the policy at the core.  I think that we should also look at the 
districts as having some level of autonomy ‒ nobody forces them unless they 
are implementing a policy counter to the national policy.72 
National officer 03  
The second narrative which refers specifically to free maternal health explains that 
many districts had been able to contextualise the national policy on free maternal 
health to pregnant women so as to meet the unique challenges of the local situations. 
The national officer from the Ministry of Health explained that the central 
government had understood this and that it had been acceptable as long the policy 
was in keeping with the direction of the national policy.  The argument for 
localisation presented above has been presented in support of decentralisation 
reforms (Manor 1999). It was also evident in Chapter five of this study that the 
argument for localisation had also been presented as one of the motives for 
embarking on the health sector decentralisation reforms in Ghana (see Chapter five).  
c. Innovative and Home Grown Solutions  
The regions and districts have been extremely active in devising innovative and local 
solutions to the health issues that concerned them. According to the respondents this, 
in turn, had helped to address the issues of inequities between and within districts. A 
participant summed this up in his comments when he alluded to the fact that a few of 
the national level polices had actually been initiated by the districts and regions. 
Respondents argued that, when the districts and regions find innovative solutions to 
incorporate in their local and national programmes, this serves as a means with 
which to bridge the gap between the various regions and the districts in the country 
as a solution that works for one region may not necessarily work in another district.  
The respondents even went further, pointing out a number of instances in which the 
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direction of national level policies had been guided and driven by innovation at the 
district and regional levels.  
In fact, when you look at the cash and carry programme, when we were 
doing the full cost recovery the pre health insurance era, a lot of the direction 
we got from the programme was coming from the districts. Solely a district 
did its own health insurance as the first pilot and we learned from them. We 
do not fault them when they come up with innovations to help implement 
national policy.73 
National Officer 04  
This extract refers to the transition from the user fee system of health care, which 
was locally nicknamed the ‘cash and carry’, to the national health insurance.  The 
respondent referred to the fact that, before the implementation of the national health 
insurance, districts had piloted the scheme through district mutual health insurance 
schemes. During these pilots the districts had also made modification and changes to 
the scheme and these had been included in the full implementation of the national 
health insurance scheme.  
d. The National Health Insurance Scheme  
It was clear that many of the respondents were of the opinion that any discussion on 
the role of decentralisation in reducing inequities in health care utilisation would 
remain incomplete without a discussion on the National Health Insurance Scheme 
(see Chapter 5). The respondents contended that the National Health Insurance 
Scheme had been the single, most important factor in mitigating health sector 
inequities in Ghana in terms of both access to health and the utilisation of health, 
particularly in the case of maternal health care.  The arguments presented links 
between the ability of communities and districts to provide innovative solutions to 
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health sector programmes, specifically, and the overall national development 
programmes.  
Since mid 2008 the scheme has included all pregnant women as an additional 
excluded groups (Sarpong et al. 2010).  The aim of this change in policy was to help 
the country to achieve the national and global maternal health goal. Studies have 
shown that the health insurance scheme has increased the utilisation of formal health 
care, especially as regards maternal health (Blanchet et al. 2012; Mensah et al. 2010; 
Brugiavini & Pace 2011). However, major criticisms of the scheme include its 
failure to reach the most vulnerable groups in the country, including the poor, as a 
result of factors such as the costs of enrolment and an inability to identify the poor 
(Witter et al. 2009; Witter & Garshong 2009; Frempong et al. 2009; Brugiavini & 
Pace 2011; Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011; Asante & Aikins 2007; Mensah et al. 2010). 
Nevertheless, the respondents pointed out that, despite these challenges, the national 
health insurance scheme, which was initiated primarily by the district assemblies, has 
contributed to reducing inequities, especially in the area of maternal health care, by 
ensuring that all pregnant women within both the regions and the districts have 
access to free maternal health care.   
The respondents also did admit that the cost of accessing care, which is often 
exacerbated by the lack of health facilities in the poorest communities, thus implying 
that the poor have to pay more as compared to other groups in terms of transportation 
and other costs when utilising the free maternal health care feature of the NHIS, does 
not help to reduce inequities as the least advantaged have to pay the most. The 
respondents also expressed concern about the prevailing situation since the 
establishment of the NHIA with insurance schemes operating independently in the 
districts without direct oversight by the assemblies that created them. A policy maker 
at the district level explained this in the narrative below.  
The health insurance was started by the district, the districts were tasked to 
put up infrastructure, recruit and ensure that it is workable. Here we put up 
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the physical structure, recruited the initial staff and provided logistics and 
furnished the offices to ensure that there was a take-off. But, as I speak now, 
this has changed, because the NHIS law has been passed and the NHIS is a 
bit decoupled from the districts’ direct intervention. So, although the district 
maintains overall supervision and oversight responsibility, the direct 
implementation is between the district NHIS office, the regional office and 
the national office.74 
District Assembly Officer 02  
e. Increased Responsiveness in Combating Health Issues  
Another reason for the reduction in inequities which was discussed by the 
respondents was the increased responsiveness of local health managers to health 
issues.  In this regard the respondents alluded to the fact that the proximity of both 
the district health directorates and the devolved district assemblies to the citizenry 
had resulted in an increased responsiveness to health issues at the local level. A 
participant explained further by citing the example of a situation in which an 
outbreak of cholera in the local community had been reported immediately reported 
to the district health director by members of the community who had then taken the 
district health director took him to the local water source which they believed was 
the source of the problem. The Health Directorate had immediately embarked on 
public education campaigns to inform the people not to use the water source.  The 
respondent pointed out that the speed with which this had been achieved had been 
possible only as a result of the fact that the district health directorate had been near 
enough to the people to be able to see the problem while the directorate was also 
empowered financially to be able to provide an immediate solution to the problem.   
However, the respondent was keen to point out that the nature of the decentralisation 
had restricted the health director’s ability to resolve the problem fully, explaining 
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that, although the director had had the funds required to construct a borehole as an 
alternative water source, under the current decentralisation system, district health 
funds could not be used for such a purpose and the assembly had not had enough 
funds to construct the borehole. He argued that such a situation would not have 
arisen under a ‘fully devolved’ system of decentralisation where the health 
directorate would have been under the complete control of the district assembly and 
would have had the power to redirect the funds. It is worth noting that this finding is 
also supported in existing literature.  
 
f. Support and Collaboration between the District Health Directorate and 
District Assembly Structure 
The final channel which the respondents identified as a means by which 
decentralisation was believed to reduce inequities was through support from the 
devolved district to the health directorate. The respondents from all levels and 
sectors revealed that, although support from the District Assemblies to the health 
directorates could be improved. They however pointed out that Assemblies in many 
ways the already provided significant support to the health directorates in the 
carrying out of their mandates, in some instances at the request of the Health 
Directorate and, in other cases, independently.  The respondents believed that this 
played a significant role in reducing inequities in the various districts. This support 
included both financial and physical support such as renovating clinic and hospitals, 
constructing health facilities and providing housing for out of town health workers. 
The respondents also pointed out the positive externalities from other programmes 
and projects of the Assemblies such as the tasks of the district public health officers 
including;  
And what we also do is that, if there is a programme to be done by health, for 
instance, immunisation programme, the Assembly certainly does not fold its 
hands. We know sometimes there are plans from their central level or the 
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Ghana Health Service has a programme which it implements at the District 
Health Directorate but what happens is that, once it is within our 
jurisdiction, we co-finance. For instance, if the Health Directorate is trying 
to distribute mosquito nets and it receives the mosquito nets from the Ghana 
Health Service or the Ministry of Health, assuming we are going to do such a 
programme and it comes here, may be the responsibility of getting certain 
resources like transportation, vehicles, fuel and may be some resources for 
the distribution, the assembly takes up that.75 
District Assembly Officer 04  
In the narrative above a District Assembly officer explains how the District 
Assemblies continue to provide support to their health directorates even when the 
programmes are initiated by and funded from the Ghana Health Service 
headquarters.  He used the example of the national immunisation day programme to 
explain how the District Assembly had provided additional funds for a programme 
that had been funded by the Ghana Health Service. The District Health Director 
argued that the additional funding is often necessary because, although programmes 
are often designed by and initiated from the central Ghana Health Service offices 
they expect the District Health Directorate also to use its available funds to support 
such programmes.  
However, in many instances, the District Health Directorate has either not allocated 
funds to support such programmes or do not have sufficient funds to do this. In the 
case of the immunisation day example cited above, although the programme had 
been initiated at the national level the Ghana Health Service had only provided the 
treated mosquito nets. There had been no additional funds provided for 
transportation and paying volunteers. At the request of the Health Directorate the 
District Assembly had stepped in and provided vehicles and fuel to assist the 
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distribution of the mosquito nets to hospitals and even schools in the district. The 
District Assembly had also recruited and paid volunteers. 
The participants also admitted that corroborating with the District Assemblies 
remained arbitrary to the extent that it sometimes depended on individual 
personalities or the officers (see chapter 5). This is further explained in section 7.5a 
below. Collaboration between the Health Directorate and the devolved District 
Assemblies has created the opportunity for these bodies to come together and 
develop insights into local problems. The respondents indicated that, in many 
instances, and especially in the rural and deprived districts and regions, it is often the 
case that these two bodies have no choice but to find a way to work effectively 
together to serve the people. When this happens they are able to bring about 
improvements in the local situation.  
This is especially obvious in the District Social Committee, which brings together 
the heads of all the social sectors within the district.  In addition, all the heads of 
units, including deconcentrated units such as health and education, attend district 
management meetings. These meetings afford the opportunity for the district 
coordinators to be given progress reports on the individual sectors especially those 
sectors that do not come fully under the devolved structure of the assembly. These 
meetings also provide the heads of the deconcentrated units with the opportunity to 
receive input from the assemblies and, even in some cases, reports on problematic 
sectors at the local level. The participants were of the opinion that this approach 
merits further improvement and should be implemented in all districts as it is already 
contributing significantly to improving health at the local level and, thus, reducing 
inequities.  
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7.5 Threats To Equity In Ghana’s Decentralised Health System 
The respondents also went further, seeking insights into the specific threats to equity 
that still existed in the decentralised system. They suggested a number of reasons and 
conditions that perpetuate inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system. In line with 
the political economy model discussed in Chapter two this section examines the 
factors that threaten equity in the health system in Ghana’s decentralised system. 
Evidence from the interviews suggested that these factors were political, economic 
and ecological. The respondents also pointed out that the political factor plays a 
major role in the ability of decentralisation to mitigate inequalities. These political 
factors included issues such as the lack of the political will to roll out a fully 
decentralised system in which power is vested in the districts that are, ultimately, 
accountable to the people within their communities. Many of the respondents also 
referred to the balance of power between districts, between the central government 
and the districts and even between the Ministry and departments as a major 
contributing factor affecting the ability of decentralisation to mitigate inequalities.   
7.5.1 Political Factors 
Several of the participants cited political factors as the cause of the continuing 
inequities in health in Ghana’s decentralised system. Many of them were unable to 
understand why, over a decade after the implementation of decentralisation reforms, 
there had been very little actual progress in the area of devolution with departments 
and agencies in the central government continuing to wield more power over 
developmental activities in the districts than the assemblies themselves. They 
believed that this was attributable to the fact that the politicians did not want the 
status quo to change because of self-interest.  
a. Political Character of the District Assemblies/Assemblies as a Tool for 
Achieving Political Objectives  
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Several of the officers interviewed alluded to the fact that the political nature of the 
devolved structure impacted significantly on disparities in the health sector.  This is 
especially the case as the political heads of the assemblies are not elected directly by 
the people but are appointed by the President of Ghana and endorsed by the majority 
of assembly members.  Many of the policy makers interviewed were of the opinion 
that this has resulted in a situation in which these political heads of the assemblies 
believe they are accountable exclusively to the president of the country and not the 
citizens or the members of their communities. This, according to the participants, 
afforded the national political leadership a means by which they are able to use the 
assemblies and, specifically, funds from the assemblies to realise their political 
objectives. However, it appeared that the respondents felt that the chief executives, 
who contributed significantly to the electoral victories of political parties, were seen 
in favourable light and, thus, it was probable that they would retain their positions.  
The nature of the political patronage system in the appointment process is such that 
many of these chief executives are not, in fact, technical people and have varied 
levels of education.  For a number of the participants, primarily those from the 
District Health Directorate, this often results in difficulties in understanding issues 
and problems of a complex nature. The majority of the District Directors of Health 
Services and technocrats interviewed viewed this as a major issue. They argued that 
the politicians prefer to spend money on physical infrastructure such as hospitals and 
clinics as they feel that, when built, such hospitals and CHPS compounds are 
extremely visible to the electorate and reflect signs of tangible development. A 
respondent from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development 
explained this as follows;  
 The political nature of the district assemblies also means that they are 
interested in spending the Common Fund only on buildings and physical 
items that they can show at the end of the four years in office for election 
purposes. So if you are unlucky and your assemblyman is not highly educated 
enough to understand the issues of health, it is very difficult to get support for 
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health activities and all your health sector support is spent on building 
clinics and CHPS compounds, even though there are no officers to work in 
these clinics  
National Officer 04 
The average politician thinks more of physical structures than programmes 
because that is palpable and, in campaigning, that will be attractive to win 
him votes rather than saying ‘I have conducted so many training courses and 
capacity building and I have done this sensitisation’.76 
National Officer 03 
Thus, the participant cited above was arguing that the nature of decentralisation as a 
political process means that the governing elite is, above all, interested in appeasing 
the citizens with visible signs of progress to ensure their very political survival. In 
terms of progress and development this implies that attention is focused on the 
tangible and visible aspects of development to the detriment of intangibles. 
The views of the participants once again bring to the fore the nature of the 
decentralisation system in Ghana. Riker (1964) argues that, under a centralised 
“local” government system in terms of which local authorities are not elected by 
local citizens but rather they are selected by higher level authorities, accountability 
does not filter downwards to the local citizens. In such a situation the local 
authorities feel obliged to the central government and there is a strong incentive on 
their part to respond to central governments priorities and in the case of Ghana, to 
the priorities of the Executive (Faguet 2014).  Faguet further points out that the 
incentives to respond to local needs are stifled (Faguet 2014) and, as in Ghana’s 
case, the local citizens are often appeased with physical infrastructure which is 
tangible. In the arguments presented above the participants indicated that the 
incentive to provide such physical infrastructures is, in most cases, driven by the 
                                                
76Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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demands of central government. Smoke (2003) presents similar arguments when he 
points to conflicting central political and bureaucratic incentives as a major 
hindrance to decentralisation. However, in such a situation decentralisation, in which 
the local officials’ terms of office are in the hands of the citizens they serve and who 
elect them, would rectify the situation(Faguet 2014).  
b. Unequal Power Relations/Incomplete Nature of Decentralisation  
At a much higher level the power dynamics between the Ministry of Health and the 
Ministry of Local Government (the sector ministry in charge of decentralisation) 
have been identified as a major reason why inequalities continue to exist in the 
decentralised system in Ghana. The proponents of this argument believe the 
inequalities will continue for as long as the decentralisation process remains 
incomplete. The reason for the incompleteness of the decentralisation process is that 
the more powerful ministries which, at the passing of the decentralisation law, had 
been sceptical and, thus, had not fully committed to decentralisation, continue to 
remain outside the decentralised structure. Many believe that the Health Ministry is 
extremely powerful as a result of factors such as the control of large amounts of 
money and the nature of health itself.  According to the participants both the Health 
Ministry and the Ghana Health Service had been afraid that, should the health sector 
be placed under the control of the district assemblies, the assemblies may have 
become too powerful.  
… but these strong sectors tried to pull out because they felt that, if they 
come under the District Assembly, the local government may become too 
strong. So, they tried as much as possible to pull out, so in a subsequent 
legislation it was ensure that the Health Service was put in place so that they 
had their own service …77 
National Officer 06 
                                                
77Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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From the beginning it was realised that it would not be possible to make the District 
Assemblies responsible for development if they were not permitted to participate in 
the major aspects of development such as health and education.  Attempts were 
subsequently made to ensure that these sectors were effectively brought into the 
national decentralised system and that they worked under the local governments. 
However, all such attempts have proved to be futile and meetings were held without 
any concrete outcomes. A participant described this situation as follows: 
It was realised that, if the local governments are responsible for development 
and you take key social sectors like education and health out, I mean what 
would be left? … I know because I am also a member of the Ghana Health 
Service Council and, from their internal discussions, have always been 
uncomfortable about working under the district assembly.78 
National Officer 06 
The memo presented in Appendix J invited staff (Directors and Deputy Directors) of 
the Ministry of Health to discuss the full decentralisation79 of the health sector. 
However, several of these memos have had no response. In addition, the Ministry of 
Health representatives often did not attend these meetings while, where they did 
attend, no concrete decisions were made. The general view of participants was that 
this situation has resulted in both gaps in the devolution process and a lack of 
structures. The health sector participants in particular highlighted the absence of an 
appropriate structure for monitoring and evaluating the health sector’s performance 
and even for the financial management of the sector.  These gaps are a result of the 
incompleteness of the decentralisation process which continues to undermine the 
system’s ability to eliminate inequities in health.  
 
c. Ad Hoc Nature of Cooperation between the Health Sector and the Devolved 
                                                
78Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
79 The devolution  
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District Assemblies  
The nature80 of the health decentralisation described so far indicates that the level of 
cooperation between the District Health Directorate and the devolved District 
Assemblies varies significantly between districts. In addition, the level of 
cooperation is also sometimes heavily dependent on the nature and characteristics of 
the officers occupying various posts at the respective departments.  This, in turn, has 
resulted in a system where, in some parts of the country, the DAs are highly engaged 
with the District Health Directorates and are supportive of their actions. In such 
districts the two bodies work well together to meet the common health priorities and 
goals set for the districts in question with both bodies being involved in setting these 
priorities and goals. On the other hand, in other districts there are definite lines of 
division between the two bodies with District Health Directorates barely engaging 
with the District Assemblies. The following two statements of respondents explain 
this;  
When the relationship between the offices is strained it means any request we 
make to the District Assembly, especially for financial assistance, is 
outrightly turned down and, of course, they are unable to monitor our work 
as we do not report to them 81 
District Health Directorate Officer 01 
I also think that support to the people should not be based on the way the 
individual does his or her things; we should have legislations that would 
mandate us to do. If, for instance, there has not been co-operation, then how 
do we achieve the organisational goal and the MDG goals?82 
District Assembly Officer 03 
                                                
80 The failure to integrate the health sector fully into Ghana’s decentralisation structure of administration has lead to what 
appears to be a parallel system of decentralisation operating in Ghana’s health sector.   
 
81Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
82 Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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The first respondent explained that the relationship between the health directorate 
and the assembly was strained and that this, in turn, had lead to the situation where 
requests for support from the assembly were almost invariably turned down. The 
assemblies had also reported that they had not provided any support at all to the 
health directorates (see sections 7.3.4 and Table 7.2). The respondent, who was from 
the health directorate, also indicated that the result of this situation was that the 
assembly was also unable to effectively monitor the activities of the officials. In the 
second quote, a respondent from a District Assembly passionately argues that 
personal relationships between officers should not impinge on their carrying out of 
their national duty.  
The nature of the current decentralisation process means that inter-personal 
relationships between officers are essential to enable them to work together to realise 
their set objectives.  
 
7.5.3 Economic Factors 
The majority of the officers interviewed were of the opinion that health inequities 
and disparities were attributable primarily to underlying disparities between the 
economic conditions in the districts and also between individuals in the districts ‒ a 
distinctly materialistic view of inequalities.  These respondents maintained that these 
gap/s between the various districts in the country would be closed only if the districts 
were all economically empowered and resourced to be able to finance the health 
sector and to lift their populations out of poverty in a sustainable manner.  These 
interviewees believed that the lack of financial strength of the districts was a major 
threat to equity in health. They attributed this lack of financial strength to a number 
of factors including the districts’ inability to generate funds internally as a result of 
their socioeconomic profiles, a failure of the governmental transfer system to bring 
about equalisation and the slow pace of fiscal decentralisation.  
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a. Levels of Poverty within the Districts  
Poverty and the living conditions of individuals in the district were cited as major 
factors contributing to the inequities that persist in health utilisation in the 
decentralised system.  Many of respondents stated that, even where the health care 
for mothers and children was basically free at public health facilities, the poor were 
unable to make use of these services.  One of the reasons for this was that the 
majority of poor people are not able to take time off work to access these services. In 
addition, the low level of education and literacy among the poor also means that they 
often do not understand the need for maternal health services. A participant explains 
this as follows; 
You know, my people are poor and often do not understand the reason why 
they should seek these facilities out … if you go to a place like Accra where 
the people are not so poor, they already understand the need to go to the 
hospital.83 
District Health Directorate Officer 04 
Finally, many pregnant women are not able to afford the cost of treatment as, despite 
the fact that the national health insurance provides all pregnant women with free 
maternal health care, there are still several costs involved in accessing these 
facilities. These costs include lost incomes to the family during visits to the hospital 
and the cost of transportation to the health facilities which, in many rural areas, for 
example, districts such as Kumbungu and a large part of the Ga South District, are 
few and far between. In a recent news item on the only hospital facility, a private 
hospital in the Kumbungu district had been forced to close down as a result of the 
non-payment of bills by policyholders by the National Health Insurance Authority. 
Thus, this meant that pregnant women and children no longer had access to the 
facility and were required to travel long distances to the regional hospital in Tamale, 
the regional capital.  
                                                
83Authors fieldwork, 2012 
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b. Level And Types Of Economic Activities  
The respondents indicated that the types and level of economic activities within their 
districts affect the districts’ ability to generate revenue for development. In many of 
the rural districts, the bulk of the economic activities carried on are non-market 
transactions and the citizens rely primarily on subsistence farming, selling only the 
surplus of what they produce. However, few of these surpluses are sold in a formal 
market environment and often the transaction often takes the form of barter trade 
with neighbours. This, in turn, means that the assemblies are seldom able to tax or 
levy these activities in order to raise the revenues needed for development purposes.  
A respondent from a rural district described this situation as follows.  
Unlike Accra, where they have numerous filling stations and shops to collect 
levies from and generate income, for us, in Kumbungu, our only source of 
revenue comes from the market and even that is nothing much compared to 
what they make in Tamale and Accra.  
District Assembly Officer 06 
Prior to decentralisation budgets were coming to the Ministries Departments 
and Agencies (MDAs) from the regional level and all departments used to get 
appreciable level. But the DACF formula has in it an element based on how 
much revenue you are able to generate and also based on service pressure, 
which I think is erroneous. Allocation should be based on the level of poverty 
and deprivation of the district. This means that we the poorer districts who 
do not have enough hotels, restaurants, fuel service stations and large market 
do not get enough property rates to generate revenue. And districts such as 
Accra get high revenues, which is then matched by the common fund 
allocation. I believe this issue must be rectified immediately to help the 
poorer districts.  
District Assembly Officer 06 
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In the narrative above the respondent, a District Officer from a rural district, 
highlights the gaps in revenue generation between the rural and urban districts. The 
respondent argues that, while urban districts such as the AMA, have a number of 
revenue sources from mainly local economic activities, and the district relies solely 
on revenues from the market in the largest town of the district. In small towns and 
villages market are only held one day in a week and, thus, these markets do not 
generate sufficient revenue for the district. In the second narrative presented, another 
district officer points to limited revenue sources for poorer districts.  This viewpoint 
is supported by the comments made by a national officer from the Ministry of 
Finance.  This officer reiterated that the rural districts have extremely limited 
revenue sources. He cited the example of the district in which he had formerly 
worked before moving to the Ministry of Finance. This district had depended on the 
revenues from the market day, which he indicated as the equivalent of GH60 
(15USD) a week as revenue.  
When I was in the district I was in Savelugu-Tatale; those days when the 
Common Fund delayed for even one month, the assembly had to wait for the 
fund to come because there was no money.  The money we got was always 
from the market and there was only one big market.  If you convert the 
revenues from those days to Ghana Cedis right now it would be only 60 Ghs 
for a week to run the whole district.84 
National Officer 01 
c. Inability of District Assemblies Common Fund to carry out Equalisation 
Function/a Bolder Approach to Redistribution 
In view of the widely acknowledged disparities in the districts transfers from the 
central government, such as the District Assemblies Common Fund should 
adequately compensate the resource poor districts. The reliance on the District 
                                                
84Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
245 
Assemblies Common Fund to do stems from the fact that it is the only source of the 
funds, apart from the internally generated funds, that every district receives, 
irrespective of performance, as it is constitutionally mandated that each district 
should receive funds from the District Assemblies Common Fund.  However, 
according to the respondents, the Common Fund has never satisfactorily performed 
the equalisation role with the result that “to those who have more is always given”.  
Existing disparities, therefore, continue unabated.  The respondents believed that the 
extent of the gaps between the districts in terms of their ability to generate IGRs is so 
huge that the only way in which the DACF may ever play any equalisation role 
would involve a bolder approach to redistribution than is the case at present. A 
participant in the interview in his comment even called for the exclusion of 
economically strong districts from the fund altogether.  
We have been advocating for a law to say that strong and highly endowed 
districts should not be entitled to the Common Fund but the constitution says, 
no, you still have to give them, no matter how much they are getting.85 
National Officer 01 
Under decentralisation many countries have attempted to use the national system 
transfer to local governments to rectify fiscal disparities between districts (Oakland 
1994; Bucovetsky & Smart 2006; Braathen 2008). However, the design of these inter 
governmental transfer system has been identified as one of the most challenging 
tasks in local government (Steffensen 2010).  It has been suggested that a policy of 
equalisation could eliminate the fiscal benefits of superior natural resource 
endowment (Oakland 1994).  A number of countries, including Tanzania, Uganda, 
Denmark and Cambodia, have used equalisation grants with mixed results. However, 
these equalisation grants are seldom used alone.  Obwona and Steffensen (2000) note 
that, while equal shares have their benefits, when exaggerated, they may result in 
adverse incentives and inefficiencies in allocation.  
                                                
85 Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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In the case of Tanzania, Braathen (2008) points that an initial grant system had 
reinforced existing inequities in service delivery between the local governments and 
that this had resulted in the need for an additional equalisation grant. It emerged from 
the discussions held with policy makers in this study that the elements of the 
Ghanaian formula as presented in Chapter 5 do not give adequate weight to the need 
criteria in the formula and, hence, the formula is unable to redress existing 
imbalances in development. It would appear that efforts at equalisation have had 
mixed results. Oakland (1994) suggests as a solution that such efforts should be 
tailored to the outcomes sought and the unique context of a country.  
c. District Capacity  
The final economic threat identified by the respondents related to concerns about the 
capacity of districts to support and manage the health sector. The respondents spoke 
about the capacity to utilise the funds available and manage the health sector 
effectively. This is closely related to the issues of manpower quality and availability 
across the various districts. They believed that this was also related to the challenge 
arising from the resultant lack of capacity to monitor the sector effectively.  These 
were intricately linked with the technical capacity of the various districts.   
As regards the capacity to utilise funds and manage the health sector, the policy 
makers at all levels highlighted the wide variations in human resources available 
across the districts. They maintained that this constituted a huge challenge, especially 
as regards the rural areas that often have to contend with lower levels of educated 
staff.  Researchers have often pointed out the difficulty involved in attracting highly 
skilled, educated and trained personnel to individual districts (Steiner 2005; 
Prud’Homme 1995). It is worth noting that these capacity concerns were raised at the 
levels of both the district health directorates and the devolved district assemblies. 
The respondents expressed the following views; 
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Capacity is an issue and we cannot run away from it ‒ it heavily affects the 
ability of the districts to perform in the first place. That was the major snag 
we had to go through as we designed the scheme.   
National Officer 01 
The capacity of people we put at the district level is much higher than 
sometimes even that of the district assemblies. In fact, some of the district 
chief executives, our district directors of health, are much more, I mean, are 
even sometimes better educated than the District Chief Executives. 
National Officer 03 
Basically, nothing, the assembly does not engage with us at all. When it 
comes to monitoring and evaluation also, the district often does not feel they 
have the capacity to do it. This is mainly because they feel that health sector 
work is more technical and so they leave us to do our thing and report to 
them at the management meetings. 
District Health Directorate  Officer 01 
In the three extracts two national officers and a district officer describe the 
challenges encountered as regards capacity under decentralisation and which they 
believe have a significant impact inequities. In the first extract a national officer 
asserted that capacity was and remains a challenge. In the second extract a national 
officer from the health sector highlighted the fact that, although capacity issues exist 
in both the health directorate and the devolved assemblies, the health sector is, at 
least, ensuring that the staff members at the district level are more qualified even 
than the District Chief Executives. He also pointed to the fact that the District Health 
Directors tend to be far better educated than even the heads of the devolved units. 
The final extract from a respondent of the district health directorate indicates that 
district staff often feel that they are often not equipped to deal with the technicality 
of health issues. Capacity challenges have often been identified as a threat to 
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decentralisation reforms and their ability to reduce poverty and inequality in a 
sustainable way (Steiner 2005; Prud’Homme 1995; Crook & Manor 1998).  The 
effect of such capacity challenges on inequality is even more severe when human 
resources are distributed as indicated by the analysis in Chapter 6 and which revealed 
wide variations between the various districts.  
 
7.5.4 Ecological/Spatial Factors 
a. Differences in Resource Endowments  
A major factor affecting inequities in healthcare and that was cited by all the 
respondents was the differences in resource endowments which significantly affected 
the revenue generation abilities of the districts.  The representatives of the districts, 
especially those located in rural areas and small towns, argued that, as a result of 
small population sizes and the limited number of formal business, the sources of 
revenues available to them remain limited as they are not able to generate sufficient 
IGRs.  In addition, on the issue of resource endowments, several respondents cited 
the differences between the districts located in the resource rich areas in the southern 
half of the country and those located in the northern regions. The participants cited 
the examples of a mining area or a timber forest area where, according to them, the 
royalties from these resources made a significant difference in terms of access to 
revenue to support the provision of social services locally.  
In addition, many of the companies located in these well-endowed areas initiate 
specific projects in terms of corporate social responsibility and also as means of 
engaging with the locals. These natural resources made a significant contribution to 
supporting what the districts were able to provide for the citizens, for example, 
hospitals established by the Anglogold Company in Obuasi and the Newmont mines 
in Kenysai.  Another example provided was that of companies located in the districts 
such as Accra helping the AMA to do away with the shift system in basic schools by 
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supporting the assembly to build new schools.  The respondents argued that, even in 
cases in which such companies do not explicitly support the districts, the districts 
derive significant positive externalities as a result of the fact that the companies are 
located within their boundaries.  In addition, many of these companies provide a 
social infrastructure for use by the staff and senior management and this, in turn, 
improves social conditions in the districts. This argument clearly illustrates the role 
of ecological factors in perpetuating inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system.  
b. Proximity to the Central Government  
The issue of proximity to the national capital was identified by all levels of 
respondents during the interviews with some of them indicating that the proximity of 
certain districts to the national capital means that these districts have more power in 
terms of the control of and access to health resources as compared to those districts 
that are further away from the national capital.  The majority of the participants who 
presented this argument were from the Northern districts. They argued that, when the 
budget are drawn up in Accra (national capital) for specific programmes, even in the 
Ghana Health Service, those districts which are further away from the capital are 
disadvantaged in that they are not able to fight for their rightful allocations. These 
respondents indicated that this, in turn, often meant they were unable to meet their 
objectives while the districts nearer to the national capital continued to fare better in 
their health outcomes, thus exacerbating the disparities in health utilisation. A 
planning officer also argued that, as compared to those districts further from the 
national capital, those districts which are nearer to the seat of government are better 
able to influence allocations while they also have better access to donors as many 
donor offices are located in Accra.  
However, although the respondents perceived this issue as a challenge, Akramov & 
Asante (2008), in assessing the importance of geography and ethnic diversity in 
decentralised local public service delivery found distance to the national capital not 
to be significant. It must, however, also be noted that this issue of distance to the 
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national capital is closely related to other geographic factors such as ecological zone 
and distance to regional capital which Akramov and Asante (2008) found to 
significantly affect the access to local public services.  
 
7.6 Limitations of the Analysis 
An issue that often arises in qualitative analysis and research is the generalisability of 
results.  This, in turn, raises a question about the external validity of this study which 
was based on the selection of four districts out of the possible forty two from the two 
regions in the country. However, although this may seem a valid question, Creswell 
& Miller (2000) argues that external validity does not play a major role in qualitative 
inquiries while Brinberg & McGrath (1985, p.13) point out that “Validity is not a 
commodity that can be purchased with techniques … Rather, validity is like integrity, 
character and quality, to be assessed relative to purposes and circumstances”. In 
view of the fact that qualitative research focuses primarily on understanding specifics 
rather than generalising to universals, the choice of a sample size depends mainly on 
what the researcher is seeking to understand.  In the main validity depends on the 
extent to which an account is accurate and the findings are interpreted in a correct 
way.  Finally, Campbell & Fiske (1959); Jick (1979); Webb et al. (1966, p.174) 
Campbell & Fiske (1959), Jick (1979) and Webb, Campbell, Schwartz & Sechrest 
(1966:174) propose that triangulation provides an acceptable solution to the search 
for validity in research.  Triangulation will be attempted in the concluding chapter of 
this study.  
The second issue to be addressed is the question of the potential bias associated with 
the purposive sampling technique which was used in both the selection of the 
districts for analysis and also the selection of the respondents for the purposes of the 
interviews. In a situation in which qualitative techniques are used, the extensive 
nature of interviews implies that the researcher due to time and cost limitation may 
be limited to fewer sources of information. Thus, a major criterion used in the 
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selection of information sources was the selection of information rich cases and 
respondents whose roles meant that they interacted on a daily basis with the 
decentralised structures. The thesis mainly sought to address the issue from the 
viewpoint of policy makers   and thus focused on policy makers within the 
decentralised structure and the health system who had direct interactions with the 
decentralised systems.  In the case of this thesis the changes in the number of district 
number (increasing) meant that a primary objective was to find districts that had 
been in existence for a number of years86. 
 
7.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter focused on the analysis of interviews which were conducted in the four 
districts chosen and with the national level officers selected in order to assess the 
inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system. The respondents argued that they 
believed decentralisation had reduced inequities in health utilisation in Ghana. 
However, they insisted that inequities within the districts remained an issue of 
concern as the various regions and districts had attained varying levels of health and 
utilisation of the health services. The arguments presented by interviewees revealed 
that the major threats to equity within Ghana’s decentralised health system were of a 
political, economic and sociocultural nature.  
Specifically, political factors such as a strong political will on the part of the 
governing elites, the power relations between various stakeholders in the 
decentralised structure, the political nature of the districts and the assembly system 
itself posed significant threats to the attainment of equity.  The economic factors 
identified included the economic endowments of the district, the level of poverty and 
social deprivation within the districts, the levels and types of economic activities in 
the districts and the inability of the DACF and other transfer funding mechanisms to 
                                                
86This requirement was not met in the case of the Kumbungu district when it was detected that, although Tolon, the selected 
district, had existed for a while, on the division of the district the Kumbungu district had retained most of the original staff and, 
thus, the participants from Tolon were not in possession of much information.  
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foster equalisation between the more endowed districts and the less endowed. There 
were also a range of sociocultural and other factors identified which all contributed 
to the levels of inequity in the health utilisation.  
A major question arising from the theoretical discussion and the analysis of the 
interviews and which remains unanswered is as follows: “At which level should 
equalisation be tackled ‒ at the local level or at the national level and, specifically, in 
the case of a developing country where there continues to be obvious gaps in the 
social and other infrastructure.”  To many of the respondents this was a very obvious 
question and they were in no doubt that the redistribution function should be 
performed at the national level with the aid of transfers from the central government 
to the districts.  Another major issue was that many of the districts officers 
interviewed strongly believed that, with the aid of transfers and economic 
empowerment, decentralisation was the solution to the inequities that exist in health 
utilisation. With the help of the interviews which were conducted on the national 
level and the discussions in previous chapters these questions and issues will be 
addressed in the final chapter. This chapter will all contain a summary of and 
conclusion to all the preceding chapters.  
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Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a summary of and the conclusion to the thesis. The chapter is 
organised in the following way. The chapter begins with a conclusion to and 
synthesis of the quantitative and qualitative elements of the study, focusing on the 
key findings. The chapter then provides a synthesis of the results and outcomes of 
the study, focusing on elements such as the contribution of the study to policymaking 
and development, to theory building on the issue of decentralisation and inequity in 
general with a specific focus on the health sector and also to the empirical academic 
discourse in developing countries specifically and in the global academic community 
as a whole.  The chapter also outlines the gaps that continue to exist in the 
exploration of the question on decentralisation and equities, indicating the limits of 
the study and outlining areas for the future consideration of researchers. These are 
then summed up in the concluding remarks to the study.   
 
8.2 Conclusions and Synthesis of Outcomes 
The study used a mixed methods design to realise the research goal of examining the 
effect of decentralisation on health inequity by addressing two research objectives 
which were, in turn, operationalised through a number of research questions.  
The first research objective was achieved using quantitative techniques to examine 
the effect of decentralisation on equity in the utilisation of maternal health services in 
Ghana. In achieving this objective the study provided a description of maternal 
health utilisation in Ghana and conducted a detailed analysis of the inequities that 
have persisted in health, in general, and maternal health care, specifically, in the two 
years assessed (2003 and 2008).  
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The second objective of the study focused on understanding the factors that have 
influenced health inequities in Ghana’s decentralised system. In order to do this the 
study examined the conceptualisation of inequities in the Ghanaian context, explored 
the level/extent of decentralisation in the Ghanaian health system, examined the 
motivations, from the perspective of the policy maker, for health sector 
decentralisation and outlined the major threats that to health equity in Ghana’s 
decentralised system, also from the perspective of the policy maker.   
The outcomes of this qualitative analysis revealed that, as discussed, the quantitative 
results were complemented by the more nuanced qualitative assessment. However, 
the qualitative analysis went further than the than the quantitative investigation by 
providing reasons why these situations persisted in the unique context of Ghana from 
the viewpoint of the representatives from selected districts. Studies that have 
previously assessed the impact of decentralisation on inequities and inequalities in 
health, including the studies of Zhong (2010); Costa-i-Font (2005) and Jiménez-
Rubio et al. (2008), have focused primarily on a quantitative examination of these 
inequities. Zhong (2010), in particular, argues for the need to explore beyond the 
quantitative analysis and understand the deeper issues relating to the basis of 
decentralisation as well as the channels through which decentralisation has impacted 
on inequities. This viewpoint of Zhong (2010) together with the fact that a majority 
of these studies focused on developed country contexts affirmed the choice of a 
mixed methods strategy for the thesis. This strategy provided a broader 
understanding of the means by which decentralisation has affected inequities and 
also the reasons why inequities persist in Ghana’s decentralised system than would 
otherwise have been the case.  The paragraphs that follows provides a detailed 
breakdown of the conclusions reached by the study. 
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8.2.1 Assessment of the Level of Decentralisation of Ghana’s Health System  
a. The Intensity of Decentralisation  
The study examined the amendments to the decentralisation process in Ghana in an 
attempt to determine the changes in the degree/intensity of the decentralisation 
process since its inception. The analysis revealed that, since 1993 when the 
decentralisation law was passed a number of actions, amendments and reviews have 
taken place with the aim of improving the effectiveness of the decentralisation 
process. These have ultimately resulted in a higher degree of decentralisation. Some 
of these, for example, the establishment of the local government services, are the 
outcome of the policy implementation process and may be viewed as part of the 
operationalisation and implementation of the decentralisation law.  
However, a significant number of these amendments were born out of the need 
increase the level of decentralisation in the country. These amendments include the 
increase in the level of the District Assemblies Common Fund available to districts, 
the creation of a fund for Members of Parliament, the establishment of the District 
Development Facility and the increases in the total number of districts and rezoning 
of district boundaries. Regardless of the motivations for such amendments, their 
result has been that the decentralisation process has gradually intensified over the 
years.  The latest review of the decentralisation policy has seen the amalgamation of 
all the laws on decentralisation into one consolidated local government bill which is 
currently before parliament.   The new look Local Government Law will comprise 
the following;  
The District Assemblies Common Fund Act 1993, ACT 455 
The Local Government Act, 1993, ACT 462,  
The National Development Planning System Act, 1994, ACT 480,  
The Local Governments Services Act, 2003, ACT 656  
The Internal Audit Agency Act, 2003 ACT 658.  
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b. The level of the Health System Decentralisation  
It was essential to know the level of decentralisation in the health sector in order to 
address the objectives of the study, especially in the context of Ghana where the 
issue of health sector decentralisation continues to ignite passions. Addressing the 
question on the status of the decentralisation of the health sector elicited the 
following three themes from the respondents, namely, the view that the sector was 
not decentralised as a result of the structure, some form of decentralisation, although 
partial, exists n the sector and, finally, the view of a minority that believed strongly 
that the health sector had not been decentralised as a result of both its nature and its 
structure. However, irrespective of the stance taken by interviewees or policy 
makers, the one issue that emerged strongly was the fact that the way in which 
decentralisation was implemented in the health sector required reform. Such reform 
was especially urgent as regards the manner of cooperation between the health sector 
and the local government system, the level of local governance and popular 
participation in the decision-making process of the health sector. As regards this 
theme it is concluded that the health sector is, in fact, decentralised and that it has in 
place structures and systems that appear to work effectively. However, the health 
sector and the communities it serves would benefit significantly from improved 
cooperation with the devolved local government system and which may require some 
streamlining of laws and roles.  
 
 c. Motivations for Health Sector Decentralisation  
The interviews also sought to determine, from the perspective of policy makers, the 
motive for the health sector decentralisation. The interviewees identified ten motives 
which were analysed and categorised into the three sub-themes of political, 
economic and administrative.  It is informative to note that enhancing equity in the 
health system at all levels was considered to be a major objective of the 
decentralisation policy. The majority of the policy makers interviewed believed it is 
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only within a decentralised system that citizens, no matter where they live, could 
enjoy equitable levels of health care.  
 
8.2.2 An Examination of the Inequities in Health  
The study adopted a five-pronged approach to examining the inequities in health in 
Ghana’s decentralised system.  This approach included an examination of the 
patterns in maternal health utilisation, an exploration of inequities in terms of 
selected health resources at the district level, an examination of inequities in the 
utilisation of antenatal health utilisation, a decomposition of these inequities into 
intra and inter regional shares and, finally, a qualitative assessment from the 
perspective of policy makers of the effect of decentralisation on health inequities in 
Ghana.  The details of these investigations are presented in the sections below.  
a. A Qualitative Assessment of Health Inequities  
The qualitative analysis of the data from the interviews revealed that policy makers 
at all levels were emphatic that decentralisation had contributed significantly to 
reducing health inequities in general and maternal health inequities specifically in 
relation to this study. The interviewees identified six channels via which they 
believed decentralisation had worked to mitigate the inequities in the health system.  
These were; increased funding to subnational health structures, local content and 
context in design and implementation of health policies, innovative and home grown 
solution by districts for health challenges, the National health insurance scheme 
which was initiated at the district level, increased responsiveness in combating health 
issues and support and collaboration between the district health directorate and the 
district assemblies.    However, they were cautious and referred to the fact that other 
policies had also been implemented over the period since decentralisation was 
implemented and that the general improvement in the economic situation in the 
country had provided a much-needed boost to and basis for the reduction in 
inequities.  The general viewpoint remained that, without the effort of the 
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decentralised local government, the decentralised health department and the 
collaboration between the two structures outcomes would have been significantly 
worse than they, in fact, were.  
b. Patterns of/in Maternal Health Utilisation  
Although important for the research objectives of the study, the patterns in the use of 
maternal health care services were was not the main focus of the study.  Chapter 6 
examined the patterns in the use of two maternal health care variables, namely, 
antenatal care use and delivery services by location and wealth. The women living in 
rural areas were noted to have lower levels of utilisation of the two maternal health 
services examined as compared to their urban counterparts.  This was especially 
obvious in the case of the more specialised services such as doctors’ services and 
hospital delivery services.  The regional level analysis revealed an extremely mixed 
pattern in the three northern regions (Northern, Upper East and Upper West). These 
regions, which are noted for their high levels of poverty, showed the lowest 
utilisation levels of all the services explored. The analysis also revealed that the 
maternal health care services examined in Ghana varied significantly by location, 
wealth and regions, both in 2003 and in 2008. Although the 2008 level showed a 
substantial improvement on the 2003 levels, these patterns illustrated the working of 
the inverse care law in the utilisation of maternal health services in Ghana. 
c. District Health Inequities in Ghana  
At the district level it was determined that wide inequities existed in the distribution 
of doctors, nurses and health facilities. Using the concentration indices, at the district 
level, nurses showed the widest inequities with an index value of 0.32. This was 
followed by inequities as regards doctors at 0.29. The positive value of the inequities 
also revealed that these resources exhibited pro-rich inequities.  
 
The concentration index for health facilities also recorded positive values, indicating 
the presence of pro rich inequities in the distribution of health facilities. This was 
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further aggravated by the fact that these facilities range between a health post and a 
health centre to a teaching hospital. At the time of the study there were only 3 
tertiary hospitals, 10 regional hospitals and 124 district hospitals throughout the 
country (Abdullah et al. 2011). It was obvious that the presence of a health facility 
did not necessarily indicate that availability of all the health services required. 
 
The interviews with the health policy makers and district official corroborated these 
findings. The policy makers argued that many of the health facilities in the rural and 
deprived districts were without the much needed health personnel and equipment. 
The interviews also pointed to the fact that rural areas had been prioritised for CHPS 
facilities and that, although this was helping to provide some level of the much 
needed services to the rural population, a consequence of prioritising rural areas for 
CHPS meant that a majority of health facilities available in rural areas were not 
either hospital or clinics. Although useful, especially in cases of emergency 
interventions, the limited scope in terms of the treatment and facilities available at 
these CHPS facilities may contribute to driving the district health inequities.   
 
d. Regional Inequities in Antenatal Care Utilisation (Measurement and 
Decomposition) 
The inequality curves analysis of the use of antenatal health care services indicated 
pro-rich inequities in the use of these services as depicted by the concentration curve 
lying wholly below the line of equality.  However, this situation is shown to have 
improved in 2008 from 2003.  This finding was corroborated by the concentration 
index analysis which provided the actual level of inequities as measured by the 
concentration indexes for 2003 and 2008. This, in turn, revealed that the general 
level of inequities in antenatal care use had dropped from their 2003 level of 0.15 to 
the 2008 level of 0.10.   
The results from the decomposition revealed that a decline in inequities in both 
between group inequities and within group inequities.  The analysis showed that, for 
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both time periods, within group inequities were significantly higher than the within 
group component. The Theil’s index confirmed this result by showing an overall 
decline in inequities from 0.17 in 2003 to 0.13 in 2008. Thus, once again as with the 
concentration index, the Theil’s index revealed a drop in both the within group 
component and the between group component. The Theil’s index also further 
confirmed the fact that inequities in antenatal care utilisation were driven primarily 
by within group inequities with within group levels of 0.16 and 0.14 for 2003 and 
2008 respectively and the corresponding between group components of 0.01 and 
0.01 respectively.  
8.2.3 Persisting Threats to Equity in Ghana’s Decentralised Health System  
The policy makers interviewed also highlighted that there continue to be threats to 
equity in Ghana’s decentralised system.  These threats were classified as political, 
economic,  and ecological factors. Political factors identified include; the very 
character of the district assemblies, unequal power relations between the ministry of 
health and the local government ministry and incomplete nature of the 
decentralisation and the Ad Hoc nature of cooperation between the Health system 
and the district assemblies. Economic factors covered; levels of poverty in the 
various districts, level and types of economic activities in the districts, challenges 
with the District Assemblies Common Fund equalising between the districts and 
districts’ capacity to utilise funds and manage the health sector and monitor the 
health sector.  Ecological factors identified were noted as; differences in natural 
resource endowment between districts and proximity to the central government. 
They respondents argued that the progress of the decentralisation process in reducing 
inequities has been significantly slowed down by the existence and persistence of 
these threats.  Thus, if decentralisation is to fully achieve one of its major objectives, 
namely, to reduce inequities, it is essential that strategies adopted to eliminate these 
threats.  
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8.3  Contribution of the Study 
8.3.1 Empirical Contribution 
The primary contribution of this study to the existing body of academic literature is 
the fact the study has provided a comprehensive empirical assessment of the effect of 
decentralisation on inequities in health, focusing specifically on maternal health care 
utilisation.  This is especially significant in view of the fact that the effect of 
decentralisation on health inequities remains unclear in the existing literature and 
depends significantly on the country specific situation. In achieving this 
comprehensive empirical assessment, the study has also provided a detailed analysis 
of regional and district level inequities in maternal health utilisation and selected 
health resource variables in the Ghanaian context. I am not aware of other empirical 
studies in the context of developing countries which have provided such a depth of 
information on this topic.  
8.3.2  Methodological Contribution 
a. Mixed Methods Approach to the Analysis of Health Utilisation in a Developing 
Context  
In recent times there has been an increased interest in the application of a mixed 
methods approach to research problems.  This approach provides a means of 
overcoming a number of challenges in the area of data availability, assessing specific 
research questions and increasing the level of detail. On the specific issue of 
decentralisation in the Ghanaian context the lack of comprehensive district level 
datasets and design challenges has meant that researchers have often stayed away 
from applying quantitative methods to questions on decentralisation in Ghana. In the 
event of researchers applying such methods they have done so to very specific cases 
and topics that rely mostly on institutional data.  In combining methods at various 
stages this study has provided a comprehensive analysis of decentralisation, 
presenting not only a national view but also enough detail to enable the 
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understanding the uniqueness of the situation in the Ghanaian context. Thus, the 
study provides guidance on the use of a mixed-methods approach to addressing 
similar gaps in data in the context of other developing countries with similar 
problems or to other research questions.  
 
b. Applying the Inequality Index Decomposition to a Maternal Health Utilisation 
Variable 
There are techniques available for measuring and decomposing inequalities and these 
have often been applied within the health context. However, researchers have not 
been bold in the application of such techniques to the developing country, primarily 
as a result of the seemingly inadequacy of data, including the lack of specific 
variables at certain levels (O’Donnell & Wagstaff 2008). These gaps in data have 
created a fear in researchers that their study results may not be comprehensive 
enough. However, although new datasets may be created to investigate such 
situations in the future, the analysis of the past patterns and circumstances is possible 
only in the context of the creation of new methods and the application of new 
anthropometric measures which seek either to eliminate or minimise the limitations 
arising from data unavailability. In the case of Ghana and measuring the effect of 
decentralisation on horizontal inequities in maternal health utilisation this study 
sought to achieve this by applying inequality indices.  This was achieved by using 
PCA techniques to determine which variables (out of the available bouquet of health 
and socioeconomic variables) best explained maternal health utilisation in the 
absence of some seemingly ideal variables such as a self-rated health variable.  
8.3.3  Theoretical Contribution 
a. Optimal Redistribution under Decentralisation  
The absence of a theoretical consensus on the effect of decentralisation on health 
inequities means that an effective assessment of the effect of decentralisation on 
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equity remains primarily an empirical issue. The theory is ambiguous about the level 
of government which should perform the redistribution function and the theoretical 
link between decentralisation and disparities and, thus, the way in which it affects 
equity at the regional level is not conclusive. Oates (1972); Pauly (1973) and Tresch 
(2002) concur that, in the absence of a strong redistribution policy, decentralisation 
has the potential to exacerbate inequalities across jurisdictions with various tax bases 
(Tresch 2002). Accordingly, in order minimise inequalities under decentralisation it 
is essential that optimal redistribution is handled by the central authorities.  
The case of Ghana, as illustrated by the relatively low levels of inter regional 
inequities, the significantly higher levels of within region inequities and a historical 
pattern of inequality between the regions, suggests that the focus on redistribution 
could not be at one level only. In the context of a developing country, in which the 
mobility of individuals is constrained by a number of factors, this study supports the 
argument for redistribution at both the national and local levels. However, there is 
need for empirical evidence to help address these issues in country specific 
situations. The horizontal inequalities framework provides an explanation of the 
reason why inter-regional inequalities, even if considered as extremely low, continue 
to serve as a threat to within group inequalities.  
b. Decentralisation and Inequalities  
No single theoretical argument provides a comprehensive reason for the persistence 
of inequalities in the context of decentralisation. Evidence from the analysis and 
discussions suggests that the persistent inequalities under decentralisation transcend 
the boundaries of subject matter and existing theories. Factors identified by this 
thesis includes; political, ecological, economic, and socio-cultural factors.  This 
finding is of particular value if research outcomes are to provide policy 
recommendations that will outline applicable and practical options to the solution of 
the problem of inequalities. By using an approach that included the application of a 
multiplicity of theoretical explanations and also a practical and policy relevant 
 
 
 
 
  
 
264 
political economy approach this study has extended the conventional techniques used 
to address similar research questions. 
 
8.4 Implication for Policy Making 
8.4.1 A Way Forward for Health and National Decentralisation 
a. State of Health Sector Decentralisation  
The debate on health sector decentralisation has been continuing in national circles. 
However, despite the fact the arguments for and against the decentralisation of the 
health sector remain heated strong any action designed to bring about has so far been 
limited. It is, however, clear that the status quo cannot continue for long.  The issue 
of the status of health sector decentralisation and its positioning within the devolved 
district assembly structure cannot continue to be avoided.  Recent discussions in the 
media (Mordy 2014; Okoampa-Ahoofe 2014) suggests that the Minister of Health 
has reopened the discussion about  the decentralisation of the health sector by 
asserting that the salaries of medical doctors should be paid by the District 
Assemblies.  
The arguments against a fully devolved structure for the health sector by respondents 
such as the district capacity to manage the sector, lines of accountability for district 
assembly heads, abuse of funds, district financial strength, the current evidence of 
the lack of support for the health directorate and the fear that health sector may not 
be prioritised,87 all remain relevant. On the other hand, the arguments in favour of a 
fully devolved health sectors such as the concerns about dual reporting lines, 
inability to adequately monitor the health sector at district level, arbitrary nature of 
the relationship between the sector and the assembly, the lack of accountability to the 
assemblies and the restrictions on districts as regards the which priority areas on 
which they choose to focus on by some respondent are also pressing. Nevertheless, it 
                                                
87Author’s Fieldwork 2012 
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is clear that action must be taken and also that, in the absence of the action, interim 
measures must be put in place to streamline cooperation and coordination and 
eliminate all arbitrariness from the relationship between the health sector and the 
district assembly structure. To quote a participant;  
National development should not depend on how people feel about each 
other; it is our job, as officers, to work together to develop the country and 
provide the citizens with social services but, in the current situation, this is 
not always clear88 
 
b. Develop a National Metric for Assessing the Economic Viability of Districts 
The decentralisation law makes provision for a review of the size and number of 
districts based on population growth and district size (see Chapter 5).  However, a 
further extremely important requirement, which appears to be often overlooked in 
the law, is the way in which this is defined and measured. In addition, it is essential 
that the districts created are economically viable. However, it remains unclear as to 
which exact metric is/was used to ensure the economic viability of existing districts 
and new districts. This, in turn, has resulted in a situation in which several districts 
are economically unviable and depend primarily on transfers from the central 
government. In the interviews conducted, the Kumbungu District Officers indicated 
that their district’s major source of revenue was from one market, which operated as 
a large market on one day a week. A participant from the Ministry of Finance also 
pointed out that, when he had initially been posted to a rural district, the district’s 
only source of revenue had been a huge market that had operated once a week only. 
This, in turn, meant that the district was almost solely depended on transfers from the 
central government and, if these funds were delayed, projects and programmes 
                                                
88Author’s fieldwork, 2012 
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would remain unattended with the staff of the district earning salaries but with little 
or no work to do. 
The analysis of the IGRs of districts presented in Chapter 5 revealed the wide gaps in 
the revenue generation abilities of district assemblies. The officers from the Ministry 
of Finance and other national level officers argued that, although they encouraged 
districts to diversify their revenue sources, the reality was, in many of the poor 
deprived districts, the lack of resource endowment and the high levels of poverty 
among the communities meant that there are not such sources available to be 
diversified. While the size of the district and the population size remains crucial as 
regards access to and delivery of services, an economically unviable district is not 
able even to attempt to provide such services. There is, therefore, an urgent need to 
develop a national metric for the assessment of a district’s economic viability before 
the creation of new districts and, where possible, the number of existing districts 
should be scaled down. The alternative is to freeze the creation of new districts or 
provide more stringent conditions for the creation of districts and address with the 
changing circumstances of districts.  
 
c. Ensuring Accountability as Districts are Empowered  
Under Ghana’s 1992 constitution and the Local Government Act the district chief 
executive is appointed by the President of Ghana. This appointment is then either 
endorsed or rejected by the assembly members. Thus, the district chief is not elected 
by the voters of the district. However, the practice of appointment by the president 
has resulted in a lack of accountability on the part of the DCEs. In addition, the 
president, who appointed them, is also the only person who may dismiss them.  
Thus, the DCEs consider themselves accountable to the president and not to the 
elected assembly members. In other words, it is loyalty to the president and not job 
performance which keeps them in office and, hence, the lack of accountability to the 
local representatives and the lack of transparency in dealing with the assemblies.  
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The period of nomination of the assembly head is often characterised by agitation on 
the part of the youth, local people in general and other identifiable groups as they 
reject many of the DCEs. However, the appointment of many of the rejected 
nominees is confirmed through negotiations.  As regards promoting development and 
reducing inequities concerns have been raised about the effect of the lack of 
accountability on support to the social sectors and even the selection of 
developmental projects at the local levels. Many of policy makers at the assembly 
level, the national level and within the health structure, alluded to the fact that 
assemblies remain largely biased toward the provision of physical infrastructure that 
is tangible and, thus, serves the executives in their electioneering campaigns as the 
physical infrastructure is depicted on election campaign advertisements and shown to 
the electorate as evidence of development.  
In the context of a developing country in which there is lack of or limited availability 
of physical infrastructure, investment in physical infrastructure is not necessarily 
negative. However, in mitigating inequalities and inequities and sustainably reducing 
poverty, an excessive focus on physical infrastructure to the detriment of more 
programmatic developmental needs has the potential to create imbalanced 
development.  The interviewees from the health directorate cited a number of 
situations in which health facilities had been constructed but without the staff and 
equipment required to manage and run the facilities effectively. One respondent gave 
the example of a District Chief Executive who had promised to construct a teaching 
hospital for a district that, at that time, did not even have adequate staff to manage 
the existing facilities. With the move toward financially empowering the District 
Assemblies, there should also be existing channels for accountability to the local 
population and this will happen only when these district heads are elected directly by 
the population. Situations such as these will be minimised if DCEs are directly 
accountable to their citizens while popular expectations will also be trimmed down 
to more realistic levels.  
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8.4.2 A National Definition for Equity In Health towards the Elimination Of 
Inequities in a Decentralised System 
The analysis revealed that low levels of health utilisation and inequities in health 
utilisation remain prevalent in regions with documented high levels of historical 
socio-economic deprivation. Based on literature examined in the study ( Rawls 1999; 
Sen 2002; Stewart 2008) the solution to the inequities in health in Ghana may lie 
predominantly in reducing the inequities in other dimensions such as the economic, 
social and political. However, despite the fact that attempts are being made to correct 
this prevailing inequities in other dimensions, the fear exists that not paying attention 
to other regions and areas may lead to those regions underperforming.  There are also 
concerns over fairness in the distribution of nationally resources with arguments that 
all groups and all Ghanaians to enjoy equal amounts of the nation’s resources.  
In the context of this study these arguments persist as a result of the lack of a 
national consensus on the definition of inequities. In order to ensure an 
understanding as to what constitutes inequities and why and how these inequities 
will be corrected there needs to be a national direction on the way in which inequities 
are defined. In applying the Rawlsian notion of justice (Rawls 1999; Rawls 1971) 
and Sen’s approach (Sen 2009) to justice as outlined in Chapter three of this thesis, it 
is suggested that, in the case of health care utilisation, all individuals and groups in 
the country should be accorded equal opportunities as regards their utilisation of 
healthcare according to their needs, irrespective of their socio-economic status. 
Anything contrary to this ideal translates into a state of injustice and, thus, if 
historical arrangements and prevailing socio-economic conditions deem this 
impossible all attempts to rectify the situation must continue.  
8.4.3 A Call for A National Data Set for District Level Analysis 
At this stage the only nationally representative sample survey at the district level 
remains the CWIQ, which is extremely dated as the most recent version was 
conducted in 2003. A possible reason for this is the continued expansion in district 
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numbers. Although surveys have been conducted in selected districts, allowing for 
analysis in these particular districts, it remains unclear how decentralisation aims to 
achieve its goals without a comprehensive national dataset on districts. Such a 
dataset would allow for the tracking of the socioeconomic performance of districts 
and even the prevailing poverty situation in districts.   
If national development is targeted at the district level, there is a need to be able to 
record patterns of growth and poverty reduction at both the district and regional 
levels.  However, this is possible only with the creation of a district level dataset that 
will allow for the tracking of performance in respect of the national developmental 
goals.  The scope of such a project is so vast that only a national statistical service 
could address it adequately. It is, therefore, imperative that national sample surveys 
move away from regions as the basis for comparison and focus on the districts as it is 
only then that the data will provide the level of detail and information required to 
influence national development patterns and reduce poverty in a sustainable way.  
Evidence suggests that the patterns at the district level vary significantly from the 
patterns at the regional levels and that regions are not always a true reflection of all 
the districts within those regions.  
  
8.5 Research Gaps: Suggested Areas for Future Studies 
The study outlines two areas for future studies in order to elaborate on the 
relationship between decentralisation and health inequities. It is recommended that 
the first such study area should involve a cross-country comparative analysis which 
would demonstrate the impact of decentralisation reforms on health inequities at a 
national level. Such a study may potentially eliminate design issues, and would also 
provide an explanation on whether different forms of decentralisation (country 
specific designs) reforms would lead to different patterns of inequities in different 
countries. It is also important to conduct collaborative regional studies although this 
would require coordinating national surveys across countries.  
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The second area suggested for further studies involves a study on the impact of 
decentralisation at the local level in the developing countries, for example, Ghana. A 
study of this nature would require a much larger scope than this study was able to 
cover and also a more detailed analysis of inequities in Ghana. It is anticipated that 
such a study would provide baseline data on socioeconomic indicators and 
performances in all the districts in Ghana.  A study of this magnitude would require 
the creation of a nationally representative survey data set at the level of districts and 
allow for a reclassification of the spatial patterns of deprivation at a much lower 
level and in more detail than is currently being achieved at the regional levels. In 
addition, it would ensure that district level poverty could be accurately measured and 
tracked for all districts in the country.  
8.6 Final Commentary  
In 2013, Ghana, as part of the implementation of the 2010 decentralisation policy 
review, introduced a composite budgeting system in terms of which health sector 
budgets and all other sector budgets would be submitted as part of the District 
Assemblies’ budgets and not the sectors’ budgets (Ministries’ budget). Thus, the 
funds for the district health directorate would, ultimately, lie with the District 
Assemblies. Many believe this is what is needed to ensure that the health directorates 
view themselves as part of the District Assembly structures.  However, others 
believe that this will not improve the prevailing situation in the least as, in such a 
case, the district would be receiving the funds only but control and use of such funds 
would remain in the hands to the Ghana Health Service through the district health 
directorates.  By the time this study had been completed a number of key reforms in 
decentralisation had been initiated and it is hoped that they will lead the way in 
reducing the health inequities that have been demonstrated in this thesis.  
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Ethics Statement  
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APPENDIX C 
Fieldwork Plan  
1. Mobilisation and review of reports (2 months) 
a. Annual Progress Reports (APRs) - Ministry of local government, 
ministry of health, selected districts (NDPC), Ghana Health Service  
b. District assemblies common fund disbursement and use (Ministry of 
local government) 
c. The Ghana Health Service and Teaching Hospital Act 1996 
2. Gathering mobilisation of secondary data – Ghana statistical Service (1.5 
month) 
a. Gathering of household surveys data (GLSS, GDHS), 
b. Refining, cleaning, merging data set and creating new variables  
3. Gathering of Primary data - Conducting of interviews and meetings with 
institutions/stakeholders (2.5 months) 
a. Pretesting of interview guide  
b. Identification of interviewees  
c. Correction and editing of interview guide  
d. Conduct fieldwork  
e. Transcribe interviews  
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APPENDIX D 
Interview Schedule 
DECENTRALISATION AND INEQUITY DISTRICT ASSEMBLIES 
District Name: 
Officer Interviewed: 
Date of interview  
Location of interview  
Section One : General Question on Decentralisation and inequity  
1. Do you have any comments on the decentralised programme? 
2. What are your views on health sector decentralised? 
3. Is the health sector decentralised?  
4. What do you know as the motives for decentralisation in general and with 
specific focus on the health sector? 
5. If respondent mentions equity above skip if not: Was equity a major goal of 
decentralisation  
6. How is equity understood in health sector  
7. Do you think decentralisation has affected equity in the health sector?  
8. What are the ways in which decentralisation affected equity in the sector 
(Assessment of impact and outline possible channels) 
9. Do you see any challenges decentralisation posses to equity in the health 
sector  
Section Two: Planning and Service Delivery  
1. Has your district set any health priorities?  
2. Any district level initiated health project/programmes? 
3. Is your district performing/supporting any specific health delivery functions? 
4. With specific focus on maternal health what roles are districts/ your district 
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preforming i. prenatal care/ postnatal/ delivery? 
5.  How are these services funded? 
 
Section Three - Health Workforce/human resource  
1. Has your assembly been involved in training of health workers? 
2. Has your assembly been involved in the recruitment of health workers? 
3. Has your district provided any motivation packages to health sector workers? 
 
Section Four - Health Information and communication technologies 
1. Does the assembly provide any support in the area of ICT (internet, 
computers, data processing) to the health directorate? 
2. Has the assembly assisted in the acquisition of any new technologies (health 
equipment’s also counts) for use in health? 
3. Does the assembly conduct any analysis of data health data for internal 
consumption or dissemination? 
 
Section Five - Financing and National Health Insurance Questions  
1. What are the sources of funding available to your district? 
2. Are these funds adequate for districts needs?  
3. What are your impressions of the following funding mechanism? 
i. DACF 
ii. DDF 
iii. IGR 
4. Has the decentralisation process resulted in varying level of financing for health 
between districts?  
5. Are there major differences in spending patterns between districts, especially 
within the health sectors?  
6. Does your district spend significant amounts of DACF on health and health related 
activities activities? 
7. Does your district spend significant amounts of IGF on health and health related 
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activities? 
8. Does districts/your district make extra effort to secure additional funding for 
health sector financing?  
9. Does your district support citizens to join in NHIS? 
 
Section Six cooperation between devolved districts and deconcentrated health 
sector  
1. Do you work with the assembly (or health directorate)  in your district? 
2. What kind of dialogue do you have with the district assembly ( or health 
directorate) within your district? 
3. Does the district monitor level of health services provided by the facilities 
within the district? 
 
Section Seven: Prognosis Questions  
1. Have there been numerous questions from stakeholders asking for further 
clarification of the decentralisation policy with respect to health? 
2. What about amendments? Have stakeholders been requesting further 
amendments to the health sector decentralisation policy? 
3. Do you feel it would be feasible or desirable to address or clarify the 
decentralisation policy with regards to health at this time? 
4. What do you think is the way forward for health sector decentralisation in 
Ghana? 
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APPENDIX E 
Regional Tables: Maternal Health Utilisation  
Table Ap1: Region and use of doctor’s services for prenatal  
Regions 2003 2008 
 Doctor  Other  None Doctor  Other  None 
Western 6.16 9.11   5.21 5.33   9.39   12.20 
Central 7.58 6.17   3.79   3.55   8.07 7.32 
Greater Accra  26.54 8.59    3.32  17.16   9.91 6.10 
Volta  6.64     7.21   9.00 4.14 8.13   18.29 
Eastern 8.53       8.24    4.74    16.57 8.36      7.32  
Ashanti 28.91   14.63   7.58 30.77   14.81 7.32 
Brong Ahafo 6.64    13.34     2.84 2.96   11.12   7.32 
Northern 3.79     14.85 35.55 6.51   12.22 18.29 
Upper West 3.79      10.06    10.43 2.96  8.36   8.54 
Upper East 1.42       7.81 17.54 10.06 9.63   7.32 
Total   100.00 100.00 100.00   100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table Ap2: Place of delivery by region  
Region/ 
Delivery Place 
2003 2008 
Home  Health 
Facility 
Other  Home  Health 
Facility 
Other  
Western 145 91 1 90 97 2 
Central 103 64 1 69 88 1 
Greater Accra  50 
 
213 
 
0 
 
31 
 
177 
 
2 
 
Volta  105 
 
95  
 
  1 
 
80 
 
101 
 
0 
 
Eastern 121   103 2 68 116 3 
Ashanti 161 259 1 85 233 0 
Brong Ahafo 154 181 1 77 130 0 
Northern 363 62 1 213 92 1 
Upper West 175 88 1 
 
98 
 
80 
 
2 
 
Upper East 176 
 
46 
 
0 
 
108 
 
101 
 
1 
 
Total 1,555 1,202     9   919 1215 12 
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APPENDIX F 
Histograms Illustrating Over Dispersion In Antenatal Care  
b. Checking for over dispersion 
 
Figure Ap1: Histogram for Antenatal Care variable 2003  
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Figure Ap2: Histogram for antenatal care variable 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
314 
 
APPENDIX G  
Correlation Matrix Of Variables  
Table  Ap3: Correlations between variables and others 2003  
 
 
Table Ap4: correlations between variables and others 2008  
 
 
 
 
 
    Location     0.3547   0.0087   0.6852  -0.1691   0.1206  -0.0298  -0.0356  -0.1237   1.0000
     working    -0.0353   0.0018  -0.1314   0.2111  -0.0427   0.2441   0.1045   1.0000
marital_st~s     0.0165  -0.0077  -0.0204   0.1381   0.0483   0.1737   1.0000
         age     0.0172   0.0241  -0.0221   0.7879   0.0297   1.0000
         BMI     0.0633   0.0111   0.1313   0.0010   1.0000
 total_child    -0.1294   0.0042  -0.2144   1.0000
wealth_ind~e     0.4166   0.0146   1.0000
    religion     0.0274   1.0000
    prenatal     1.0000
                                                                                               
               prenatal religion wealth~e total_~d      BMI      age marita~s  working Location
    Location     0.2908  -0.1196   0.6546  -0.1817   0.1445   0.0093  -0.0145  -0.0832   1.0000
     working    -0.0315  -0.0136  -0.0633   0.1573   0.0075   0.1609   0.0821   1.0000
marital_st~s     0.0152  -0.0206   0.0176   0.1681   0.0368   0.2337   1.0000
         age     0.0490   0.0873  -0.0293   0.7435   0.0743   1.0000
         BMI     0.1213  -0.0323   0.1821  -0.0031   1.0000
 total_child    -0.1358   0.1772  -0.2785   1.0000
wealth_ind~e     0.3666  -0.2841   1.0000
    religion    -0.1505   1.0000
    prenatal     1.0000
                                                                                               
               prenatal religion wealth~e total_~d      BMI      age marita~s  working Location
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APPENDIX H 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Output   
 
Table Ap5: PCA- 2008 PCA Output  
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
           Comp9        .199352            .             0.0222       1.0000
           Comp8        .289573     .0902212             0.0322       0.9778
           Comp7         .58751      .297937             0.0653       0.9457
           Comp6        .676258     .0887482             0.0751       0.8804
           Comp5        .917067      .240809             0.1019       0.8053
           Comp4        .940951     .0238835             0.1046       0.7034
           Comp3         .99483     .0538793             0.1105       0.5988
           Comp2        1.70821      .713378             0.1898       0.4883
           Comp1        2.68625      .978043             0.2985       0.2985
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    1.0000
                                                  Trace            =         9
                                                  Number of comp.  =         9
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =      4909
                               
                                                                                                            
        Location    -0.3462    0.4234    0.1006    0.1286    0.4463    0.0186   -0.2950    0.6220   -0.0278 
    Attended_sch    -0.4263    0.1536   -0.0558   -0.1665   -0.1729    0.0477    0.8233    0.2182    0.0782 
        religion     0.2512   -0.1884    0.3022    0.5448    0.5456    0.1661    0.4244   -0.0886   -0.0008 
    worked_in1~s     0.3109    0.3504   -0.1157   -0.0809   -0.1179    0.8558   -0.0203    0.0244    0.1152 
    Wealth_quint    -0.4040    0.4468    0.0269    0.0109    0.2449   -0.0044   -0.0613   -0.7316    0.1930 
    Visited_he~y     0.0288    0.2679   -0.4980    0.7330   -0.3385   -0.1598    0.0168    0.0166   -0.0378 
             age     0.3829    0.4841    0.0405   -0.2115    0.0930   -0.2405    0.1874   -0.0804   -0.6816 
             BMI    -0.0290    0.2049    0.7948    0.2242   -0.5192   -0.0214   -0.0672    0.0119    0.0237 
     total_child     0.4766    0.3018    0.0080   -0.1414    0.0806   -0.3918    0.1042    0.1219    0.6899 
                                                                                                            
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4     Comp5     Comp6     Comp7     Comp8     Comp9 
                                                                                                            
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
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Table Ap6: 2003 PCA Output  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
                                                                              
           Comp9        .195633            .             0.0217       1.0000
           Comp8        .260169      .064536             0.0289       0.9783
           Comp7         .66091      .400741             0.0734       0.9494
           Comp6        .693248     .0323379             0.0770       0.8759
           Comp5        .920766      .227519             0.1023       0.7989
           Comp4        .991183     .0704164             0.1101       0.6966
           Comp3        1.01297     .0217834             0.1126       0.5865
           Comp2        1.63422      .621255             0.1816       0.4739
           Comp1         2.6309      .996683             0.2923       0.2923
                                                                              
       Component     Eigenvalue   Difference         Proportion   Cumulative
                                                                              
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =    1.0000
                                                  Trace            =         9
                                                  Number of comp.  =         9
Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =      5688
                               
                                                                                                            
        Location    -0.3889    0.4522   -0.0925   -0.0472   -0.1215   -0.2305   -0.3871    0.6391   -0.0856 
    Attended_sch    -0.3886    0.2155    0.0376   -0.0838   -0.1100    0.4627    0.7259    0.2001    0.0305 
        religion    -0.0137    0.0558    0.8682    0.3458   -0.3447   -0.0350   -0.0569   -0.0081    0.0088 
    worked_in1~s     0.3431    0.3059    0.0200   -0.0907   -0.0110    0.7683   -0.4210    0.0232    0.1095 
    Wealth_quint    -0.4189    0.4699   -0.0707   -0.0653   -0.0956   -0.0959   -0.1369   -0.7051    0.2454 
    Visited_he~y     0.0620    0.2734    0.4290   -0.3532    0.7665   -0.1312    0.0825    0.0259   -0.0202 
             age     0.4079    0.4776   -0.1000    0.0309   -0.1948   -0.1469    0.2195   -0.1502   -0.6814 
             BMI    -0.0497    0.1802   -0.1729    0.8559    0.4404    0.0788    0.0378    0.0189    0.0259 
     total_child     0.4814    0.3104   -0.0839    0.0196   -0.1603   -0.2952    0.2599    0.1734    0.6738 
                                                                                                            
        Variable      Comp1     Comp2     Comp3     Comp4     Comp5     Comp6     Comp7     Comp8     Comp9 
                                                                                                            
Principal components (eigenvectors) 
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Table Ap7: Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 
Variable  KMO 2003 KMO 2008 
Total_child 0.6216 0.6299 
 BMI  0.7182 0.7484 
Age 0.5660 0.5674 
Visited health Facility  0.7193 0.6598 
Wealth_quintile 0.5974 0.6170 
Worked_in_12months  0.8084 0.7983 
religion 0.5127 0.7635 
Attended_sch 0.8010 0.7960 
Location   0.6257 0.6202 
Overall 0.6376 0.6505 
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APPENDIX I 
Negative Binomial Regression Results And Diagnostics Tests 
 
Table Ap8: 2008 regression results  
 
 
 
. fitstat
                                                                                         
                  alpha     .0690364   .0131176                      .0475709    .1001877
                                                                                         
               /lnalpha    -2.673121   .1900095                     -3.045533    -2.30071
                                                                                         
                  _cons     2.919149   .2226794    14.04   0.000     2.513765    3.389908
               Location     1.100645   .0359713     2.93   0.003     1.032354    1.173455
           Attended_sch     1.060053    .031272     1.98   0.048       1.0005    1.123152
               religion     .9543358   .0163613    -2.73   0.006      .922801    .9869483
      worked_in12months      .960598   .0410487    -0.94   0.347     .8834211    1.044517
           Wealth_quint     1.087983   .0125456     7.31   0.000      1.06367    1.112852
Visited_health_facility     1.120684   .0303046     4.21   0.000     1.062835    1.181682
                    age     1.016648   .0029121     5.76   0.000     1.010957    1.022372
                    BMI     1.000026   .0000112     2.38   0.018     1.000005    1.000048
            total_child     .9541176   .0091241    -4.91   0.000     .9364011    .9721692
                                                                                         
               prenatal          IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                        Robust
                                                                                         
Log pseudolikelihood = -4.986e+09                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Dispersion           = mean                       Wald chi2(9)    =     436.36
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =       2084
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. 
BIC:                       9.972e+09     BIC':                     -4.439e+08
AIC:                     4785020.026     AIC*n:                     9.972e+09
Maximum Likelihood R2:         1.000     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            1.000
McFadden's R2:                 0.043     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.043
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(2073):                   9.972e+09     LR(9):                     4.439e+08
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -5.208e+09     Log-Lik Full Model:       -4.986e+09
Measures of Fit for nbreg of prenatal
                           Cond
  Mean VIF      1.65
----------------------------------------------------
  Location      1.81    1.35    0.5516      0.4484
Attended_sch      1.42    1.19    0.7028      0.2972
  religion      1.15    1.07    0.8725      0.1275
worked_in12months      1.04    1.02    0.9626      0.0374
Wealth_quint      2.26    1.50    0.4415      0.5585
Visited_health_facility      1.02    1.01    0.9768      0.0232
       age      2.44    1.56    0.4103      0.5897
       BMI      1.04    1.02    0.9631      0.0369
total_child      2.70    1.64    0.3701      0.6299
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        23.6234 
---------------------------------
    10     0.0137         23.6234
    9     0.0350         14.8023
    8     0.0873          9.3717
    7     0.1163          8.1173
    6     0.1655          6.8055
    5     0.2251          5.8354
    4     0.3512          4.6721
    3     0.4486          4.1338
    2     0.8922          2.9312
    1     7.6652          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
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Table AP 9: 2003 Regression Results  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                         
                  alpha     .1106566   .0143974                       .085749    .1427992
                                                                                         
               /lnalpha    -2.201323   .1301084                     -2.456331   -1.946316
                                                                                         
                  _cons     2.122959   .1754284     9.11   0.000     1.805525    2.496202
               Location     1.202731   .0384978     5.77   0.000     1.129595    1.280602
           Attended_sch     1.179104   .0296471     6.55   0.000     1.122405    1.238667
               religion     1.014724   .0484276     0.31   0.759     .9241112    1.114221
      worked_in12months     1.072001    .038957     1.91   0.056     .9983029    1.151141
           Wealth_quint      1.09571   .0133342     7.51   0.000     1.069884    1.122158
Visited_health_facility     1.118338   .0273982     4.57   0.000     1.065907    1.173348
                    age     1.017499   .0026947     6.55   0.000     1.012231    1.022794
                    BMI     1.000006   9.09e-06     0.68   0.499     .9999883    1.000024
            total_child     .9509213   .0081808    -5.85   0.000     .9350217    .9670912
                                                                                         
               prenatal          IRR   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                        Robust
                                                                                         
Log pseudolikelihood = -6.237e+09                 Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
Dispersion           = mean                       Wald chi2(9)    =     664.93
Negative binomial regression                      Number of obs   =       2661
BIC:                       1.247e+10     BIC':                     -6.336e+08
AIC:                     4687427.952     AIC*n:                     1.247e+10
Maximum Likelihood R2:         1.000     Cragg & Uhler's R2:            1.000
McFadden's R2:                 0.048     McFadden's Adj R2:             0.048
                                         Prob > LR:                     0.000
D(2650):                   1.247e+10     LR(9):                     6.336e+08
Log-Lik Intercept Only:   -6.553e+09     Log-Lik Full Model:       -6.237e+09
Measures of Fit for nbreg of prenatal
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  Mean VIF      1.71
----------------------------------------------------
  Location      1.99    1.41    0.5024      0.4976
Attended_sch      1.29    1.14    0.7757      0.2243
  religion      1.00    1.00    0.9960      0.0040
worked_in12months      1.07    1.03    0.9342      0.0658
Wealth_quint      2.28    1.51    0.4381      0.5619
Visited_health_facility      1.02    1.01    0.9830      0.0170
       age      2.82    1.68    0.3550      0.6450
       BMI      1.02    1.01    0.9809      0.0191
total_child      2.90    1.70    0.3446      0.6554
----------------------------------------------------
  Variable      VIF     VIF    Tolerance    Squared
                        SQRT                   R-
  Collinearity Diagnostics
 Eigenvalues & Cond Index computed from scaled raw sscp (w/ intercept)
 Condition Number        24.3717 
---------------------------------
    10     0.0126         24.3717
    9     0.0360         14.4047
    8     0.0927          8.9714
    7     0.1086          8.2896
    6     0.1832          6.3815
    5     0.2841          5.1249
    4     0.4326          4.1527
    3     0.4631          4.0138
    2     0.9262          2.8381
    1     7.4609          1.0000
---------------------------------
        Eigenval          Index
                           Cond
 
 
 
 
  
 
322 
APPENDIX J 
Memo 
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APPENDIX K 
Utilisation Of DDF In Study Districts 
Tamale 
FOAT 
YEAR Sector  Budget 
 2008 Education  591230 
2008  Health  114745 
2008  Total sanitation  69808 
2008 Energy 32700 
   Subtotal 2008 808483 
2010 Economic  172941 
2010 Education  4064257 
2010 Health  90027 
2010 Water and sanitation  850590 
2010 Energy  80579 
2010 Subtotal 2010 5258394 
GA SOUTH 
2009 Education  611138 
2009 Health  260767 
2009 Subtotal 2009 871905 
2010 Economic  72000 
2010 Education  92151 
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2010 Health  59050 
2010 Water and sanitation  27950 
2010 Roads 182867 
 Subtotal 2010 434018 
ACCRA METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY 
2009 Economic  500000 
2009 Education  492282 
2009 Health  32000 
2009 Energy 258000 
 Subtotal  1282282 
KUMBUNGU 
2010 Economic  52800 
2010 Education  356800 
2010 Health  83625 
 Total  493225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
